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1
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE DEFENSE EVIDENCE JURY NY2D AMOROSE SUPRA REASONABLENESS REASONABLE EXPLANATION MOYE MURDER CHARGE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE EXCUSE DETERMINATION RESPONDENT APPELLANT PENAL LAW SUBMISSION JUDGE REVERSE CASASSA SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT LLOYD OBJECTIVE ELEMENT CONTROL INFLUENCE |
2 No. 127
The People &c.,
Respondent,
v.
Lydell Harris,
Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
2000 NY Int. 122
November 16, 2000
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
De Nice Powell, for appellant.
Anthea H. Bruffee, for respondent.
_________________________________________________________________
LEVINE, J.:
Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murder in the second
degree (Penal Law § 125.25(1)). The evidence established that
defendant killed his long-time friend, Larry Amorose, with a machete.
With the help of his girlfriend, defendant decapitated and dismembered
Amorose's body, put the body parts in garbage bags and discarded the
bags in the ocean off Coney Island.
The trial court rejected defendant's request for a charge on extreme
emotional disturbance (Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a)) on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to justify submission of that
affirmative defense to the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the
judgment of conviction (266 2 564), and a Judge of this Court granted
defendant leave to appeal. We now reverse.
The Legislature has recognized that some intentional homicides may
result from "an understandable human response deserving of mercy"
(People v Casassa, , 49 NY2d 668, 680-681, cert denied 449 US
842). Thus, the fact "that (a) homicide was committed under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating
circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree"
(Penal Law § 125.20(2)). Mitigation is not limited to circumstances
associated with the traditional "heat of passion" doctrine, but may be
considered with respect to a broad range of situations where the trier
of fact believes that such leniency should be afforded an emotionally
disturbed defendant (see, People v Casassa, supra, at 679, 681).
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