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THE PEOPLE &C. v GIOVANI N. QUINONES Click to find out why . . .



Keywords & Phrases
CourtCode: AP, CourtName: NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, Plaintiff: THE PEOPLE &C., State: NEW YORK, UniqueCaseRef: NE>AP>I00_0121, Penal Law, Restitution, Victim Assistance Fee, Mandatory Surcharge/crime, Sentencing Court, Impose, Crime Victim, Appellate Division, Robbery, Ad2d, Pay, Affirm, Driver, Cab, Judge, Cabrera, Payment, Paid, Language, Respondent, Opinion, Ciparick, Statute, Conviction, Jury, Charges, Incidents, Money, Guilty , ContentID: 120248414

Case Documents
1 2000-11-16 OPINION
[ see first page and extracted highlights below  ] ItemID: 120324
3 pages
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Total Documents: 1 document , 3 pages
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1 . OPINION

EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
RESTITUTION
VICTIM ASSISTANCE FEE
DEFENDANT
MANDATORY SURCHARGE/CRIME
SENTENCING COURT
IMPOSE
CRIME VICTIM
APPELLATE DIVISION
ROBBERY
AD2D
PAY
AFFIRM
DRIVER
CAB
JUDGE
CABRERA
PAYMENT
PAID
LANGUAGE
RESPONDENT
OPINION
CIPARICK
STATUTE
CONVICTION
JURY
CHARGES
INCIDENTS
MONEY
GUILTY


   2 No. 123
   The People &c.,
   Respondent,
   v.
   Giovani N. Quinones,
   Appellant.
     _________________________________________________________________

   2000 NY Int. 121

   November 16, 2000

   This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
   in the New York Reports.

   Submitted by Yasmin Daley Duncan, for appellant.
   Ellen O'Hara Woods, for respondent.
     _________________________________________________________________

   CIPARICK, J.:

   The primary issue in this appeal is whether, consistent with Penal
   Law § 60.35(6), a sentencing court may simultaneously impose a
   sentence of restitution to the crime victim, along with the mandatory
   surcharge/crime victim assistance fee. Based on the clear language of
   that statute, we conclude that the sentencing court can order both,
   and we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

   Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of four counts of robbery
   in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree.
   These charges arose out of two incidents, the first of which involved
   the robbery of a taxicab driver. Defendant along with three young
   women hired a cab to take them to a deserted location. Brandishing
   knives, they ordered the driver to give them money. The driver
   complied, giving defendant and his companions $100 in cash and then
   exited the cab. Defendant and the others drove away with the cab and
   its contents. In the second incident that same day, defendant and a
   young woman held their victim at knifepoint and demanded money. He had
   only 25 cents and a stick of gum, which defendant and his cohort took.

   The robberies were charged in separate indictments but these were
   joined for trial. Defendant's accomplices accepted guilty pleas and
   agreed to testify against him at trial. After the jury returned guilty
   verdicts on all the robbery counts, County Court imposed a prison term
   for each conviction, and ordered defendant to pay the cab driver $100
   in restitution (see, Penal Law § 60.27). The court also imposed the
SNIPPETS:
  • This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York
  • Ellen O'Hara Woods, for respondent.
  • The primary issue in this appeal is whether, consistent with Penal Law § 60.35, a sentencing
  • Based on the clear language of that statute, we conclude that the sentencing court can order
  • Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of four counts of robbery in the first degree and
  • These charges arose out of two incidents, the first of which involved the robbery of a
  • giving defendant and his companions $100 in cash and then exited the cab.
  • In the second incident that same day, defendant and a young woman held their victim at
  • After the jury returned guilty verdicts on all the robbery counts, County Court imposed a
  • The Appellate Division affirmed in all respects, and a Judge of this Court granted defendant
  • The First and Third Departments prohibit a sentencing court from imposing the mandatory
  • The Second and Fourth Departments are of the view that both can be imposed simultaneously,
  • We hold that the plain language of the statute permits the sentencing court to order both
  • The Legislature could have prohibited the imposition of both outright, but instead employed
  • Opinion by Judge Ciparick.
  •    |