EDWARD E. KLEIN, APPELLANT, v. EDWIN EUBANK, ET AL., RESPONDENTS, PLANET
HOLLYWOOD, INC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS DISCONTINUED.
87 N.Y.2d 459, 663 N.E.2d 599, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1996).
January 9, 1996
1 No. 307 (1996 NY Int. 2)
Decided January 9, 1996
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Jay B. Solomon, for Appellant.
Edwin L. Eubank, for Respondents.
Titone, J.:
In this proceeding brought by an attorney to enforce a statutory
charging lien, the issues are whether an attorney who was once but is
no longer the attorney of record may invoke the Judiciary Law § 475
lien and whether the protection of that statute is forfeited when the
attorney and client mutually consent to the termination of their
relationship. We hold that the statutory lien is available even where
both of these conditions are present.
Petitioner represented respondents Eubank Group, Edwin Eubank and
Ellis Duncan as attorney of record in their efforts to recover a real
estate brokerage commission. During the course of this representation,
difficulties between petitioner and his clients emerged. After about
eight months, petitioner formally withdrew from his representation,
and a consent to a change of attorney was executed and filed. Edwin
Eubank, who is himself a lawyer, then became the attorney of record.
When the action was settled some thirteen months later, petitioner
commenced the present proceeding to determine and enforce the charging
lien to which he believed himself entitled pursuant to Judiciary Law
475. An escrow fund sufficient to cover petitioner's claimed fees was
deposited with the court. Respondents then moved for summary judgment
dismissing the petition, arguing that only the present attorney of
record has the right to bring a proceeding to enforce the section 475
lien.
The Supreme Court agreed with respondents' contention and dismissed
the proceeding, holding that the language of the statute suggested
that the lien should be confined to the attorney of record at the time
SNIPPETS:
HOLLYWOOD, INC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS DISCONTINUED.
Jay B. Solomon, for Appellant.
In this proceeding brought by an attorney to enforce a statutory charging lien, the issues
Petitioner represented respondents Eubank Group, Edwin Eubank and Ellis Duncan as attorney of
After about eight months, petitioner formally withdrew from his representation, and a consent
Respondents then moved for summary judgment dismissing the petition, arguing that only the
The Supreme Court agreed with respondents' contention and dismissed the proceeding, holding
The Appellate Division upheld the dismissal on the alternative theory that petitioner's
We now reverse.
It has long been held that attorneys who terminate their representation for just cause
Thus, it is simply inaccurate to state that, as a general proposition, attorneys who
The Keeffe Court stated in dictum that "n attorney's charging lien may be lost if he
However, that broadly stated proposition must be read in conjunction with the two cases cited
There is no indication in Keeffe that the Court intended by its dictum to override or modify
Attorney-client relationships frequently end because of personality conflicts,
Instead, we hold that where an attorney's representation terminates and there has been no
Applying this approach to the present case, we conclude that the lower courts' grant of
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