IN THE MATTER OF EDWIN L. (ANONYMOUS), APPELLANT.
88 N.Y.2d 593, 671 N.E.2d 1247, 648 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1996).
July 9, 1996
2 No. 171 (1996 NY Int. 160)
Decided July 9, 1996
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
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Patricia S. Constantikes, for appellant.
Linda H. Young, for respondent presentment agency.
New York County District Attorney, amicus curiae.
SMITH, J.:
Appellant contends that before finding that a juvenile has
violated the conditions of an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal (ACD), procedural due process principles require Family
Court to conduct a hearing, at which hearsay evidence may be
considered only after a finding of good cause by the court to dispense
with the confrontation of witnesses. Since neither the Family Court
Act nor the requirements of procedural due process impose such
restrictions upon the discretion of the Family Court to vacate an ACD
order, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division. The inquiry
conducted by the Family Court here in determining whether appellant
violated the conditions of the ACD satisfied the requirements of due
process and the presentment agency presented sufficient evidence of
violations.
Respondent presentment agency filed two petitions, arising out of
separate incidents, charging appellant, who was 13 years old at the
time, with conduct which would have constituted crimes if committed by
an adult. Based on appellant's admissions, Family Court issued
fact-finding orders that appellant's acts would have constituted the
crimes of possession of burglar's tools under one petition, and
criminal mischief in the fourth degree and possession of burglar's
tools under the second petition, if committed by an adult.
At the dispositional hearing, appellant, with the agreement of
the presentment agency, sought an ACD for both petitions. Family Court
granted appellant's request and issued one ACD order, dated June 12,
1992, for both petitions. The ACD order specified three conditions.
Appellant was required to (1) attend school while at Graham Windham, a
residential facility; (2) continue residing at Graham Windham unless
SNIPPETS:
IN THE MATTER OF EDWIN L., APPELLANT.
Appellant contends that before finding that a juvenile has violated the conditions of an
Since neither the Family Court Act nor the requirements of procedural due process impose such
The inquiry conducted by the Family Court here in determining whether appellant violated the
Respondent presentment agency filed two petitions, arising out of separate incidents,
Based on appellant's admissions, Family Court issued fact-finding orders that appellant's
Appellant was required to attend school while at Graham Windham, a residential facility;
The violation petition alleged that appellant had failed to comply with the conditions that
Appellant also argued that he was entitled to a hearing, equivalent to hearings conducted for
The presentment agency appeared with a Graham Windham caseworker and stated readiness to
Analogizing the ACD to parole and probation, appellant contends that he should have received
Except where the petition alleges that the respondent has committed a designated felony act,
Court set forth a balancing test for determining whether a State has provided adequate due
Although an ACD resembles the dispositions of conditional discharge and probation, because a
We rejected this contention and held that although the mere fact of arrest would not be
We hold that the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied when a Family Court
Even the majority recognizes the weak foundational basis for the witness' testimony when it
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