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COURT-DECISION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
EAVESDROPPING PEN REGISTER DEFENDANTS SUPPRESSION LAW INSTALLATION STATUTE EVIDENCE MONITORING CPL COURT RECORDING UNITED STATES SUPRA WIRETAP INVESTIGATOR APPELLATE DIVISION LAW ENFORCEMENT TERMINATION COMMUNICATION DEFENDANT SCOCCO WRITTEN NOTICE ATTORNEY AUDIO REASONABLENESS SMITH PRIVACY HUESTON LISTENING DEVICE |
The PEOPLE & c., Respondent, v. Milton BIALOSTOK, Appellant. The PEOPLE & c., Respondent, v. Lawrence SCOCCO, Appellant. Nos. 17, 18. Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 25, 1993. SIMONS. Defendants have been convicted on gambling and conspiracy charges based, in part, on evidence derived from electronic monitoring of two telephone lines used to transmit bets. On these appeals they question whether a pen register [FN1] having the additional capacity to monitor conversations should be treated as an eavesdropping device [FN2] under the Criminal Procedure Law and therefore permitted only when a magistrate has issued a warrant based on probable cause. We hold that unless a warrant is obtained for instruments such as these, which were capable of monitoring conversations, the evidence must be suppressed. In these cases, however, the error was harmless. Defendant Scocco also contends that suppression is required in his case because law enforcement officials failed to meet the requirement of CPL 700.50(3) that written notice of a wiretap be given within 90 days of a warrant's termination. Because he received adequate informal notice through his attorney within the applicable time period, suppression is not required. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed in each case. I Defendants and three others were indicted following an investigation of three "wire rooms" where bets were being taken over the telephone. They challenge the lawfulness of the electronic monitoring of the telephone lines at one of them. In late November of 1986, an investigator installed electronic devices and monitoring telephones on two lines servicing the room. Each device was to serve as a pen register recording the telephone numbers dialed. Under the law at that time, a warrant based on probable cause was required for an eavesdropping device (CPL 700.15) but none was needed to install a pen register. [FN3] Numbers recorded by the devices over the next several days were then used to support an application for an eavesdropping warrant to monitor conversations on the two lines. The warrant was issued and the investigator returned to the monitoring equipment, where, by simply attaching an audio cable, a tape recorder and a wire to activate the recorder's remote start, he converted the previously installed units into listening devices. Calls were monitored from December 12 until December 22 and the evidence obtained was used by the People to prosecute defendants and their associates. The nature of the equipment used on the two lines was first discovered at trial during the testimony of the investigator who installed it. Unlike the traditional pen register, the equipment employed here had audio capacity and thus defendants contended that the monitors were really eavesdropping devices. Though no evidence was introduced to suggest any conversations were heard or recorded prior to the December 12 warrant, defendants argued that the technological capacity of the devices brought them within the eavesdropping statute and required that an eavesdropping warrant be obtained prior to installation. The trial judge ruled that no warrant was needed because the devices were used solely as pen registers. The Appellate Division agreed, relying on the testimony of the installer that he had "disabled" the audio function at installation and that it had remained disabled throughout the period prior to the warrant. II Analysis begins with an understanding of why pen registers were exempted from the warrant requirement in theSNIPPETS: |
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