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IN THE MATTER OF DIANA GRAVLIN v HEINZ RUPPERT Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: IN THE MATTER OF DIANA GRAVLIN, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>I02_0058, Support, Agreement, Obligations, Child, Family Court, Respondent, Petitioner, Parties, Separation Agreement, Cssa, Expenses, Support Provisions, Visitation, Appellate Division, Clothing, Pay, Showing, Unanticipated Change, Father, Daughter, Opinion, Ny2d, Custody, Standards, Matter, Accordance, Justify, Concomitant, Brescia, Reverse , ContentID: 120254608

Case Documents
1 1980-01 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 131612
5 pages
TXT
Total Documents: 1 document , 5 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
AGREEMENT
OBLIGATIONS
CHILD
FAMILY COURT
RESPONDENT
PETITIONER
PARTIES
SEPARATION AGREEMENT
CSSA
EXPENSES
SUPPORT PROVISIONS
VISITATION
APPELLATE DIVISION
CLOTHING
PAY
SHOWING
UNANTICIPATED CHANGE
FATHER
DAUGHTER
OPINION
NY2D
CUSTODY
STANDARDS
MATTER
ACCORDANCE
JUSTIFY
CONCOMITANT
BRESCIA
REVERSE


   3 No. 53
   In the Matter of Diana Gravlin,
   Appellant,
   v.
   Heinz Ruppert,
   Respondent.
     _________________________________________________________________

   2002 NY Int. 58

   May 7, 2002

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Peter J. Scagnelli, for appellant.
   Paul M. Whitaker, for respondent.
     _________________________________________________________________

   CIPARICK, J.:

   This appeal calls upon us to determine whether modification of child
   support provisions of a separation agreement is warranted where there
   has been an unforeseen change in circumstances, resulting in a
   complete failure of the support obligations contemplated in the
   parties' agreement.

   Petitioner-mother and respondent-father were married in January 1980
   and had one child -- a daughter -- in 1984. By March 1994, the parties
   separated and entered into a separation agreement. As the agreement
   recited, the parties were aware of the provisions of the Child Support
   Standards Act (Family Court Act § 413 (CSSA)) and their respective
   rights and support obligations under it.(1) Nonetheless, they
   agreed to depart from CSSA guidelines, noting that petitioner was
   capable of providing basic child support without assistance from
   respondent, and that the child would spend about 35% of her time with
   her father during which time he would pay all her expenses. Further,
   respondent would pay for the child's clothing, with petitioner
   assisting with the shopping, and would fund a college trust with
   $10,000 (which he apparently did). At the time of the agreement,
   petitioner's adjusted gross income was approximately $38,000 per year,
   respondent's approximately $23,000. The couple divorced on July 15,
   1994; the separation agreement was incorporated but not merged into
   the judgment of divorce.

   Initially, the parties operated under the terms of the separation
SNIPPETS:
  • In the Matter of Diana Gravlin, Appellant, v. Heinz Ruppert, Respondent.
  • This appeal calls upon us to determine whether modification of child support provisions of a
  • As the agreement recited, the parties were aware of the provisions of the Child Support
  • Further, respondent would pay for the child's clothing, with petitioner assisting with the
  • Petitioner retained primary custody while the child visited with her father one day a week
  • After that, all significant visitation between respondent and his daughter came to an end, as
  • The court further stated that "ven if we assume that petitioner was attempting to prove an
  • We conclude that petitioner has made a sufficient showing to justify a modification of the
  • We therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit to Family Court for
  • The terms of a separation agreement incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce
  • However, the needs of a child must take precedence over the terms of the agreement when it
  • Separately, in Boden, we recognized the need for modification based on maintaining the
  • In Boden we held that a child support award in excess of that provided for in a separation
  • the Appellate Division went further and suggested that even if "the cessation of visitation
  • Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the
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