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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
EXCEPTION MEMORANDUM APPELLANT MAYORAL SUCCESSION MAYOR COMMON COUNCIL PRESIDENT PROVISION LEGISLATURE UTICA CITY RESPONDENTS YORK RICHARD COSTS GOVERNS POWERS CITY CHARTER VACANCY GENERAL ELECTION INCONSISTENT BILL JACKET CONSTITUTION JUDGE NY2D CHIEF JUDGE KAYE JUDGES SMITH LEVINE CIPARICK WESLEY ROSENBLATT CONCUR |
4 No. 149
In the Matter of Edward Revere,
Appellant,
v.
Robert Sullivan, as Utica City Clerk, et al.,
Respondents.
_________________________________________________________________
2000 NY Int. 100
September 15, 2000
This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
Richard E. Kaplan, for appellant.
Richard A. Frye, for respondents.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
General City Law § 2-a(1) governs mayoral succession in cities
where the Mayor and Common Council President (or comparable officer)
are elected citywide and hold office in tandem. The law provides that
upon resignation of the Mayor, the powers and duties of the mayoralty
devolve upon the Common Council President "for the residue of the
term" (General City Law § 2-a(1)). The statute, however, contains an
exception. To qualify for the exception, a city charter provision must
have been enacted prior to November 5, 1975 and provide "for a vacancy
in the office of mayor to be filled in at the next general election if
the vacancy occurs before the twentieth day of September and otherwise
in the general election held in the following year" (General City Law
§ 2-a(3)(b)). Because Utica City Code § 2.023(c) does not fit within
the exception, the successorship provision of General City Law
2-a(1) governs. To the extent that Henry v Tutunjian (96 AD2d 1009) is
inconsistent with our holding today, it should not be followed.
The legislative history of General City Law § 2-a(3)(b) leaves no
doubt as to the limited purpose of the exception (see, Bill Jacket,
L 1980, ch 191). It was drawn specifically to rectify an inconsistency
between the General City Law and the New York City Charter (see,
Sponsor's Memorandum, in Bill Jacket, L 1980, ch 191). The Legislature
did not enact the exception to invite local departures from the
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