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1
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
CRIME BRIBERY INVESTIGATOR COURT JURY YORK INSPECTOR PENAL LAW VIOLATION HOTEL UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE OPINION JUDGE STATUTE APPELLATE DIVISION INFLUENCE AGREEMENT FIRE SAFETY NY2D HEARSAY STATEMENTS PRIMA FACIE CONSPIRACY PROSECUTION UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATOR CONVICTION MENTAL STATE CRIMINAL CODE INTERPRETATION |
THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. BAC TRAN, APPELLANT.
80 N.Y.2d 170, 603 N.E.2d 950, 589 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1992).
October 27, 1992
1 No. 181
Decided October 27, 1992
_________________________________________________________________
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Doris G. Traub, for Appellant.
Birgit E. Kollmar, for Respondent.
BELLACOSA, J.:
This prosecution stems from two separate incidents of alleged bribery
by defendant of a municipal fire safety inspector and an undercover
investigator. The amounts involved, $310 and $100, are relatively
petty. However, the object of these municipal-corruption-type crimes
-- official disregard of fire safety violations in two Manhattan
hotels -- is potentially very grave.
The appeal by a grant of leave from a Judge of this Court is from an
Appellate Division order affirming the conviction on both bribery
counts after a jury trial. Two primary issues are presented. The
first, which the People concede is an open question, is whether the
key phrase "agreement or understanding" in Penal Law § 200.00 means
only "intent to influence", or whether its plain language imposes on
the People the requirement to prove something more than simple intent.
Because we acknowledge and give effect to the Legislature's addition
of a new "gist" (People v Harper, 75 NY2d 313, 317) to the statute
that is distinct from simple intent, we must also determine whether
the People presented evidence sufficient to avoid dismissal of the
charge irrespective of error in the instruction to the jury on this
point.
The second count of the conviction against defendant implicates the
separate legal issue of whether the People presented independent prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy justifying use of a co-conspirator's
recorded hearsay evidence against defendant. We conclude that no prima
facie proof of a conspiracy was made out at any time during the trial
warranting admission of the recorded hearsay statements of the alleged
co- conspirator. The order of the Appellate Division should be
reversed and both counts of bribery in the third degree should be
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