MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.  Roe v. Wade
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179,
present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes
under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for
approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a
legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent
attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking
about an old issue.  We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and
emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even
among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject
inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human
existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values,
and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.  In addition, population
growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend [**709] to complicate and not to
simplify the problem.  Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and,
because we do, we [*117] have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis
upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's
attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr.
Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905):  "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."  I The Texas
statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code. n1
These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein [*118] defined, or to attempt
one, except with respect to "an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of
the States. n2  ==========Begin Footnotes========== n1 "Article 1191. Abortion
"If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to
be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any
violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an
abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is
meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that
a premature birth thereof be caused.  "Art. 1192. Furnishing the means  "Whoever
furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as
an accomplice.  "Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion  "If the means used shall fail to produce
an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion,
provided it be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be
fined not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.  "Art. 1194. Murder
in producing abortion  "If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so
produced or by an attempt to effect the same it is murder."  "Art. 1196. By medical
advice  "Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."  The foregoing Articles, together

                MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring *  Roe v.
Wade==========Begin Footnotes========== * [This opinion applies also to No. 70-
18, Roe v. Wade, ante, p. 113.]  ==========End Footnotes========== I agree that,
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the abortion statutes of Georgia
and Texas impermissibly limit the performance of abortions necessary to protect the
health of pregnant women, using [*208] the term health in its broadest medical context.
See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971). I am somewhat troubled that the
Court has taken notice of various scientific and medical data in reaching its conclusion;
however, I do not believe that the Court has exceeded the scope of judicial notice
accepted in other contexts.  In oral argument, counsel for the State of Texas informed the
Court that early abortion procedures were routinely permitted in certain exceptional
cases, such as nonconsensual pregnancies resulting from rape and incest. In the face of a
rigid and narrow statute, such as that of Texas, no one in these circumstances should be
placed in a posture of dependence on a prosecutorial policy or prosecutorial discretion.
Of course, States must have broad power, within the limits indicated in the opinions, to
regulate the subject of abortions, but where the consequences of state intervention are so
severe, uncertainty must be avoided as much as possible. For my part, I would be inclined
to allow a State to require the certification of two physicians to support an abortion, but
the Court holds otherwise. I do not believe that such a procedure is unduly burdensome,
as are the complex steps of the Georgia statute, which require as many as six doctors and
the use of a hospital certified by the JCAH.  I do not read the Court's holdings today as
having the sweeping consequences attributed to them by the dissenting Justices; the
dissenting views discount the reality that the vast majority of physicians observe the
standards of their profession, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical
judgments relating to life and health. Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the
Constitution requires abortions on demand. Roe v. Wade

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting. *
Roe v. Wade ==========Begin Footnotes========== * [This opinion applies also to
No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade, ante, p. 113.]  ==========End Footnotes========== At the
heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no
danger whatsoever to the life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for
any one or more of a variety of reasons -- convenience, family planning, economics,
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The common claim before us
is that for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without asserting or
claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request if
she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake the procedure.  The Court for
the most part sustains this position: During the period prior to the time the fetus becomes
viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of
the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus; the Constitution,
therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against any state law or policy seeking to
protect the fetus from an abortion not prompted by more compelling reasons of the
mother.  With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a
new constitutional right for pregnant mothers [*222] and, with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most
existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50
States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued
existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible
impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court
perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an
improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the
Constitution extends to this Court.  The Court apparently values the convenience of the
pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or
potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of
values, I can in no event join the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional
warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the
States. In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable
men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power
of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and
by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate
it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political
processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.  It is my view, therefore, that
the Texas statute is not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who
seek to serve only their convenience rather than to protect their life or health. Nor is this
plaintiff, who claims no threat to her mental or physical health, entitled to assert the
possible rights of those women [*223] whose pregnancy assertedly implicates their
health. This, together with United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), dictates reversal
of the judgment of the District Court.  Likewise, because Georgia may constitutionally
forbid abortions to putative mothers who, like the plaintiff in this case, do not fall within
the reach of ' 26-1202 (a) of its criminal code, I have no occasion, and the District Court
had none, to consider the constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the Georgia
statute as applied to those pregnancies posing substantial hazards to either life or health. I

