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OPPENHEIMER & CO. v OPPENHEIMER, APPEL, DIXON & CO Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: OPPENHEIMER & CO., State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>086_0685, Letter Agreement, Substantial Performance, Parties, Written Consent, Sublease, Deadline, Condition Precedent, Contract, Tenant Work, Doctrine, York, Forfeiture, Paragraph, Oppenheimer, Formation, Oral Notice, Language, Condition Set, Constructive Conditions, Restatement, Respondent, Appellant, Ciparick, Letter Agreement Setting, Existence, Shipment , ContentID: 120250861

Case Documents
1 1995-11-30 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 124770
8 pages
HTML
Total Documents: 1 document , 8 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
PLAINTIFF
LETTER AGREEMENT
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE
PARTIES
WRITTEN CONSENT
SUBLEASE
DEADLINE
CONDITION PRECEDENT
CONTRACT
TENANT WORK
DOCTRINE
YORK
FORFEITURE
COURT
PARAGRAPH
OPPENHEIMER
FORMATION
ORAL NOTICE
LANGUAGE
CONDITION SET
ATTORNEY
CONSTRUCTIVE CONDITIONS
RESTATEMENT
RESPONDENT
APPELLANT
CIPARICK
LETTER AGREEMENT SETTING
EXISTENCE
SHIPMENT
  OPPENHEIMER & CO., INC., RESPONDENT, v. OPPENHEIM, APPEL, DIXON & CO.,
  APPELLANT.

    86 N.Y.2d 685, 660 N.E.2d 415, 636 N.Y.S.2d 734
    November 30, 1995

   1 No. 274 (1995 NY Int. 258)
   Decided November 30, 1995
     _________________________________________________________________

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Darrell K. Fennell, for Appellant.
   Gregory N. Wallance, for Respondent.

   CIPARICK, J.:

   The parties entered into a Letter Agreement setting forth certain
   conditions precedent to the formation and existence of a sublease
   between them. The agreement provided that there would be no sublease
   between the parties "unless and until" plaintiff delivered to
   defendant the prime landlord's written consent to certain "tenant
   work" on or before a specified deadline. If this condition did not
   occur, the sublease was to be deemed "null and void." Plaintiff
   provided only oral notice on the specified date. The issue presented
   is whether the doctrine of substantial performance applies to the
   facts of this case. We conclude it does not for the reasons that
   follow.

   I.

   In 1986, plaintiff Oppenheimer & Co. moved to the World Financial
   Center in Manhattan, a building constructed by Olympia & York Company
   (O & Y). At the time of its move, plaintiff had three years remaining
   on its existing lease for the 33rd floor of the building known as One
   New York Plaza. As an incentive to induce plaintiff's move, O & Y
   agreed to make the rental payments due under plaintiff's rental
   agreement in the event plaintiff was unable to sublease its prior
   space in One New York Plaza.

   In December 1986, the parties to this action entered into a
   conditional Letter Agreement to sublease the 33rd floor. Defendant
   already leased space on the 29th floor of One New York Plaza and was
   seeking to expand its operations. The proposed sublease between the
   parties was attached to the Letter Agreement. The Letter Agreement
   provided that the proposed sublease would be executed only upon the
   satisfaction of certain conditions. Pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of the
SNIPPETS:
  • Darrell K. Fennell, for Appellant.
  • Gregory N. Wallance, for Respondent.
  • The parties entered into a Letter Agreement setting forth certain conditions precedent to the
  • The agreement provided that there would be no sublease between the parties "unless and until"
  • The issue presented is whether the doctrine of substantial performance applies to the facts
  • In 1986, plaintiff Oppenheimer & Co. moved to the World Financial Center in Manhattan, a
  • Assuming satisfaction of the condition set forth in paragraph 1, defendant was required to
  • plaintiff's attorney telephoned defendant's attorney on February 25 and informed defendant
  • Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, asserting that defendant waived
  • the court issued an order in limine barring any reference to substantial performance of the
  • Nonetheless, during the course of trial, the court permitted the jury to consider the theory
  • Most conditions precedent describe acts or events which must occur before a party is obliged
  • Express conditions must be literally performed, whereas constructive conditions, which
  • This interpretive preference is especially strong when a finding of express condition would
  • Plaintiff argued secondarily that it substantially complied with the express condition of
  • Advice of shipment to be made by cable immediately goods are dispatched".
  • Opinion by Judge Ciparick.
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