MICHAEL SLAMOW ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. JOHN DELCOL, &C., APPELLANT, ET AL.,
  DEFENDANT.

    79 N.Y.2d 1016, 594 N.E.2d 918, 584 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1992).
    May 7, 1992

   2 No. 76
   Decided May 7, 1992
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   This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
   publication in the New York Reports.

   Matthew D. Arkin, for Appellant.
   David W. Silverman, for Respondents.

   MEMORANDUM:

   The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs,
   for the reasons stated by the Appellate Division (____AD2d_____).

   We would but add the following, in response to the dissent. The best
   evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they
   say in their writing. Here, the words used in the parties' contract
   are clear and unambiguous, and entitle the purchasers to return of
   their down payment. That this may be a standard clause in a form for
   the sale of real property suggests even more strongly that the clause
   should be rewritten if it is indeed inaccurate, rather than for this
   Court to speculate as to what the parties to a particular transaction
   could have believed it meant.
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   HANCOCK, J. (dissenting):

   I would reverse and reinstate the order of Supreme Court.

   The appeal turns on one issue: the meaning of paragraph 23, the
   mortgage contingency clause in form M 146 --the standard contract of
   sale for condominiums, prepared by The Committee on Real Property Law
   of The Association of The Bar of the City of New York. The standard
   mortgage contingency clause, -- with the blank spaces for the date and
   the amount of the lender's commitment filled in by the parties --
   provides in pertinent part:

     23. Mortgage Contingency: The obligations of Purchaser hereunder
     are conditioned upon issuance on or before September 1, 1988 of a