TINA LABELLO, AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, APPELLANT v. ALBANY MEDICAL
CENTER HOSPITAL ET AL, RESPONDENT.
85 N.Y.2d 701, 651 N.E.2d 908, 628 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1995).
June 7, 1995
3 No. 146 (1995 NY Int. 128)
Decided June 7, 1995
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
John V. Bell, for Appellant
Arete Sprio, for Respondents
BELLACOSA, J.:
Plaintiff mother and guardian, Tina LaBello, on behalf of Donald
LaBello, age 12, sues the Albany Medical Center Hospital and others
for injuries allegedly inflicted in November 1982. The case turns on
the accrual date for a medical malpractice claim predicated on
prenatal injuries allegedly negligently caused by defendants. The
issue, as particularized and applied, is whether this infant's cause
of action accrued when the alleged negligent act or omission occurred,
or, rather, on the date he was born.
The Appellate Division, in a split decision, reversed Supreme Court
and held that the governing event for accrual is the "act, omission or
complained of failure," as explicitly prescribed in CPLR 214-a.
Supreme Court had granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendants'
Statute of Limitations defenses, but the Appellate Division's reversal
denied that motion and certified to us the question whether it erred.
We answer the Appellate Division's question in the affirmative and,
thus, reverse its order and reinstate the decision of Supreme Court.
We hold that an infant plaintiff's medical malpractice cause of
action, premised on alleged injurious acts or omissions occurring
prior to birth, accrues on the earliest date the injured infant
plaintiff could juridically assert the claim and sue for relief, that
is, the date of being born alive.
This medical malpractice action emanates from prenatal care rendered
to the infant plaintiff's mother between November 9, 1982 and November
11, 1982. Defendants allegedly failed to assess the significance of an
ultrasound report and an amniocentesis test, and permitted the mother
SNIPPETS:
Plaintiff mother and guardian, Tina LaBello, on behalf of Donald LaBello, age 12, sues the
The issue, as particularized and applied, is whether this infant's cause of action accrued
The Appellate Division, in a split decision, reversed Supreme Court and held that the
Supreme Court had granted plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' Statute of Limitations
We answer the Appellate Division's question in the affirmative and, thus, reverse its order
We hold that an infant plaintiff's medical malpractice cause of action, premised on alleged
Defendants' answer included two affirmative defenses under the Statute of Limitations.
The dissenting Justices would have affirmed Supreme Court's ruling based on the general tort
It rests on this Court's well-settled principles that an infant plaintiff has no right of
our determination is supported by the language of CPLR 214-a and the otherwise anomalous
Our reasoning and result develop from Woods v Lancet (303 NY 349, supra) and Endresz v
Translated into tort law, this means that there is but a 'conditional prospective liability *
Thus, legal distinction between accrual of a cause of action and the right to sue on, or the
Our precedents, on careful analysis, do not support such a distinction between "hava cause of
Moreover, we have acknowledged that accrual cannot occur until the claim becomes
CPLR 214-a states the accrual-upon-act-or-omission rule and admits of only two exceptions
Moreover, implicit in the Kronos rationale, which links accrual to the time when all elements
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