PAULINE SNYDER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. TOWN INSULATION, INC., ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
81 N.Y.2d 429, 615 N.E.2d 999, 599 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1993).
June 15, 1993
4 No. 129 (1993 N.Y. Int. 135)
Decided June 15, 1993
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Richard J. Lippes, for Appellants.
William E. Nitterauer, for Respondent Town Insulation.
Preclusion ordered, for Respondent Scientific Applications.
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SIMONS, J.:
Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained as a result of emissions from urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation installed in their home in 1977. Defendants are the
manufacturers and installers of the insulation. The sole issue is
whether plaintiffs' causes of action for personal injuries are barred
by the three-year Statute of Limitations.(n 1) Because plaintiffs
conceded before the trial court that the date of discovery rule of
CPLR 214-c should not apply retroactively to their claims, resolution
of that question turns on whether accrual under CPLR 214 is measured
from the date of injury or from the date of last exposure.(n 2) We
agree with the courts below that the date of injury rule applies and
that the actions were time-barred. We therefore affirm.
In February 1977, plaintiff Pauline Snyder contracted with defendant
Town Insulation to have Rapco brand insulation installed at the home
she shared with her son, plaintiff Richard Snyder. The insulation was
blown into the walls of the house on March 29, 1977. Plaintiffs allege
they began to experience respiratory problems and other symptoms of
physical illness "about the date of installation". It was not until
1981, however, when the Federal government banned the sale of
urea-formaldehyde foam insulation, that the Snyders learned of the
emissions and that health hazards were associated with the product.
The State Department of Health later determined that formaldehyde was
present in the air inside the Snyders' home. The insulation has not
been removed from the dwelling.
SNIPPETS:
William E. Nitterauer, for Respondent Town Insulation.
Preclusion ordered, for Respondent Scientific Applications.
Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as a result of
The sole issue is whether plaintiffs' causes of action for personal injuries are barred by
actions were time-barred.
We therefore affirm.
It was not until 1981, however, when the Federal government banned the sale of
On February 1, 1982, nearly five years after the Snyders had the insulation installed, a
Because the Snyders claimed in their pleadings that they were injured "about the date of
The Snyders responded that under New York law a cause of action for personal injury arising
The Appellate Division affirmed but added in dicta that the date of last exposure rule
the cause of action does not accrue until an injury is sustained (Schmidt v Merchants Desp.
Co., 270 NY 287, 300-301; accord, Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90; see generally,
Stated another way, accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all
Co., 149 AD2d 20, 26).
But neither Martin nor any of the cited decisions of this Court have done so; for more than a
In Schmidt, a worker commenced a negligence action against his employer, alleging that
He argued that accrual should be marked from the date of the onset of the disease (270 NY
Giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt that dust inhalation -- and thus injury --
Nor was the issue raised in Schwartz v Heyden Newport Chem.
Thus none of the earlier cases supports plaintiffs, and their position ultimately rests on
that was the date of accrual because plaintiffs then could truthfully allege all the elements
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