IN THE MATTER OF OSWALD N. (ANONYMOUS), RESPONDENT. / COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK
STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, APPELLANT, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF QUEENS COUNTY,
RESPONDENT.
87 N.Y.2d 98, 661 N.E.2d 679, 637 N.Y.S.2d 949
December 5, 1995
2 No. 282 (1995 NY Int. 270)
Decided December 5, 1995
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Julie S. Mereson, for Appellant.
Sharon Y. Brodt, for Respondent District Attorney.
Kim L. Darrow, for Respondent.
KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE:
This case presents a straightforward question of statutory
interpretation: do the provisions of CPL 330.20 authorize an order
extending the conditions placed on an insanity acquittee's release
from a psychiatric facility for a period greater than ten years? We
conclude that CPL 330.20 authorizes such an extension, and therefore
reinstate the three-year extension ordered by the trial court.
In 1966, while on a weekend pass from Creedmore Psychiatric Center, a
secure psychiatric facility in Queens Village, defendant Oswald N.--a
paranoid schizophrenic--strangled his wife of two months because her
"face turned into a devil." Having achieved the capacity to understand
the proceedings against him (CPL 730.10), defendant was ultimately
found to be not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect
for the crime of second-degree murder. In post-trial proceedings
resulting from his insanity acquittal, the court determined that
defendant constituted a physical danger to himself or others and in
March 1976 remanded him to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental
Health for recommitment to Creedmore for five years (see, CPL
330.20(6); 330.20(1)(c)).
At the end of the five-year commitment period and upon a finding that
he no longer suffered from a dangerous mental disorder, defendant was
conditionally released from hospitalization in 1981 (see, CPL
330.20(12)). Defendant's release, however, was expressly made subject
to an order requiring him to make regular visits to a psychiatric
clinic every two weeks where he would receive injections of prolixin
SNIPPETS:
IN THE MATTER OF OSWALD N., RESPONDENT.
/ COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, APPELLANT, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
This case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: do the provisions
We conclude that CPL 330.20 authorizes such an extension, and therefore reinstate the
Having achieved the capacity to understand the proceedings against him, defendant was
In post-trial proceedings resulting from his insanity acquittal, the court determined that
At the end of the five-year commitment period and upon a finding that he no longer suffered
Defendant's release, however, was expressly made subject to an order requiring him to make
In 1990, when the Commissioner sought to extend the order of conditions for a third time,
The two psychiatrists further opined that the order of conditions should be extended to
Under CPL 330.20, the statute which establishes the procedure in criminal cases for the
As a "track one" insanity acquittee (see Matter of George L., 85 NY2d 295), defendant was
At issue on this appeal is the arguably ambiguous language in the statute providing that an
Defendant argues that by using the word "an" the Legislature intended that there be only one
As noted by the Appellate Division dissenters, had the Legislature intended such a
In contrast to the analogous provisions in CPL 330.20 governing the length of retention and
Defendant's argument that the Legislature must have intended a ten-year limit because
Yet the Constitution does not forbid an insanity acquittee from being committed for a period
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