UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK, APPELLANT, v. THE
CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
RESPONDENTS.
79 N.Y.2d 236, 590 N.E.2d 719, 581 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1992).
March 26, 1992
1 No. 49
Decided March 26, 1992
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
John F. Mills, for Appellant.
John Hogrogian, for Respondents.
TITONE, J.:
At issue in this appeal is the power of the Supreme Court to grant
injunctive relief as a means of preserving the status quo during the
pendency of an improper labor practice proceeding before the New York
City Board of Collective Bargaining. The courts below concluded that
the Supreme Court has no such power, and we agree. Accordingly,
plaintiff's complaint, which sought such relief, was properly
dismissed.
The parties' dispute began on November 26, 1990 with defendants'
issuance of an intra-departmental order changing the classification of
a position within the New York City Fire Department from "full duty"
to "light duty" effective January 1, 1991. Contending that the
reclassification would have a negative practical impact on the safety
of its members, plaintiff, the uniformed firefighters' collective
bargaining agent, filed petitions for relief with the New York City
Board of Collective Bargaining (the "Board"), the agency charged with
overseeing labor relations between the City and its employees (NYC
Admin Code § 12-309). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the
challenged order represented an improper labor practice and that it
ought to be rescinded so that the matter could be resolved through the
collective bargaining process (see, id., §§ 12-306, 307).
Shortly after filing its petitions, plaintiff commenced the present
action in Supreme Court seeking an order enjoining defendants from
implementing their new policy "pending a determination by OCB of the
merits of (plaintiff's) improper practice * * * and scope of
bargaining petition(s)." Plaintiff alleged that such relief was
SNIPPETS:
CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
At issue in this appeal is the power of the Supreme Court to grant injunctive relief as a
The parties' dispute began on November 26, 1990 with defendants' issuance of an
Contending that the reclassification would have a negative practical impact on the safety of
Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the challenged order represented an improper labor
plaintiff commenced the present action in Supreme Court seeking an order enjoining defendants
On the parties' cross-motions, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that it had
In support of that conclusion, the court relied on two recent Appellate Division decisions
79 AD2d 186) and distinguished a third (Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling on the ground that there was no
The purpose of plaintiff's Supreme Court action is not to obtain a final adjudication on the
The most obvious source of authority for granting preliminary injunctive relief is CPLR 6301,
Since there is no such judicial action pending between the parties here, a preliminary
As a general rule, the courts of this State have "no inherent absolute power to grant
the Legislature has placed elaborate restrictions on the use of preliminary injunctions in
Since such specific provisions would not apply to preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to
Significantly, consistent with the policies underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
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