THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. JOHN MAY, APPELLANT.
81 N.Y.2d 725, 609 N.E.2d 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1992).
December 16, 1992
1 No. 247
Decided December 16, 1992
_________________________________________________________________
This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
DeNice Powell, for Appellant.
Hector Gonzalez, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, defendant's
motion to suppress granted and the indictment dismissed.
On March 8, 1989, at about 2:30 a.m., defendant and a female companion
were seated in a parked Oldsmobile on a deserted street known for
criminal activity. Two police officers, patrolling in a marked car,
drove up behind them to investigate. As the officers approached, with
the patrol car's red turret lights and spotlight on, defendant started
the engine of the Oldsmobile and slowly pulled away. At this point,
one of the officers, using the police car's loudspeaker, ordered the
car to pull over. Defendant did so.
The officers approached the Oldsmobile and asked defendant to produce
his license, registration or insurance card and as the officers waited
for him to do so, they noticed that a towel was draped over the
steering wheel column. They called in the car's license plate number
and were advised that the car was stolen. The officers then placed
defendant under arrest. A body search revealed three vials of crack
cocaine in his pocket, and when the towel was removed from the
steering column the officers discovered that the column had been
broken and rewired.
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the crack and the police
pictures subsequently taken of the stolen car as the fruits of an
illegal stop and seizure. The motion was denied.
We preliminarily note that, despite the fact that defendant was seated
in a stolen car, the police stopped him personally and he consequently
has standing to challenge the legality of that stop (see, People v
SNIPPETS:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, defendant's motion to suppress
On March 8, 1989, at about 2:30 a.m., defendant and a female companion were seated in a
As the officers approached, with the patrol car's red turret lights and spotlight on,
At this point, one of the officers, using the police car's loudspeaker, ordered the car to
The officers approached the Oldsmobile and asked defendant to produce his license,
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the crack and the police pictures subsequently
We preliminarily note that, despite the fact that defendant was seated in a stolen car, the
Turning to the merits, we hold that when the police, using red turret lights, a spotlight and
the police officers here could not have entertained a reasonable suspicion that a crime had
Moreover, defendant's action in moving the car slowly away as the police approached could not
The police could have followed the car, to keep it under observation while they checked on
Nothing said here should be construed as holding that the police may not make a common-law
The police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them, however, without a
The instant case deals with the second level, the common law right of inquiry in an analogous
The conduct of the officers, among the range of options available in the given circumstances,
this latest twist of the operating principle in this milieu thrusts the common law right to
Acting Chief Judge Simons and Judges Kaye,
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