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting. *
Roe v. Wade  ==========Begin Footnotes========== * [This opinion applies also to
No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade, ante, p. 113.]  ==========End Footnotes========== At the
heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no
danger whatsoever to the life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for
any one or more of a variety of reasons -- convenience, family planning, economics,
dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The common claim before us
is that for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without asserting or
claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request if
she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake the procedure.  The Court for
the most part sustains this position: During the period prior to the time the fetus becomes
viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of
the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus; the Constitution,
therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against any state law or policy seeking to
protect the fetus from an abortion not prompted by more compelling reasons of the
mother.  With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a
new constitutional right for pregnant mothers [*222] and, with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most
existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50
States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued
existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible
impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court
perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an
improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the
Constitution extends to this Court.  The Court apparently values the convenience of the
pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or
potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of
values, I can in no event join the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional
warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the
States. In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable
men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power
of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and
by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate
it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political
processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.  It is my view, therefore, that
the Texas statute is not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who
seek to serve only their convenience rather than to protect their life or health. Nor is this
plaintiff, who claims no threat to her mental or physical health, entitled to assert the
possible rights of those women [*223] whose pregnancy assertedly implicates their
health. This, together with United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), dictates reversal
of the judgment of the District Court.  Likewise, because Georgia may constitutionally
forbid abortions to putative mothers who, like the plaintiff in this case, do not fall within
the reach of ' 26-1202 (a) of its criminal code, I have no occasion, and the District Court
had none, to consider the constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the Georgia
statute as applied to those pregnancies posing substantial hazards to either life or health. I

        ROE, ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DALLAS COUNTY No.
70-18 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 410 U.S. 113; 93 S. Ct. 705; 35
L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) December 13, 1971, Argued  January 22, 1973, Decided Reargued
October 11, 1972.  APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.  Roe v. Wade Syllabus: A pregnant single
woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician
(Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted
to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant,
separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of
contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the
wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe
and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable
controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the
court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those
plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint
not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and
appall cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and
Hallford. Held:  1. While 28 U. S. C. ' 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from
the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is
properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the
arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.  2.
Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.  (a) Contrary to
appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit.
Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is
an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy must exist at review
stages and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 124-125.  (b) The District Court
correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Hallford, who
alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state
prosecutions pending against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66. Pp. 125-127.  (c)
The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not
occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129.  3. State
criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-
saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and
other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified
right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has
legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of
human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various
stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.  (a) For the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp.
163, 164.  (b) For the stage subsequentto approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163, 164.

        ROE, ET AL. v. WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DALLAS COUNTY No.
70-18 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 410 U.S. 113; 93 S. Ct. 705; 35
L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) December 13, 1971, Argued  January 22, 1973, Decided Reargued
October 11, 1972.  APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.  Roe v. Wade Syllabus: A pregnant single
woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on
medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician
(Hallford), who had two state abortion prosecutions pending against him, was permitted
to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the wife not being pregnant,
separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of
contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the
wife's health. A three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe
and Hallford, and members of their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable
controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though not injunctive, relief was warranted, the
court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and overbroadly infringing those
plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does' complaint
not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and
appall cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and
Hallford. Held:  1. While 28 U. S. C. ' 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from
the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is
properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the
arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. P. 123.  2.
Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. Pp. 123-129.  (a) Contrary to
appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit.
Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is
an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy must exist at review
stages and not simply when the action is initiated. Pp. 124-125.  (b) The District Court
correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Hallford, who
alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state
prosecutions pending against him. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66. Pp. 125-127.  (c)
The Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not
occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. Pp. 127-129.  3. State
criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-
saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and
other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified
right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has
legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of
human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various
stages of the woman's approach to term. Pp. 147-164.  (a) For the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Pp.
163, 164.  (b) For the stage subsequentto approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. Pp. 163, 164.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

-----------------------------------------------------

JANE ROE, et al.,

Appellants,

v.
                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
          
No. 70-18

 

HENRY WADE,

Appellee.

