IN THE MATTER OF JAMES M. ARMSTRONG v. CENTERVILLE FIRE COMPANY,
83 N.Y.2d 937 (1994).
June 16, 1994
3 No. 98 (1994 NY Int. 112)
Decided June 16, 1994
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Petitioner, a volunteer member of respondent Centerville Fire Company,
received a letter from respondent's President in January, 1991,
directing him, in accordance with respondent's by-laws, to put his
resignation as Secretary of respondent in writing, no later than
February 1, 1991. When petitioner failed to do so, a majority of
respondent's members voted to expel him as a member of respondent,
effective March 28, 1991, and he was so notified by letter of March
21, 1991. Petitioner unsuccessfully demanded his reinstatement at a
meeting of respondent's Board of Directors held May 23, 1991. He
commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement on
September 6, 1991.
Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the proceeding
was time barred, and the Appellate Division affirmed (195 AD2d 723).
We agree. Petitioner's expulsion from respondent's membership became
final and binding March 28, 1991. The Statute of Limitations began to
run on that date, unless petitioner was entitled to a hearing before
being expelled (Matter of DeMilio v Borghard, 55 NY2d 216, 220).
Petitioner was not statutorily entitled to a hearing before being
expelled for having violated respondent's by-laws. The controlling
statute (General Municipal Law § 209-l) only grants volunteer officers
and volunteer members of fire departments the right to a hearing (upon
written notice of charges) before being removed on the ground of
incompetence or misconduct. The Legislature did not intend thereby to
interfere with the disciplining of volunteer firefighters in
connection with the conduct of the internal affairs of a fire company.
Thus, General Municipal Law § 209-l expressly provides that the right
to a hearing and other statutory procedural protections "shall not
affect the right of members of any fire company to remove a volunteer
SNIPPETS:
This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Petitioner, a volunteer member of respondent Centerville Fire Company, received a letter from
When petitioner failed to do so, a majority of respondent's members voted to expel him as a
Petitioner unsuccessfully demanded his reinstatement at a meeting of respondent's Board of
Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the proceeding was time barred, and
Petitioner's expulsion from respondent's membership became final and binding March 28,
The Statute of Limitations began to run on that date, unless petitioner was entitled to a
Petitioner was not statutorily entitled to a hearing before being expelled for having
The controlling statute (General Municipal Law § 209-l) only grants volunteer officers and
the determination of whether petitioner's recalcitrance in submitting a written resignation
Therefore, petitioner's sole remedy was in the nature of mandamus to review rather than
The four-month period of limitations governing mandamus to review starts to run when the
Commencement of this proceeding the following September was therefore untimely.
Since the lower courts correctly resolved this controversy, an affirmance is warranted.
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