Opinion of Stevens, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2047
 ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In an admirable effort to frame its inquiries in broadly significant terms, the majority
offers six pages of commentary on the issue of whether an owner of property can
challenge regulations adopted prior to her acquisition of that property without ever
discussing the particular facts or legal claims at issue in this case. See ante, at 16-21.
While I agree with some of what the Court has to say on this issue, an examination of the
issue in the context of the facts of this case convinces me that the Court has over-
simplified a complex calculus and conflated two separate questions. Therefore, while I
join Part II-A of the opinion, I dissent from the judgment and, in particular, from Part
II-B.
I Though States and local governments have broad power to adopt regulations limiting
land usage, those powers are constrained by the Constitution and by other provisions of
state law. In adopting land-use restrictions, local authorities must follow legally valid and
constitutionally sufficient procedures and must adhere to whatever substantive
requirements are imposed by the Constitution and supervening law. If a regulating body
fails to adhere to its procedural or substantive obligations in developing land- use
restrictions, anyone adversely impacted by the restrictions may challenge their validity in
an injunctive action. If the application of such restriction to a property owner would
cause her a "direct and substantial injury," e.g., Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958), I have no doubt that she has standing to challenge the
restriction's validity whether she acquired title to the property before or after the
regulation was adopted. For, as the Court correctly observes, even future generations
"have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land." Ante, at
18.
It by no means follows, however, that, as the Court assumes, a succeeding owner may
obtain compensation for a taking of property from her predecessor in interest. A taking is
a discrete event, a governmental acquisition of private property for which the state is
required to provide just compensation. Like other transfers of property, it occurs at a
particular time, that time being the moment when the relevant property interest is
alienated from its owner.1
Precise specification of the moment a taking occurred and of the nature of the property
interest taken is necessary in order to determine an appropriately compensatory remedy.
For example, the amount of the award is measured by the value of the property at the
time of taking, not the value at some later date. Similarly, interest on the award runs from
that date. Most importantly for our purposes today, it is the person who owned the
property at the time of the taking that is entitled to the recovery. See, e.g., Danforth v.

Scalia, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 99-2047

ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I write separately to make clear that my understanding of how the issues
discussed in Part II-B of the Court's opinion must be considered on remand is
not Justice O'Connor's.
The principle that underlies her separate concurrence is that it may in some
(unspecified) circumstances be "[un]fai[r]," and produce unacceptable
"windfalls," to allow a subsequent purchaser to nullify an unconstitutional
partial taking (though, inexplicably, not an unconstitutional total taking) by
the government. Ante, at 4. The polar horrible, presumably, is the situation in
which a sharp real estate developer, realizing (or indeed, simply gambling on)
the unconstitutional excessiveness of a development restriction that a naï ;ve
landowner assumes to be valid, purchases property at what it would be worth
subject to the restriction, and then develops it to its full value (or resells
it at its full value) after getting the unconstitutional restriction
invalidated.
This can, I suppose, be called a windfall-though it is not much different from
the windfalls that occur every day at stock exchanges or antique auctions, where
the knowledgeable (or the venturesome) profit at the expense of the ignorant (or
the risk averse). There is something to be said (though in my view not much) for
pursuing abstract "fairness" by requiring part or all of that windfall to be
returned to the naï ;ve original owner, who presumably is the "rightful" owner
of it. But there is nothing to be said for giving it instead to the government-
which not only did not lose something it owned, but is both the cause of the
miscarriage of "fairness" and the only one of the three parties involved in the
miscarriage (government, naï ;ve original owner, and sharp real estate
developer) which acted unlawfully-indeed unconstitutionally. Justice O'Connor
would eliminate the windfall by giving the malefactor the benefit of its
malefaction. It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a
purchaser who bought property at a bargain rate from a thief clothed with the
indicia of title, by making him turn over the "unjust" profit to the thief.
In my view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took
title (other than a restriction forming part of the "background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) should have no bearing upon the
determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a
taking. The "investment-backed expectations" that the law will take into account
do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that

