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SDAO v NATIONAL GRANGE MUT. INS. CO Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: SDAO, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>087_0853, Underinsurance, Liability, Insurance, Limits, Bodily Injury, Vehicle, Policy, Payment, Appellant, Insurance Policies, Tortfeasor, Exhaustion, Regulation, Memorandum, Insurance Law, Coverage, Judge, Respondent, Appellate Division, Costs, Supreme Court, Injury Liability Bonds, Motor Vehicle, Amount, Condition Precedent, Accident, Judgments, Settlements , ContentID: 120251002

Case Documents
1 1995-12-05 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 124911
2 pages
HTML
Total Documents: 1 document , 2 pages
Price: $ 19.95


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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
LIABILITY
INSURANCE
LIMITS
BODILY INJURY
VEHICLE
POLICY
PAYMENT
APPELLANT
INSURANCE POLICIES
TORTFEASOR
EXHAUSTION
PLAINTIFF
REGULATION
MEMORANDUM
INSURANCE LAW
COVERAGE
JUDGE
RESPONDENT
APPELLATE DIVISION
COSTS
SUPREME COURT
INJURY LIABILITY BONDS
MOTOR VEHICLE
AMOUNT
CONDITION PRECEDENT
ACCIDENT
JUDGMENTS
SETTLEMENTS
DEFENDANT


  CARLA C. S'DAO, APPELLANT, v. NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
  RESPONDENT.

    87 N.Y.2d 853, 661 N.E.2d 1378, 638 N.Y.S.2d 597
    December 5, 1995

   4 No. 256 (1995 NY Int. 275)
   Decided December 5, 1995
     _________________________________________________________________

   This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
   publication in the New York Reports.

    Damon A. DeCastro, for Appellant.
   Richard J. Lutzel, for Respondent.

    MEMORANDUM:

    The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs,
   and the order of Supreme Court reinstated.

    Insurance Law § 3420(f)(2) provides that supplemental uninsured
   motorist insurance -- known colloquially as underinsurance -- is
   available "if the limits of liability under all bodily injury
   liability bonds and insurance policies of another motor vehicle liable
   for damages are in a lesser amount than the bodily injury liability
   insurance limits of coverage provided by such policy" (emphasis
   added). Under this definition, a tortfeasor is "underinsured" if the
   limits of his or her liability for bodily injury are less than the
   amount of corresponding insurance purchased by the injured insured
   (Prudential Prop. and Cas. Co. v Szeli, 83 NY2d 681, 684).

    As a condition precedent to payment of underinsurance, "the limits of
   liability of all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies
   applicable at the time of the accident shall be exhausted by payment
   of judgments or settlements" (Insurance Law § 3420(f)(2)). Where
   plaintiff was a passenger injured in a two-vehicle accident, the
   question arises whether exhaustion of the limits of liability of all
   policies held by both tortfeasors is required before the
   underinsurance coverage in plaintiff's policy is available.

    We conclude that the exhaustion requirement of section 3420(f)(2)
   relates back to the statute's reference to "another motor vehicle" and
   indicates that the proper focus is on the underinsured status of each
   individual tortfeasor.(n 1) Nothing in the statutory language or
   the policy providing underinsurance at issue here notifies the insured
SNIPPETS:
  • This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
  • Damon A. DeCastro, for Appellant.
  • Richard J. Lutzel, for Respondent.
  • The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the order of Supreme
  • Insurance Law § 3420provides that supplemental uninsured motorist insurance -- known
  • a tortfeasor is "underinsured" if the limits of his or her liability for bodily injury are
  • As a condition precedent to payment of underinsurance, "the limits of liability of all bodily
  • Where plaintiff was a passenger injured in a two-vehicle accident, the question arises
  • Applying these principles, plaintiff, who was injured when the car in which she was riding
  • the Appellate Division erred in denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment that she is
  • In 1992, the Insurance Department promulgated Regulation 35- D, to assist in interpreting
  • Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
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