THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT v. NILES ATKINS, APPELLANT.
85 N.Y.2d 1007, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 630 N.Y.S.2d 965
June 13, 1995
AppT No. 134 (1995 NY Int. 153)
Decided June 13, 1995
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
Robert S. Dean, for Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Brennan, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of Appellate Term should be affirmed. Defendant was arrested
and charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs
(Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4)) after he was found behind the
wheel of a vehicle which had collided with a parked vehicle. Blood
withdrawn from defendant after his arrest tested positively for the
presence o f phencyclidine, or PCP.
Defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing
that the test was administered in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 1194(2) because the blood was withdrawn more than two hours after
his arrest. The motion was decided on a brief stipulated account of
the facts surrounding the administration of the test, as follows.
Defendant was arrested at the scene of the accident and taken to a
hospital for examination. Within two hours of his arrest, defendant
consented to the administ ration of a blood test. The test, however,
was not administered until two hours and 28 minutes after his arrest.
Supreme Court denied the motion, and Appellate Term affirmed, finding
the two hour requirement of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2) to b e
inapplicable because defendant had voluntarily consented to the blood
test.
In People v Ward (307 NY 73), this Court held that former section 71-a
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law -- the predecessor "deemed consent"
statute to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(n 1) -- had no applicati
on where the defendant expressly and voluntarily consented to a blood
test (id., at 76). Noting that the deemed consent statute "was
concerned, not with those who consented to take the test, but with
those who were required to submit", we found it "diffi cult to
perceive any necessity for the protections embodied in (the deemed
SNIPPETS:
Defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs
Defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the test was
The motion was decided on a brief stipulated account of the facts surrounding the
Supreme Court denied the motion, and Appellate Term affirmed, finding the two hour
In People v Ward, this Court held that former section 71-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law --
Noting that the deemed consent statute "was concerned, not with those who consented to take
Defendant's contention that the two hour limitation in section 1194was intended by the
This argument is completely undermined by the lack of a corresponding time limit for
To the extent that defendant argues that his consent to the blood test was not voluntary,
The two-hour limitation is a legislative determination on relevance: if the sample has not
I base my view on the legislative history of the statute.
In 1941, the Legislature amended former section 70of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to allow,
Opposition to the amendment primarily centered on two issues: its constitutionality, and the
Thus, the two-hour limit is, to some extent, a compromise,but one that provided a bright-line
Even after the Vehicle and Traffic Law was amended to allow the admission into evidence of
The Legislature recognized, however, that some drivers, particularly when their faculties
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