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MOTION OF RESPONDENT LIBERTY MEDIA CORP TO REOPEN
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DECISION & ORDER
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TCI COMMISSION LMC TURNER PROGRAMMING SERVICE COMPETITION LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION VIDEO PROGRAMMING ACQUISITION COMPLAINT RESPONDENTS TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM LIBERTY MEDIA MVPD FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SUBSCRIBERS TELE-COMMUNICATIONS CLAYTON ACT SEPARATE COMPANY DISTRIBUTION TCI CONTROL SHAREHOLDERS TIME WARNER CATVS NATIONAL VIDEO PROGRAMMING CNN UNITED STATES CARRIAGE TERMS DBS HBO VOTING POWER |
9610004
B213455
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
COMMISSIONERS: Robert Pitofsky, Chairman
Mary L. Azcuenaga
Janet D. Steiger
Roscoe B. Starek, III
Christine A. Varney
____________________________________)
In the Matter of ))
TIME WARNER INC., )
a corporation; ))
TURNER BROADCASTING )
SYSTEM, INC., )
a corporation; )) Docket No. C-3709
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
a corporation; and ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, )
a corporation. )
____________________________________)
The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having initiated an
investigation of the proposed acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
( Turner ) by Time Warner Inc. ( Time Warner ), and Tele-Communications, Inc. s
( TCI ) and Liberty Media Corporation s ( LMC ) proposed acquisitions of
interests in Time Warner, and it now appearing that Time Warner, Turner, TCI,
and LMC (collectively, Respondents ) having been furnished with a copy of a
draft complaint that the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the
Commission for its consideration, and which, if issued by the Commission,
would charge respondents with violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18; and
Respondents, their attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having
thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by
respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft
of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement
purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law
has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other
provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and
The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having
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CONSENT AGREEMENT
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TCI AGREEMENT PROPOSED RESPONDENTS LMC VIDEO PROGRAMMING SERVICE COMMISSION TURNER OFFICERS LIBERTY MEDIA MVPD BUSINESS SEPARATE COMPANY TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM LAW TCI CONTROL SHAREHOLDERS TELE-COMMUNICATIONS ACQUISITION TIME WARNER CATVS CARRIAGE TERMS SUBSCRIBERS FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VOTING POWER AFFILIATES NATIONAL VIDEO PROGRAMMING DISTRIBUTION SUCCESSORS TWE REPRESENTATIVES WTBS |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
___________________________________ )
In the Matter of ) )
TIME WARNER INC., )
a corporation; ))
TURNER BROADCASTING )
SYSTEM, INC., )
a corporation; )) File No. 961-0004
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
a corporation; and ))
LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, )
a corporation. )
___________________________________ )
AGREEMENT CONTAINING CONSENT ORDER
The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having initiated an investigation of
the proposed acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner") by Time Warner Inc.
("Time Warner"), and Tele-Communications, Inc.'s ("TCI") and Liberty Media Corporation's
("LMC") proposed acquisitions of interests in Time Warner, and it now appearing that Time
Warner, Turner, TCI, and LMC, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "proposed
respondents," are willing to enter into an agreement containing an order to divest certain
assets, and providing for other relief:
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between proposed respondents, by their duly
authorized officers and attorneys, and counsel for the Commission that:
1. Proposed respondent Time Warner is a corporation organized, existing and doing
business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware with its office and
principal place of business located at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York
10019.
2. Proposed respondent Turner is a corporation organized, existing and doing business
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, with its office and principal
place of business located at One CNN Center, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.
3. Proposed respondent TCI is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under
and by virtue of the law of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of
business located at 5619 DTC Parkway, Englewood, Colorado 80111.
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COMPLETE CONSENT PACKAGE
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TCI TURNER AGREEMENT RESPONDENT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LMC PROPOSED RESPONDENTS PROGRAMMING SERVICE BUSINESS TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM ACQUISITION CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING LIBERTY MEDIA OFFICERS CONSENT ORDER MVPDS VIDEO PROGRAMMING SEPARATE COMPANY TELE-COMMUNICATIONS TCI CONTROL SHAREHOLDERS DISTRIBUTION SUBSCRIBERS TRADE COMMISSION ACT UNITED STATES VOTING POWER WTBS CARRIAGE TERMS TIME WARNER CATVS AFFILIATES |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
___________________________________ )
In the Matter of ) )
TIME WARNER INC., )
a corporation; ))
TURNER BROADCASTING )
SYSTEM, INC., )
a corporation; )) File No. 961-0004
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
a corporation; and ))
LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, )
a corporation. )
___________________________________ )
AGREEMENT CONTAINING CONSENT ORDER
The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having initiated an investigation of
the proposed acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner") by Time Warner Inc.
