THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. ANDREW COOPER, APPELLANT.

    90 N.Y.2d 292, 683 N.E.2d 11, 660 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1997).
    June 27, 1997

   1 No. 141 (1997 NY Int. 122)
   Decided June 27, 1997
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   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.
   Frances A. Gallagher, for appellant.
   Susan Axelrod, for respondent.

   CIPARICK, J.:

   On July 24, 1992, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint in Criminal
   Court charging defendant with two counts of driving while intoxicated
   (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192(2), 1192(3)). Upon learning from
   defendant's criminal history report that he had been convicted in 1985
   for driving while intoxicated, the People served notice on defendant
   at his arraignment of their intention to submit felony charges to a
   grand jury (see, CPL 170.20). The People subsequently replaced the
   misdemeanor complaint with an instrument charging defendant with two
   felony counts of driving while intoxicated (see, Vehicle and Traffic
   Law §§ 1192(3), 1193(1)(c)). Defendant was thereafter indicted and,
   after a jury trial, convicted of driving while intoxicated as a
   felony. Defendant was sentenced to five years probation, the
   conditions of which included paying a $1,000 fine, entering an alcohol
   treatment program, selling his car, and surrendering his license for a
   period of ten years.

   Defendant's sole argument on this appeal is that the People violated
   the speedy-trial statute (see, CPL 30.30(1)). Specifically, defendant
   contends that the People were obligated to announce their readiness
   for trial within 90 days of the action's commencement because the
   action was commenced by the filing of a misdemeanor complaint,
   notwithstanding the action's subsequent conversion to a felony case.
   The People acknowledge that they failed to answer ready within 90 days
   of the action's commencement, but argue that they complied with the
   speedy-trial statute by answering ready within the six-month period
   applicable to felony prosecutions. For the following reasons, we agree
   with the People.

   Initially, and most importantly, the statutory language supports the
   People's contention that they had six months to prepare for the felony