SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 00-763
SHARON B. POLLARD, PETITIONER v. E. I.
du PONT de NEMOURS & COMPANY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2001]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a front pay award is an element of compensatory
damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We conclude that it is not.
I Petitioner Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment
based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253,
§42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. After a trial, the District Court found that Pollard was subjected
to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The District Court
further found that the harassment resulted in a medical leave of absence from her job for
psychological assistance and her eventual dismissal for refusing to return to the same
hostile work environment. The court awarded Pollard $107,364 in backpay and benefits,
$252,997 in attorney's fees, and, as relevant here, $300,000 in compensatory damages
the maximum permitted under the statutory cap for such damages in §42 U.S.C. 1981a
(b)(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record demonstrated that
DuPont employees engaged in flagrant discrimination based on sex and that DuPont
managers and supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it. 213 F.3d 933 (CA6
2000).
The issue presented for review here is whether front pay constitutes an element of
"compensatory damages" under §42 U.S.C. 1981a and thus is subject to the statutory
damages cap imposed by that section. Although courts have defined "front pay" in
numerous ways, front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the
period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. For instance,
when an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available without
displacing an incumbent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening
of such a position and have ordered front pay to be paid until reinstatement occurs. See,
e.g., Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1053-1054 (CA5 1988); King v.
Staley, 849 F.2d 1143, 1145 (CA8 1988). In cases in which reinstatement is not viable
because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or
because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the
discrimination, courts have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement. See, e.g.,
Gotthardt v. National R. R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (CA9 1999);
Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (CA10 1980). For the purposes of
this opinion, it is not necessary for us to explain when front pay is an appropriate remedy.
The question before us is only whether front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element
of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus subject to the
Act's statutory cap on such damages.
SNIPPETS:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
This case presents the question whether a front pay award is an element of compensatory
I Petitioner Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company,
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record demonstrated that DuPont employees
The issue presented for review here is whether front pay constitutes an element of
Although courts have defined "front pay" in numerous ways, front pay is simply money awarded
For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available
In cases in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between the
The question before us is only whether front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element
On appeal, Pollard argued that Hudson was wrongly decided because front pay is not an element
She also argued that §1981a, by its very terms, explicitly excludes from the statutory cap
Plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of sex traditionally have been
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress expanded the remedies available to these plaintiffs
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that front pay constitutes compensatory damages awarded for
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that front pay is not an element of compensatory
court was authorized to "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
The meaning of this provision of the NLRA prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
In applying §10of the NLRA, the Board consistently had made awards of what it called
the original language of §706authorizing backpay awards was modeled after the same language
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