("Time Warner"), and Tele-Communications, Inc.'s ("TCI") and Liberty Media Corporation's
("LMC") proposed acquisitions of interests in Time Warner, and it now appearing that Time
Warner, Turner, TCI, and LMC, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "proposed
respondents," are willing to enter into an agreement containing an order to divest certain
assets, and providing for other relief:
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between proposed respondents, by their duly
authorized officers and attorneys, and counsel for the Commission that:
1. Proposed respondent Time Warner is a corporation organized, existing and doing
business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware with its office and
principal place of business located at 75 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York
10019.
1
2. Proposed respondent Turner is a corporation organized, existing and doing business
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Georgia, with its office and principal
place of business located at One CNN Center, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.
3. Proposed respondent TCI is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under
and by virtue of the law of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of
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COMPLAINT
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RESPONDENT TIME WARNER TURNER TRADE COMMISSION ACT FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TELEVISION PROGRAMMING SERVICES CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING AGREEMENTS MVPDS LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION TCI CLAYTON ACT TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM UNITED STATES SALE COMMERCE HOUSEHOLDS TIMES RELEVANT SUBSCRIPTION REVENUES COMMON STOCK TELE-COMMUNICATIONS LMC OUTSTANDING CNN SUBSCRIBERS LOCAL AREAS TIME WARNER-TURNER ACQUISITION CROWN JEWEL HEADLINE NEWS WTBS |
9610004
B213455
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
____________________________________)
In the Matter of ))
TIME WARNER INC., )
a corporation; )
)
TURNER BROADCASTING )
SYSTEM, INC., ) Docket No. C-3709
a corporation; )
)
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
a corporation; and ))
LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, )
a corporation. )
____________________________________)
COMPLAINT
Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, and
by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Acts, the Federal Trade Commission
("Commission"), having reason to believe that respondents Time Warner Inc., Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc., Tele-Communications, Inc., and Liberty Media Corporation, all
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, have entered into various agreements in violation of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and that if the
terms of such agreements were to be consummated, would result in a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof
would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:
I. Definitions
1. For the purposes of this complaint, the following definitions shall apply:
a. "Cable Television Programming Service" means satellite-delivered video
programming that is offered, alone or with other services, to Multichannel Video Programming
Distributors ("MVPDs") in the United States.
b. "Fully Diluted Equity of Time Warner" means all Time Warner common stock
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AZCUENAGA STATEMENT
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MARKET TCI TURNER ENTRY COMPETITION PROGRAMMING TRANSACTION COMMISSION LAW EFFICIENCIES SUBSCRIBERS NETWORKS CHANNEL ANTITRUST PRICE AGREEMENTS FCC DBS CABLE SYSTEM OPERATORS MVPDS DISTRIBUTION CNN FCC REPORT CONSENT ORDER ACQUISITION CLAYTON ACT HBO VIDEO PROGRAMMING CABLE HOUSEHOLDS |
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MARY L. AZCUENAGA
in Time Warner Inc., Docket C-3709
The Commission today issues a consent order to settle allegations that
the acquisition by Time Warner Inc. (Time Warner) of Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. (Turner), and related agreements with
Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), would be unlawful. Alleging that this
transaction violates the law is possible only by abandoning the rigor
of the Commission's usual analysis under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
To reach this result, the majority adopts a highly questionable market
definition, ignores any consideration of efficiencies and blindly
assumes difficulty of entry in the antitrust sense in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The decision of the majority
also departs from more general principles of antitrust law by favoring
competitors over competition and contrived theory over facts.
The usual analysis of competitive effects under the law, unlike the
apparent analysis of the majority, would take full account of the
swirling forces of innovation and technological advances in this
dynamic industry. Unfortunately, the complaint and the underlying
theories on which the order is based do not begin to satisfy the
rigorous standard for merger analysis that this agency has applied for
years. Instead, the majority employs a looser standard for liability
and a regulatory order that threatens the likely efficiencies from the
transaction. Having found no reason to relax our standards of analysis
for this case, I cannot agree that the order is warranted.
Product Market
We focus in merger analysis on the likelihood that the transaction
will create or enhance the ability to exercise market power, i.e.,
raise prices. The first step usually is to examine whether the merging
firms sell products that are substitutes for one another to see if
there is a horizontal competitive overlap. This is important in a case
based on a theory of unilateral anticompetitive effects, as this one
is, because the theory requires a showing that the products of the
merging firms are the first and second choices for consumers.
In this case, it could be argued from the perspective of cable system
operators and other multichannel video program distributors (MVPDs),
who are purchasers of programming services, that all video programming
networks are substitutes. This is the horizontal competitive overlap
that is alleged in the complaint.