-----------------------------------------------------

                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
     Washington,
D.C.

                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
                &nbs
    
Wednesday, October 11, 1972.

The
above-entitled matter came on for oral argument at 10:04 o clock, a.m.

BEFORE:

WARREN

 Transcript Of Reargument Before The U.S. Supreme Court In
 Jane Roe, et al. Appellants v. Henry Wade
 October 11, 1972
   MS. WEDDINGTON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the
Court:
 We are once again before this Court to ask relief against
the continued enforcement of the Texas abortion statute. And
I ask that you affirm the ruling of the three judge court
below which held our statute unconstitutional for two
reasons: The first, that it was vague; and the second, that
it interfered with the Ninth Amendment rights of a woman to
determine whether or not she would continue or terminate a
pregnancy.
 As you will recall, there are three- four- three plaintiffs
and one intervenor involved here. The first plaintiff was
Jane Roe, an unmarried, pregnant girl who had sought an
abortion in the State of Texas and was denied it because of
the Texas abortion statute, which provides an abortion is
lawful only for the purpose of saving the life of the woman.
 In the original action she was joined by a married couple,
John and Mary Doe. Ms. Doe had a medical condition. Her
doctor had recommended, first, that she not get pregnant;
and, second, that she not take the pill.
 After this cause was instituted, and after, in fact, the
three judge court had been granted, those three plaintiffs
were joined by an intervenor, Dr. Hallford, who was, at the
time he intervened, under a pending State criminal
prosecution under the statute. He did not ask that his
prosecution be stopped by the court, but rather joined in
the original request for a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against future prosecution. As a matter of
fact, he has not-his prosecution has not been continued. But
the District Attorney against whom we filed the suit has
taken a position that, because there was no injunction, he
is still free to institute prosecutions. There is a letter
from his office in the Appendix stating that he will
continue prosecutions. And, in fact, there have been a very
limited number of prosecutions in the State of Texas since
the three judge court entered its declaratory judgment.
 CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN E. BURGER: Prosecutions of doctors,
you're speaking of?




  MS. WEDDINGTON: Prosecutions of doctors, yes, sir.
 The problem that we face in Texas is that even though we
were granted a declaratory judgment ruling the law
unconstitutional, even though we've been before this Court

ROE, et al

ROE, et al., Appellants,

-v-

WADE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF DALLAS COUNTY, Appellee.

No. 70-18

Washington, D.C.

December 13, 1971

The above-entitled matter came on for
oral argument

 

BEFORE:

WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice of the United States

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice

POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice

BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice

THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

MRS. SARAH WEDDINGTON represented Jane Roe

JAY FLOYD, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General of Texas, represented Henry Wade
and the State of Texas

 

PROCEEDINGS

Jane ROE, Plaintiff,

Jane ROE, Plaintiff,

v.

Henry WADE, Defendant,

v.

James Hubert HALLFORD, M.D.,
Intervenor.

 

John DOE and Mary Doe, Plaintiffs,

v.

Henry WADE, Defendant.

 

Civ. A. Nos. 3-3690-B, 3-3691-C.

United States District Court, N.D.
Texas, Dallas Division.

June 17, 1970.

 

*1219

Linda N. Coffee, Dallas, Tex., Sarah Weddington, Austin, Tex., for
plaintiffs.

Fred Bruner, Daugherty, Bruner, Lastelick & Anderson, Ray L. Merrill, Jr.,
Dallas, Tex., for intervenor.

John B. Tolle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., Jay Floyd, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Austin, Tex., for defendant.

Before GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, and HUGHES and TAYLOR, District judges.

PER CURIAM: