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VIOLETA ESPINAL v MELVILLE SNOW CONTRACTORS, INC Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: VIOLETA ESPINAL, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>I02_0060, Contract, Melville, Duty, Snow, Ny2d, Tort, Liability, Obligation, Palka, Care, Exacerbates, Appellate Division, Moch, Eaves Brooks, Instrument, Party, Premises, Owner, Harm, Basis, Motion, Summary Judgment, Allege, Plow, Icy Condition, Miltope, Third-party , ContentID: 120254599

Case Documents
1 2000-05 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 131603
6 pages
TXT
Total Documents: 1 document , 6 pages
Price: $ 19.95


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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
MELVILLE
PLAINTIFF
DUTY
SNOW
NY2D
TORT
LIABILITY
OBLIGATION
PALKA
CARE
EXACERBATES
DEFENDANT
APPELLATE DIVISION
MOCH
EAVES BROOKS
INSTRUMENT
PARTY
COURT
PREMISES
OWNER
HARM
BASIS
MOTION
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ALLEGE
PLOW
ICY CONDITION
MILTOPE
THIRD-PARTY


   2 No. 63
   Violeta Espinal,
   Appellant,
   v.
   Melville Snow Contractors, Inc.,
   Respondent. (And a third-party action.)
     _________________________________________________________________

   2002 NY Int. 60

   June 4, 2002

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Thomas Torto, for appellant.
   Christopher Simone, for respondent.
     _________________________________________________________________

   ROSENBLATT, J.:

   Plaintiff has brought this personal injury action against defendant, a
   company that entered into a snow removal contract with a property
   owner. We are called upon to determine whether the company may be held
   liable to plaintiff for injuries she sustained when she slipped and
   fell on the premises. To decide this appeal, we must determine whether
   a contractor of this type owes a duty to a third person, such as
   plaintiff.

   On January 28, 1998 plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned
   by her employer, Miltope Corporation. Attributing her fall to an "icy
   condition," plaintiff sued Melville Snow Contractors, the company
   under contract to plow and remove snow from the premises.(1) She
   alleged that Melville created the icy condition by negligently
   removing snow from the parking lot. Melville moved for summary
   judgment, contending that it owed no duty of care to plaintiff.

   Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding that Melville had failed
   to show that "there was a reasonable explanation for the existence of
   the ice * * * other than a failure on its part to remove snow and ice
   in a non-negligent manner." The Appellate Division reversed, granted
   Melville's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
   The court held that Melville owed plaintiff no duty of care. Important
   for purposes of this appeal, the court also held that plaintiff's
   "allegation that (Melville) created or exacerbated the hazardous
   condition did not provide a basis for liability." We now affirm the
SNIPPETS:
  • Plaintiff has brought this personal injury action against defendant, a company that entered
  • We are called upon to determine whether the company may be held liable to plaintiff for
  • To decide this appeal, we must determine whether a contractor of this type owes a duty to a
  • On January 28, 1998 plaintiff slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by her employer,
  • Attributing her fall to an "icy condition," plaintiff sued Melville Snow Contractors, the
  • contending that it owed no duty of care to plaintiff.
  • The Appellate Division reversed, granted Melville's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
  • The court held that Melville owed plaintiff no duty of care.
  • Because a finding of negligence must be based on the breach of a duty, a threshold question
  • Here, we must determine whether any such duty ran from Melville to plaintiff, given that
  • the existence and scope of a duty is a question of law requiring courts to balance sometimes
  • Under our decisional law a contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give
  • Moch, Eaves Brooks and Palka identify contractual situations involving possible tort
  • There, the defendant entered into a contract with the City of Rensselaer to supply water to
  • Because the plaintiff company was not a third-party beneficiary, it could not sue for breach
  • We observed, however, that irrespective of the attendant contractual obligations, tort
  • In Eaves Brooks we continued the theme, identifying detrimental reliance as another basis for
  • Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to allege detrimental reliance on Melville's continued
  • a defendant who undertakes to render services and then negligently creates or exacerbates a
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