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SCOTT v MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. CO Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: SCOTT, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>086_0429, Discrimination, Employment, Contract, Executive Law, Boycott, Independent Contractor, Insurance, York, Commerce, Blacklisting, Statute, Termination, Alleges, Insurance Company, Respondent, Agents, Agency, Summary Judgment, Motion, Ad2d, Trade, Affirm, Protections, Human Rights, Dismissing, Discriminatory Practice, Resident , ContentID: 120251000

Case Documents
1   OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 124909
6 pages
HTML
Total Documents: 1 document , 6 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
DEFENDANTS
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT
EXECUTIVE LAW
BOYCOTT
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
INSURANCE
YORK
COMMERCE
BLACKLISTING
STATUTE
TERMINATION
ALLEGES
INSURANCE COMPANY
RESPONDENT
AGENTS
AGENCY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTION
AD2D
BUSINESS
TRADE
AFFIRM
PROTECTIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS
DISMISSING
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE
RESIDENT


  Marilyn G. Scott, Appellant, v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company
  et al., Respondents..

    86 N.Y.2d 429, 657 N.E.2d 769, 633 N.Y.S.2d 754
    October 19, 1995

   (Case Commentary by Editorial Board)
   4 No. 210 (1995 NY Int. 206)
   Decided October 19, 1995
     _________________________________________________________________

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Nira T. Kermisch, for Appellant.
   Marian Blankopf, for Respondent insurance company.
   Mark L. Suher, for individual Respondent.

   TITONE, J.:

   Plaintiff insurance agent brought a discrimination claim against
   defendant insurance company for termination of her agency contract
   allegedly on the basis of her gender, age and marital status. The
   question before us is whether the suit may be predicated on Executive
   Law § 296(1)(a), which prohibits discrimination in employment, or
   under section 296(13), which prohibits discrimination in commerce or
   trade. For the following reasons, we affirm the holdings of the courts
   below that plaintiff could not avail herself of the protections of
   either section under the circumstances of this case.

   Defendant G. James Blatt runs a "general agency" through which he
   markets the insurance products of defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life
   Insurance Company. In 1979, defendant Blatt hired plaintiff Marilyn
   Scott as an insurance agent under a Career Contract. In 1987,
   plaintiff became a District Manager responsible for running a separate
   agency for defendant at a new location and for recruiting insurance
   agents to expand the company's markets. The agreement contained in the
   Career Contract executed by the parties in 1985 stated that "(n)othing
   in this contract shall be construed as creating the relationship of
   employer and employee between" defendants and plaintiff. Both the
   Career Contract and the District Manager contract were terminable at
   will by either party.

   Defendant Blatt terminated plaintiff's Career Contract and Series 6
   License to sell certain mutual funds and annuities in June 1992.
   Plaintiff then commenced this action in December 1992 against both
SNIPPETS:
  • Marian Blankopf, for Respondent insurance company.
  • Plaintiff insurance agent brought a discrimination claim against defendant insurance company
  • The question before us is whether the suit may be predicated on Executive Law § 296, which
  • we affirm the holdings of the courts below that plaintiff could not avail herself of the
  • plaintiff became a District Manager responsible for running a separate agency for defendant
  • The agreement contained in the Career Contract executed by the parties in 1985 stated that
  • Plaintiff then commenced this action in December 1992 against both defendants pursuant to New
  • Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that, as an
  • Supreme Court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint.
  • That section provides that "t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice * * * for an
  • Although plaintiff alleges that she was required to recruit and train agents according to
  • Co. 145 AD2d 90, 94).
  • Apparently unable to allege that defendants engaged in a formal boycott or blacklisting of
  • Under settled precepts of statutory construction, the underscored language should not be read
  • The statute's specific reference to boycotts, blacklisting and refusals to deal indicates
  • While the enactment found its impetus in the Arab boycott of Jewish businesses, it was
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