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PEOPLE v SANTANA Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: PEOPLE, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>080_0092, Queens, York, Queens County, Cpl, Incompetent, Opinion, Supreme Court, Reason, Capacity, Separate, Charges, Determination, Queens County District, Psychiatrists, Defense Counsel, Commitment Order, Penal Law, Examination, Competency, Testimony, Criminal Action, Readiness, Prosecution, Appellate Division, Defendant Argues, Defendant Fit, York State Supreme, District Attorney , ContentID: 120249014

Case Documents
1 1992-07-07 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 120924
14 pages
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Total Documents: 1 document , 14 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT
QUEENS
YORK
QUEENS COUNTY
CPL
INCOMPETENT
OPINION
SUPREME COURT
REASON
CAPACITY
SEPARATE
CHARGES
DETERMINATION
QUEENS COUNTY DISTRICT
PSYCHIATRISTS
DEFENSE COUNSEL
COMMITMENT ORDER
PENAL LAW
EXAMINATION
COMPETENCY
TESTIMONY
CRIMINAL ACTION
READINESS
PROSECUTION
APPELLATE DIVISION
DEFENDANT ARGUES
DEFENDANT FIT
YORK STATE SUPREME
DISTRICT ATTORNEY


  THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. EMANUEL SANTANA, APPELLANT.

    80 N.Y.2d 92, 600 N.E.2d 201, 587 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1992).
    July 7, 1992

   2 No. 140
   Decided July 7, 1992
     _________________________________________________________________

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Stanley Neustadter, for Appellant.
   Annette Cohen, for Respondent.

   HANCOCK, J.:

   Defendant was indicted for forcible rape and robbery, first degree
   sexual abuse and other crimes for three separate incidents in Queens
   in which he attacked different women at knifepoint. He pleaded not
   guilty by reason of insanity. At the jury trial, the only issue was
   whether defendant lacked the mental capacity to commit the crimes by
   reason of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15). Defendant was
   convicted on all charges, and the Appellate Division affirmed
   unanimously.

   In his appeal to our court, defendant argues that there should be a
   reversal because of the trial court's restriction of his counsel's
   right to consult with his own psychiatric expert witness in connection
   with the cross-examination of the People's expert and concerning the
   possible presentation of surrebuttal testimony. We agree and conclude
   that there should be a new trial. For reasons which follow, however,
   we do not agree with defendant that the indictments should be
   dismissed for violation of the speedy trial rule (CPL § 30.30). Nor do
   we find merit in defendant's contention that the trial court was
   required to permit him to audio-tape the examination of his client by
   the People's clinical psychologist.

   I

   At trial, defendant conceded that he had committed the offenses and
   called witnesses only on the issue of his mental condition. The
   principal defense witness was Dr. Stephen Teich, a psychiatrist, who
   gave his expert opinion, based on several interviews with defendant,
   that defendant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
   Defendant, as a child, had been sexually abused by his brother. In
SNIPPETS:
  • Defendant was indicted for forcible rape and robbery, first degree sexual abuse and other
  • the only issue was whether defendant lacked the mental capacity to commit the crimes by
  • In his appeal to our court, defendant argues that there should be a reversal because of the
  • For reasons which follow, however, we do not agree with defendant that the indictments should
  • Nor do we find merit in defendant's contention that the trial court was required to permit
  • The principal defense witness was Dr. Stephen Teich, a psychiatrist, who gave his expert
  • Defense counsel, therefore, requested permission to audio-tape the examination for the
  • Defendant's trial, which took place in May 1987, was preceded by a prolonged period during
  • The period relevant to defendant's CPL § 30.30 contention begins on April 10, 1985 when the
  • Similar incompetency proceedings were also being conducted in New York County in connection
  • 1986 the director of Mid-Hudson notified New York County Supreme Court that the hospital
  • On September 24, 1986, Mid-Hudson for the first time notified Queens County Supreme Court and
  • The Appellate Division agreed with the denial of defendant's speedy trial motion but did so
  • a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,
  • Although the Queens County six-month commitment order expired on October 10, 1985, that
  • Defendant argues that the Queens County district attorney failed in his duty to monitor the
  • We hold only, under the unique circumstances of this case where defendant remained an
  • The majority nonetheless finds that the timing requirements of CPL 30.30 were not violated,
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