One problem with the alleged all-programming market is that basic
cable programming services (such as Turner's CNN) and premium cable
programming services (such as Time Warner's HBO) are not substitutes
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APPENDIX I
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TIME WARNER COMMISSION TURNER CONSENT ORDER BUSINESS TCI LMC LIBERTY MEDIA STOCK ACQUISITION PROGRAMMING SERVICE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAW TELE-COMMUNICATIONS IRS COUNSEL VIRTUE TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM REQUIRING DISTRIBUTION RULING PARTIES PROVISIONS DELAWARE TRADE COMMISSION ACT LIBERTY TRACKING STOCK SEPARATE HOLDERS INTERNAL REVENUE |
Appendix I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
____________________________________))
In the Matter of ) )
TIME WARNER INC., )
a corporation; ))
TURNER BROADCASTING )
SYSTEM, INC., )
a corporation; )) File No. 961-0004
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )
a corporation; and ))
LIBERTY MEDIA CORPORATION, )
a corporation. ))
____________________________________)
INTERIM AGREEMENT
This Interim Agreement is by and between Time Warner Inc. ("Time Warner"), a
corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the law of the State
of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business at New York, New York; Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner"), a corporation organized, existing, and doing business
under and by virtue of the law of the State of Georgia with its office and principal place of
business at Atlanta, Georgia; Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI"), a corporation organized,
existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the law of the State of Delaware, with its
office and principal place of business located at Englewood, Colorado; Liberty Media Corp.
("LMC"), a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the law
of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business located at Englewood,
Colorado; and the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), an independent agency of the
United States Government, established under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15
U.S.C. § 41 et seq.
WHEREAS Time Warner entered into an agreement with Turner for Time Warner to
acquire the outstanding voting securities of Turner, and TCI and LMC proposed to acquire
stock in Time Warner (hereinafter "the Acquisition");
WHEREAS the Commission is investigating the Acquisition to determine whether it
would violate any statute enforced by the Commission;
WHEREAS TCI and LMC are willing to enter into an Agreement Containing Consent
Order (hereafter "Consent Order") requiring them, inter alia, to divest TCI's and LMC's
Interest in Time Warner and TCI's and LMC's Turner-Related Businesses," by contributing
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ANALYSIS TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT
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TCI PROGRAMMING TURNER CONSENT ORDER DISTRIBUTION PROPOSED CONSENT ORDER COMMISSION AGREEMENT CARRIAGE OWNERSHIP CABLE TELEVISION CABLE NETWORKS RELATED TRANSACTIONS ACQUISITION SEPARATE COMPANY LMC TIME WARNER STOCK TCI CONTROL SHAREHOLDERS INCENTIVES NEWS SERVICE CNN MARKET POWER TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM INTERIM AGREEMENT SUBSCRIBERS PSAS MVPDS CABLE SYSTEM OPERATORS COMPETITION |
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED
CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT
I. Introduction
The Federal Trade Commission has accepted for public comment from Time Warner
Inc. ("Time Warner"), Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("Turner"), Tele-Communications,
Inc. ("TCI"), and Liberty Media Corporation ("LMC") (collectively "the proposed
respondents") an Agreement Containing Consent Order ("the proposed consent order"). The
Commission has also entered into an Interim Agreement that requires the proposed
respondents to take specific action during the public comment period.
The proposed consent order is designed to remedy likely antitrust effects arising from
Time Warner's acquisition of Turner as well as related transactions, including TCI's proposed
ownership interest in Time Warner and long-term cable television programming service
agreements between Time Warner and TCI for post-acquisition carriage by TCI of Turner
programming.
II. Description of the Parties, the Acquisition and Related Transactions
Time Warner is a leading provider of cable networks and a leading distributor of cable
television. Time Warner Entertainment ("TWE"), a partnership in which Time Warner holds
the majority interest, owns HBO and Cinemax, two premium cable networks. Time Warner
and Time Warner Cable, a subsidiary of TWE, are collectively the nation's second largest
distributor of cable television and serve approximately 11.5 million cable subscribers or
approximately 17 percent of U.S. cable television households.
Turner is a leading provider of cable networks. Turner owns the following "marquee"
or "crown jewel" cable networks: Cable News Network ("CNN"), Turner Network
Television ("TNT"), and TBS SuperStation (referred to as "WTBS"). Turner also owns
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STAREK STATEMENT
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COMPETITION COMMISSION TBS COMPLAINT VERTICAL INTEGRATION TRANSACTION DISTRIBUTORS PRICE MARKET POWER PRODUCERS MVPD FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BUNDLING ENTRY DOCKET TCI DISSENTING STATEMENT COMPETITIVE HARM INCENTIVES COMMISSIONER ROSCOE PROGRAMMERS CABLE OPERATORS SUBSTITUTES SUBSCRIBERS TIME WARNER TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM TRADE COMMISSION ACT ACQUISITION FORECLOSURE |
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROSCOE B. STAREK, III
In the Matter of
Time Warner Inc., et al.
