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1
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT SETTLE CPLR PROPOSED JUDGMENT ENTRY PRACTICE SIEGEL PARTY SIGNATURE APPELLATE DIVISION PRACTICE COMMENTARIES SUBMITTING AD2D YORK NYCRR PLAINTIFF CONSOL LAWS REVERSE MOTION TIME LIMIT SUPREME COURT DEFENDANTS ABANDONMENT DELAY CLERK JUDGE DISPOSITION PREVAILING PARTY REINSTATE |
Charles R. Funk, Appellant, v. Mark Barry et al., Respondents.
89 N.Y.2d 364, 675 N.E.2d 1199, 653 N.Y.S.2d 247 ( 1996).
December 19, 1996
(Case Commentary by Editorial Board)
4 No. 262 (1996 NY Int. 248)
Decided December 19, 1996
______________________________________________________________________
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
______________________________________________________________________
Bruce F. Freeman, for appellant.
Frank G. Montemalo, for respondents.
TITONE, J.:
The question presented for our review is whether the 60-day
time limit for the submission of proposed judgments for signature
contained in 22 NYCRR 202.48 applies where the court's decision
contains no direction to submit or settle the order. We resolve a
conflict among the Appellate Division Departments and conclude that
the 60-day period applies only where a proposed judgment or order
explicitly directs that it be settled or submitted for signature.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed.
Following a bench trial, Supreme Court found in favor of
plaintiff in the amount of $5,000 on his cause of action for
conversion, with interest to be computed from a specified date. The
court did not direct any party to settle or submit the judgment for
signature.
Eleven months after the court's verdict, plaintiff's attorney
submitted a proposed judgment for entry. Defendant objected on the
ground that the proposal was untimely. Plaintiff then moved for an
order permitting entry of the judgment. Defendants cross-moved for an
order dismissing the action as abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48,
which contains a 60-day time limit for "submission of orders,
judgments and decrees for signature." The court granted plaintiff's
motion and denied defendants' cross motion.
The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the action. The
court acknowledged a split in authority among the Appellate Division
Departments, but followed its own holding in Hickson v Gardner (134
AD2d 930), which provides that the 60-day time limit of section 202.48
SNIPPETS:
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