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1
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
CITY ABUTTING SIDEWALK MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LIABILITY APPELLANTS PROPERTY OWNERS BEACH STATUTE RESPONDENT LOCAL LAWS TRANSFERRING ABUTTING LANDOWNER INJURIES DEFECT ROONEY COURT INVALID MOTION REPAIR STATE STATUTE MARY HAUSSER SUMMARY JUDGMENT PERSONAL INJURY APPELLATE DIVISION AD2D POWERS ADOPT LOCAL LAWS FAILURE |
MARY HAUSSER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. SALVATORE GIUNTA, RESPONDENT.
88 N.Y.2d 449, 669 N.E.2d 470, 646 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1996).
May 2, 1996
2 No. 108(1996 NY Int. 103)
Decided May 2, 1996
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Jerome Turner, for Appellants.
L. Kevin Sheridan, for Respondent.
SMITH, J.:
The issue presented by this personal injury action is whether
Municipal Home Rule Law § 11(j) renders invalid section 256 of the
City of Long Beach Code, which makes a landowner with property
abutting city sidewalks liable for injuries caused by defects in the
sidewalk. We conclude that Long Beach Code § 256 is not invalidated by
the Municipal Home Rule Law and reverse the order of the Appellate
Division.
Appellants Mary and Henry Hausser live next door to respondent
Salvatore Giunta in the City of Long Beach. Portions of a city
sidewalk abut the property in front of both houses. In 1989,
appellants commenced this action for personal injury against
respondents Salvatore and Theresa(n 1) Giunta seeking to recover
for injuries appellant Mary Hausser sustained after she tripped over a
broken, cracked or depressed portion of the sidewalk abutting the
front of respondent's property.(n 2) Appellant sustained serious
injuries to her knee which required surgery. By notice of motion dated
February 1, 1993, respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing that
under Rooney v City of Long Beach (42 AD2d 34), section 11(1)(j) of
the Municipal Home Rule Law invalidated section 256 of the City Code.
By notice of motion dated March 31, 1993, appellants opposed
respondent's motion, and cross-moved for summary judgment.(n 3)
Supreme Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent neither created the
defect nor caused the defective condition due to special use, and
respondent was not clothed with liability by a statute or ordinance.
The court concluded that the facts of this case were controlled by
Rooney v City of Long Beach (42 AD2d 34, appeal dismissed 33 NY2d
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