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1
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
TRAFFIC LAW HIGHWAY STATUTE HAZARD VEHICLES EXEMPT COURT RECKLESS DISREGARD LEGISLATION YORK WILSON EMERGENCY VEHICLES RILEY STANDARD INTERPRET RESPONDENTS APPELLANTS HAZARDOUS OPERATION BILL JACKET PROVISIONS LIABILITY CHIEF JUDGE STREET SWEEPER LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LEGISLATURE SNOWPLOW RECKLESSNESS STANDARD LANGUAGE MOTOR VEHICLES AMENDMENT |
3 No. 131
Betty A. Riley et al.,
Appellants,
v.
County of Broome, et al.,
Respondents.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4 No. 132
John P. Wilson,
Appellant,
v.
State of New York,
Respondent.
_________________________________________________________________
Case No. 131:
_________________________________________________________________
2000 NY Int. 124
November 21, 2000
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication
in the New York Reports.
Thomas F. Cannavino, for appellants.
Robert G. Behnke, for respondents. Case No. 132: Lawrence W. Golden,
for appellant.
Robert M. Goldfarb, for respondent.
_________________________________________________________________
KAYE, CHIEF JUDGE:
These appeals call upon us to do what increasingly is asked of courts
in this age of statutes: interpret the words of a legislative
enactment which the contesting parties construe differently. In
particular, we are asked whether Vehicle and Traffic Law section
1103(b) exempts statutorily defined "hazard vehicles" engaged in
highway work from the "rules of the road," and whether it limits the
liability of their owners and operators to reckless disregard for the
safety of others. We conclude that defendants correctly read the
statute, and we hold -- as did the courts before us -- that the
vehicles here were exempt from the rules of the road and their
liability limited to reckless conduct.
SNIPPETS:
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