THE PEOPLE &C., APPELLANT, v. RONALD LATHAM, RESPONDENT.
90 N.Y.2d 795, 689 N.E.2d 527, 666 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1997).
December 17, 1997
3 No. 261
(97 NY Int. 0224)
Decided December 17, 1997
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
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Bruce E. Knoll, for appellant.
F. Stanton Ackerman, for respondent.
WESLEY, J.:
On May 18, 1990, after Marie Shambeau informed defendant that she
intended to end their relationship, defendant assaulted her by
stabbing and strangling her. After defendantwas indicted, defendant
pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted murder in the second degree.
On January 22, 1991, defendant was sentenced to a term of
incarceration of 7 ½ to 22 ½ years. Seven weeks later, Marie Shambeau
died.
An indictment was thereafter returned charging defendant with second
degree murder. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss that indictment
on double jeopardy grounds, but the Appellate Division reversed and
reinstated the indictment. On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding
that "(n)either defendant's asserted belief that his plea would end
all criminal exposure stemming from his conduct nor the fact that
Shambeau's death was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the plea
can prevent as a matter of double jeopardy a subsequent prosecution
for murder in the second degree" ( People v Latham, 83 NY2d 233,
239). We distinguished cases from other jurisdictions cited by
defendant in which it was established that, "at the time of plea both
the defendant and the prosecution intended the plea to close the
matter forever," noting "(t)hat is not the case before us" ( id.).
At trial, the People introduced factual admissions made by defendant
during the attempted murder plea allocution. Defendant was found
guilty of first degree manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of 8 1/3
to 25 years incarceration.
SNIPPETS:
On May 18, 1990, after Marie Shambeau informed defendant that she intended to end their
defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted murder in the second degree.
Defendant successfully moved to dismiss that indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the
On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding that "either defendant's asserted belief that his
the People introduced factual admissions made by defendant during the attempted murder plea
Defendant was found guilty of first degree manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of 8 1/3 to
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that defendant had not effectively waived
We now reverse.
"A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading
Nevertheless, because a court could not possibly advise a defendant on all the particular
It is important to note that the defendant in Ford attacked the voluntariness of his plea by
The voluntariness of a plea is challenged prior tosentencing by a motion to withdraw the plea
In the absence of such a motion, however, the plea and the resulting conviction of attempted
The Appellate Division improperly permitted defendant to convert his direct appeal of his
Because the plea is presumed voluntary, there was no bar to the People's use of the plea
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the case remitted to
Opinion by Judge Wesley.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Smith and Ciparick concur.
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