IN THE MATTER OF JACOB. ROSEANNE M. A. ET AL., APPELLANTS.
IN THE MATTER OF DANA (ANONYMOUS).G.M. (ANONYMOUS), APPELLANT.
86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716
November 2, 1995
(Case Commentary by Editorial Board)
4 No. 195 (1995 NY Int. 241)
2 No. 196 (1995 NY Int. 241)
Decided November 2, 1995
_________________________________________________________________
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
No. 195:
Nicholas S. Priore, for Appellant.
No appearance, for Respondent.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., amicus curiae.
No. 196:
Beatrice Dohrn, for Appellant.
No appearance, for Respondent.
Center Kids, et al.; Association of the Bar of the City of New York;
and American Civil Liberties Union et al., amici curiae.
KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE:
Under the New York adoption statute, a single person can adopt a child
(Domestic Relations Law § 110). Equally clear is the right of a single
homosexual to adopt (see 18 NYCRR 421.16(h)(2) (qualified adoption
agencies "shall not * * * reject() (adoption petitions) solely on the
basis of homosexuality")). These appeals call upon us to decide if the
unmarried partner of a child's biological mother, whether heterosexual
or homosexual, who is raising the child together with the biological
parent, can become the child's second parent by means of adoption.
Because the two adoptions sought--one by an unmarried heterosexual
couple, the other by the lesbian partner of the child's mother--are
fully consistent with the adoption statute, we answer this question in
the affirmative. To rule otherwise would mean that the thousands of
New York children actually being raised in homes headed by two
unmarried persons could have only one legal parent, not the two who
want them.
SNIPPETS:
IN THE MATTER OF DANA.G.M.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE:
Under the New York adoption statute, a single person can adopt a child.
These appeals call upon us to decide if the unmarried partner of a child's biological mother,
Because the two adoptions sought--one by an unmarried heterosexual couple, the other by the
In Matter of Jacob, Roseanne M.A. and Jacob's biological father separated prior to the
Though acknowledging that "the granting of an adoption in this matter may be beneficial to
In Matter of Dana, appellants are G.M. and her lesbian partner, P.I., who have lived together
Limiting our analysis, as did the courts below, to the preserved statutory interpretation
Thus, the adoption statute must be applied in harmony with the humanitarian principle that
This policy would certainly be advanced in situations like those presented here by allowing
one thing is clear: section 110 allows appellants to become adoptive parents.
The language in section 110 permitting adoptions by "an adult or minor husband and his wife
Yet further recognition of this transformation is evidenced by the fact that unlike the
Literal application of this language would effectively prevent these adoptions since it would
Thus, from the very beginning of what is now section 117, both the scholarly commentary about
ir Natural Relatives as Issue, 60 St. John's L Rev 329 ).
Moving beyond the language and history of section 117 itself, our reading of the statute is
The above-described amendments to Social Services Law § 383-c and Domestic Relations Law §
The statute thus expressly permits parties to agree that the biological parent will retain
Accordingly, in each proceeding, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed,
This longstanding and widely-recognized principle of statutory construction is invoked merely
As former Chief Judge Breitel noted in another connection, the "judicial process is not
Since the statutory construction issue directly implicated Article VI, section 13 of the
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