Docket No. C-3709
I respectfully dissent from the Commission's decision to issue a
complaint and final order against Time Warner Inc. ("TW"), Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. ("TBS"), Tele-Communications, Inc. ("TCI"),
and Liberty Media Corporation. The complaint against these producers
and distributors of cable television programming alleges
anticompetitive effects arising from (1) the horizontal integration of
the programming interests of TW and TBS and (2) the vertical
integration of TBS's programming interests with TW's and TCI's
distribution interests. I am not persuaded that either the horizontal
or the vertical aspects of this transaction are likely "substantially
to lessen competition" in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18, or otherwise to constitute "unfair methods of
competition" in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. Moreover, even if one were to assume the validity
of one or more theories of violation underlying this action, the order
does not appear to prevent the alleged effects and may instead create
inefficiency.
Horizontal Theories of Competitive Harm
This transaction involves, inter alia, the combination of TW and TBS,
two major suppliers of programming to multichannel video program
distributors ("MVPDs"). Accordingly, there is a straightforward theory
of competitive harm that merits serious consideration by the
Commission. In its most general terms, the theory is that cable
operators regard TW programs as close substitutes for TBS programs.
Therefore, the theory says, TW and TBS act as premerger constraints on
each other's ability to raise program prices. Under this hypothesis,
the merger eliminates this constraint, allowing TW -- either
unilaterally or in coordination with other program vendors -- to raise
prices on some or all of its programs.
Of course, this story is essentially an illustration of the standard
theory of competitive harm set forth in Section 2 of the 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Were an investigation pursuant to this
theory to yield convincing evidence that it applies to the current
transaction, under most circumstances the Commission would seek
injunctive relief to prevent the consolidation of the assets in
question. The Commission has eschewed that course of action, however,
choosing instead a very different sort of "remedy" that allows the
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PITOFSKY STATEMENT
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PROGRAMMING COMMISSION COMPETITORS MARKET CHANNEL TCI MVPDS ENTRY SUBSCRIBERS INCENTIVES FORECLOSURE CNN TRANSACTION EVIDENCE MERGER CARRIAGE MARQUEE DISTRIBUTION ANTITRUST ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGIES FIRMS INDUSTRY DISSENTING PROGRAMMING SERVICE MOREOVER ENTRY BARRIERS RIVALS PRICE |
Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and Commissioners Steiger and Varney
In the Matter of
Time Warner Inc.
Docket No. C-3709
The merger and related transactions among Time Warner, Turner, and TCI
involve three of the largest firms in cable programming and delivery
-- firms that are actual or potential competitors in many aspects of
their businesses. The transaction merges the first and third largest
cable programmers (Time Warner and Turner). At the same time, absent
the relief in our consent order, the transaction would have further
aligned the interests of TCI and Time Warner, the two largest cable
distributors. Finally, the transaction greatly increases the level of
vertical integration in an industry in which the threat of foreclosure
is both real and substantial. While the transaction posed complicated
and close questions of antitrust enforcement, the conclusion of the
dissenters that there was no competitive problem at all is difficult
to understand, especially since none of the public comments received
suggested that relief was unnecessary.
Many of the concerns raised in the dissenting Commissioners statements
are carefully addressed in the analysis to aid public comment, which
we append to this statement. We write to clarify our views on certain
specific issues raised in the dissents.
Product market. The dissenting Commissioners suggest that the product
market alleged, "the sale of Cable Television Programming Services to
MVPDs (Multichannel Video Programming Distributors)," cannot be
sustained. The facts suggest otherwise. Substantial evidence,
confirmed in the parties' documents and testimony, as well as
documents and sworn statements from third-parties, indicated the
existence of an all cable television market. Indeed, there was
significant evidence of competitive interaction in terms of carriage,
promotions and marketing support, subscriber fees, and channel
position between different segments of cable programming, including
basic and premium channel programming. Cable operators look to all
types of cable programming to determine the proper mix of diverse
content and format to attract a wide range of subscribers.
Although a market that includes both CNN and HBO may appear somewhat
unusual on its face, the Commission was presented here with
substantial evidence that MVPDs require access to certain "marquee"
channels, such as HBO and CNN, to retain existing subscribers or
expand their subscriber base. Moreover, we can not concur that
evidence in the record supports Commissioner Azcuenaga's proposed
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