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THE PEOPLE &C. v CARLOS CINTRON Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: THE PEOPLE &C., State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>I00_0113, Evidence, Officers, Car, Ny2d, Vehicle, Jury, Possession, Police, Inference, Stolen Property, Guilt, Lights, Flight, Appellant, Exclusive Possession, Judge, Crimes, Consent, Inferring, Consciousness, Facts, Yazum, Disbelief, Supra, Charges, Circumstantial Evidence, Appellate Division, Insufficient , ContentID: 120248425

Case Documents
1 2000-10-24 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 120335
3 pages
HTML
Total Documents: 1 document , 3 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
EVIDENCE
OFFICERS
CAR
NY2D
VEHICLE
JURY
POSSESSION
POLICE
INFERENCE
STOLEN PROPERTY
GUILT
LIGHTS
FLIGHT
APPELLANT
EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION
JUDGE
CRIMES
CONSENT
INFERRING
CONSCIOUSNESS
FACTS
YAZUM
DISBELIEF
SUPRA
CHARGES
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
LAW
APPELLATE DIVISION
INSUFFICIENT


   2 No. 96
   The People &c.,
   Respondent,
   v.
   Carlos Cintron,
   Appellant.
     _________________________________________________________________

   2000 NY Int. 113

   October 24, 2000

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Joshua M. Levine, for appellant.
   Sabine Browne, for respondent.
     _________________________________________________________________

   WESLEY
   , J.:

   On the evening of January 12, 1997, two police officers parked in an
   unmarked car on a one-way street in Brooklyn spotted defendant Carlos
   Cintron when he drove past them in a green 1990 Acura Legend and
   sounded its horn. When the officers entered the license plate number
   into their police vehicle's computer console, they discovered that the
   insurance on the car had been suspended. The officers then decided to
   follow the car.

   After defendant went through a red light at an intersection, forcing
   pedestrians to jump out of the way, the officers turned on their
   flashing lights and siren. Defendant did not stop but instead
   accelerated, leading the officers on a high-speed car chase during
   which he wove in and out of traffic and executed various evasive
   maneuvers. He eventually crashed the vehicle into a guardrail. When
   the officers approached, defendant jumped from the car and ran. A
   foot-chase ensued and the officers ultimately apprehended defendant.
   The officers later learned that the car had been stolen three days
   earlier. Defendant testified at trial that a friend had let him drive
   the car, that he drove away at high speed because he was fleeing from
   a man with a gun, and that he did not hear the police siren or see the
   flashing lights.

   The court did not instruct the jury either on the inference arising
   from the recent and exclusive possession of stolen property (see, 1
SNIPPETS:
  • The People &c., Respondent, v. Carlos Cintron, Appellant.
  • On the evening of January 12, 1997, two police officers parked in an unmarked car on a
  • After defendant went through a red light at an intersection, forcing pedestrians to jump out
  • He eventually crashed the vehicle into a guardrail.
  • The court did not instruct the jury either on the inference arising from the recent and
  • The jury found defendant guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third and
  • The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and a Judge of this Court granted defendant
  • Defendant argues that, due to the People's failure to request the charges noted above, the
  • Under this standard, the People are entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to
  • In order to establish defendant's guilt of criminal possession of stolen property, the People
  • Unauthorized use of a vehicle requires the People to prove that the defendant knew that he
  • the jury could reasonably conclude from both the direct and the circumstantial evidence
  • Knowledge that property is stolen can be established through circumstantial evidence "such as
  • In addition, the jury could reasonably have inferred defendant's knowledge that the car was
  • The jury was also entitled to find consciousness of guilt if they disbelieved defendant's
  • While we have noted that evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as flight, has limited
  • These facts are sufficient to support the reasonable inference that defendant knew that the
  • The absence of specific jury charges concerning a defendant's exclusive and recent possession
  • Those charges inform the jury of inferences they are entitled to draw; their absence does not
  • the jury's disbelief of defendant's testimony only compounds the existing consciousness of
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