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PEOPLE v MEZON Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: PEOPLE, State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>080_0155, Motion, Suppression, Cpl, Written-notice, Ny2d, Prosecutor, Accordance, Appellate Division, Statutory, Response, Suppress Evidence, Reasonable Notice, Defense Counsel, Jennings, Opinion, Writing, County Court, Entertaining, Ruling, Concluding, Litigants, Inherent, Singleton, Lawrence, Protections, Judge, Unlawful Arrest, Expedite , ContentID: 120248994

Case Documents
1 1992-10-22 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 120904
4 pages
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Total Documents: 1 document , 4 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT
SUPPRESSION
CPL
WRITTEN-NOTICE
NY2D
PROSECUTOR
ACCORDANCE
APPELLATE DIVISION
STATUTORY
RESPONSE
DEFENDANT
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
REASONABLE NOTICE
DEFENSE COUNSEL
JENNINGS
OPINION
WRITING
COUNTY COURT
ENTERTAINING
RULING
CONCLUDING
LITIGANTS
INHERENT
SINGLETON
LAWRENCE
PROTECTIONS
JUDGE
UNLAWFUL ARREST
EXPEDITE


  THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. ERASMO MEZON, APPELLANT.

    80 N.Y.2d 155, 603 N.E.2d 943, 589 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1992).
    October 22, 1992

   2 No. 182
   Decided October 22, 1992
     _________________________________________________________________

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Bennett L. Gershman, for Appellant.
   Richard Longworth Hecht, for Respondent.

   TITONE, J.:

   CPL 710.60(1) provides that pretrial motions to suppress evidence must
   be made "in writing and upon reasonable notice to the people." The
   issue in this appeal is whether the People may effectively waive
   compliance with this statutory requirement. Although we conclude that
   a waiver is permissible, we nonetheless hold that in this case
   defendant's oral motion should not have been considered because, as an
   examination of the record reveals, the People did not, in fact, waive
   their right to receive written notice of his motion.

   In November 1989, while defendant was being arraigned on an indictment
   charging him with burglary and other related offenses, defense counsel
   asked the County Court if it would consider entertaining an oral
   application to suppress certain evidence which had been seized from
   defendant at the time of his arrest. The prosecutor responded that he
   believed that his office would expedite the motion if he could "just
   have (it) in writing." The County Court, however, stated that it was
   "going to allow the oral application." In so ruling, the court
   observed that the People would not be "prejudiced."

   Immediately after deciding to entertain the oral application, the
   court invited defense counsel to speak about the facts underlying the
   motion. Counsel thereafter related certain unsworn allegations that
   had been made at defendant's preliminary hearing. Although the
   prosecutor was given the opportunity to mention any additional facts
   he deemed relevant, he confined himself to a reading of the factual
   narrative in the police report, noting that he felt himself to be at
   somewhat of a "disadvantage" because he had not been present at the
   felony hearing. In response to further inquiry by the court, the
   prosecutor stated that the People would be ready to proceed with a
SNIPPETS:
  • CPL 710.60provides that pretrial motions to suppress evidence must be made "in writing and
  • Although we conclude that a waiver is permissible, we nonetheless hold that in this case
  • In November 1989, while defendant was being arraigned on an indictment charging him with
  • The prosecutor responded that he believed that his office would expedite the motion if he
  • In so ruling, the court observed that the People would not be "prejudiced."
  • Although the prosecutor was given the opportunity to mention any additional facts he deemed
  • In response to further inquiry by the court, the prosecutor stated that the People would be
  • After hearing from both sides, the County Court granted defendant's motion, concluding that
  • Relying on CPL 710.60, that court concluded that defense counsel's oral application to
  • The Appellate Division correctly ruled that the County Court should not have entertained
  • A motion to suppress evidence on any of the grounds set forth in CPL 710.20 is litigated in
  • CPL 710.60provides that such motions, when made prior to trial, "must be in writing and upon
  • the trial courts are not empowered to dispense with CPL 710.60's written notice requirement
  • Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 6-7, citing Riglander v Star Co., 98 App Div 101,
  • We have previously considered the People's power to waive analogous statutory written-notice
  • In People v Singleton, for example, we ruled that by failing to object to the unorthodox
  • Finally, in People v Jennings, we discussed Singleton and Lawrence and elaborated upon the
  • Where the prosecution deems such protections unnecessary, we concluded, there is no sound
  • Nor does the law require litigants who have unsuccessfully sought a ruling to boycott the
  • Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified in accordance with the
  • Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Hancock and Bellacosa concur.
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