THE PEOPLE &C., RESPONDENT, v. MARVIN HARRIS, APPELLANT.

    80 N.Y.2d 796, 599 N.E.2d 681, 587 N.Y.S.2d 277 (1992).
    June 9, 1992

   2 No. 95
   Decided June 9, 1992
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   This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
   publication in the New York Reports.

   Harold V. Ferguson, Jr., for Appellant.
   William M. Harrington, for Respondent.

   MEMORANDUM:

   The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

   Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of robbery in the first
   degree for his participation in the knife-point mugging of an elderly
   victim as she approached and entered her Brooklyn home. At trial, the
   victim testified regarding her lineup identification of defendant.
   Admission of this testimony, which should have been suppressed because
   of the suggestive nature of the lineup, was erroneous. Despite this
   trial error, the Appellate Division affirmed under the harmless error
   doctrine. It concluded that strong independent source evidence
   supporting the victim's in-court identification of defendant was
   established and explicitly found by the hearing court, and that this
   evidence was sufficient to satisfy the harmless error test.

   While the Appellate Division was correct that the existence of an
   independent source for an in-court identification is relevant to
   harmless error determinations, in this case the strength of the
   independent source evidence, standing alone, does not establish
   harmless error. A traditional and more thorough harmless error
   analysis is required.

   We nevertheless agree that the order affirming the judgment of
   conviction should be affirmed. The mugging victim's strong,
   independently evolved, nonsuggestive, in-court identification was
   buttressed by her sister's testimony and by other surrounding
   evidentiary inferences and circumstances. Taken together, there is no
   reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to
   defendant's conviction; thus, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
   doubt (see, People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677; see also, People v Crimmins,