DAVID GRUBER, RESPONDENT, v. NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, APPELLANT,
JOHN E. SWEENEY, AS COMM'R OF LABOR, RESPONDENT.
89 N.Y.2d 225, 674 N.E.2d 1354, 652 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1996).
November 26, 1996
3 No. 228 (1996 NY Int. 230)
KENT A. GREENE, RESPONDENT, v. NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, APPELLANT,
JOHN E. SWEENEY, AS COMM'R OF LABOR, RESPONDENT,
November 26, 1996
3 No. 229 (1996 NY Int. 230)
Decided November 26, 1996
_________________________________________________________________
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
No. 228:
Ellen Ravitch, for Appellant.
Francis J. Smith, Jr., for individual Respondent.
Steven A. Segall, for Respondent Commissioner.
No. 229:
Ellen Ravitch, for Appellant.
David J. Wukitsch, for individual Respondent.
Steven A. Segall, for Respondent Commissioner.
TITONE, J.:
Labor Law &167; 593(1) provides that claimants will be disqualified
from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if they voluntarily
separate without good cause from their "last employment" prior to the
filing of an unemployment claim. In each of these two cases, the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that the words "last
employment" as used in that section did not refer to the last covered
"employment" as that term is defined in Labor Law &167; 511, but
referred to the claimant's last actual employment, regardless of
whether that employment was covered by the Unemployment Insurance Law.
Under the circumstances presented, the question of statutory
interpretation presented is one of law for this Court, requiring no
deference to the agency determinations below. Having performed that
function, we conclude that the term "last employment" refers to
covered employment, and that these claimants were disqualified from
receiving benefits because they voluntarily separated from their last
SNIPPETS:
NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF PERSONNEL, APPELLANT,
JOHN E. SWEENEY, AS COMM'R OF LABOR, RESPONDENT.
No. 228: Ellen Ravitch, for Appellant.
Francis J. Smith, Jr., for individual Respondent.
Steven A. Segall, for Respondent Commissioner.
Labor Law &167; 593provides that claimants will be disqualified from receiving unemployment
In each of these two cases, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that the words
Under the circumstances presented, the question of statutory interpretation presented is one
Having performed that function, we conclude that the term "last employment" refers to covered
Matter of Gruber
He was employed as a research assistant for the New York City Department of Health from July
However, claimant received permission to begin rendering his services for the hospital at an
By initial determination, the local unemployment office concluded that Gruber's "last
The court reasoned that "although claimant's employment with the College was not 'covered'
Judicial review of the determinations of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is limited
Although the proper interpretation of a statute ordinarily presents an issue of law reserved
The Legislature has defined with precision both the underlying purpose of the legislative
By defining the specific classes of employment that the Law is designed to cover and by
One such disqualification is voluntary separation from a claimant's "last employment" without
Employers of persons who provide services in the categories that are excluded from the
In defining the reach of the system, the Legislature chose to exclude from the recognized
The key interpretive issue on this appeal is whether the 12 statutory exclusions from the
Unlike the coverage provisions, Labor Law &167; 593 manifestly has as its underlying
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