O'Connor, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 99-2047

ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice O'Connor, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but with my understanding of how the issues
discussed in Part II-B of the opinion must be considered on remand.
Part II-B of the Court's opinion addresses the circumstance, present in this
case, where a takings claimant has acquired title to the regulated property
after the enactment of the regulation at issue. As the Court holds, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping rule that the
preacquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto defeats any takings
claim based on that use restriction. Accordingly, the Court holds that
petitioner's claim under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), "is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the
effective date of the state-imposed restriction." Ante, at 21.
The more difficult question is what role the temporal relationship between
regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper Penn Central
analysis. Today's holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation's
enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central
analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration
from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. Our
polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our
other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under these cases,
interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors
that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time
the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of
those expectations.
The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. We have recognized that this constitutional guarantee
is " `designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.' " Penn Central, supra, at 123-124 (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The concepts of "fairness and justice" that underlie
the Takings Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we
have eschewed "any `set formula' for determining when `justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons." Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962)). The outcome instead "depends largely `upon the particular
circumstances [in that] case.' " Penn Central, supra, at 124 (quoting United
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).

Ginsburg, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 99-2047

ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join,
dissenting.
A regulatory takings claim is not ripe for adjudication, this Court has
held, until the agency administering the regulations at issue,
proceeding in good faith, "has arrived at a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply [those regulations] to the particular land
in question." Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985). Absent such a final
decision, a court cannot "kno[w] the nature and extent of permitted
development" under the regulations, and therefore cannot say "how far
the regulation[s] g[o]," as regulatory takings law requires. MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348, 351 (1986).
Therefore, even when a landowner seeks and is denied permission to
develop property, if the denial does not demonstrate the effective
impact of the regulations on the land, the denial does not represent
the "final decision" requisite to generate a ripe dispute. Williamson
County, 473 U.S., at 190.
MacDonald illustrates how a highly ambitious application may not ripen
a takings claim. The landowner in that case proposed a 159-home
subdivision. 477 U.S., at 342. When that large proposal was denied, the
owner complained that the State had appropriated "all beneficial use of
its property." Id., at 352, n. 8; see also id., at 344. This Court
concluded, however, that the landowner's claim was not ripe, for the
denial of the massive development left "open the possibility that some
development [would] be permitted." Id., at 352. "Rejection of
exceedingly grandiose development plans," the Court observed, "does not
logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly
unfavorable reviews." Id., at 353, n. 9.
As presented to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Anthony Palazzolo's
case was a close analogue to MacDonald. Palazzolo's land has two
components. Approximately 18 acres are wetlands that sustain a rich but
delicate ecosystem. See 746 A. 2d 707, 710, and n. 1 (R. I. 2000).
Additional acres are less environmentally sensitive "uplands." (The
number of upland acres remains in doubt, see ibid., because Palazzolo
has never submitted "an accurate or detailed survey" of his property,
see Tr. 190 (June 18-19, 1997).) Rhode Island's administrative agency
with ultimate permitting authority over the wetlands, the Coastal
Resources Management Council (CRMC), bars residential development of

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 99-2047

ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in the town of
Westerly, Rhode Island. Almost all of the property is designated as coastal
wetlands under Rhode Island law. After petitioner's development proposals were
rejected by respondent Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council
(Council), he sued in state court, asserting the Council's application of its
wetlands regulations took the property without compensation in violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, binding upon the State through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner sought review in this
Court, contending the Supreme Court of Rhode Island erred in rejecting his
takings claim. We granted certiorari. 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
IThe town of Westerly is on an edge of the Rhode Island coastline. The town's
western border is the Pawcatuck River, which at that point is the boundary
between Rhode Island and Connecticut. Situated on land purchased from the
Narragansett Indian Tribe, the town was incorporated in 1669 and had a
precarious, though colorful, early history. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts
contested the boundaries-and indeed the validity-of Rhode Island's royal
charter; and Westerly's proximity to Connecticut invited encroachments during
these jurisdictional squabbles. See M. Best, The Town that Saved a State-
Westerly 60-83 (1943); see also W. McLaughlin, Rhode Island: A Bicentennial
History 39-57 (1978). When the borders of the Rhode Island Colony were settled
by compact in 1728, the town's development was more orderly, and with some
historical distinction. For instance, Watch Hill Point, the peninsula at the
southwestern tip of the town, was of strategic importance in the Revolutionary
War and the War of 1812. See Best, supra, at 190; F. Denison, Westerly and its
Witnesses 118-119 (1878).
In later times Westerly's coastal location had a new significance: It became a
popular vacation and seaside destination. One of the town's historians gave this
happy account:
"After the Civil War the rapid growth of manufacture and expansion of trade had
created a spending class on pleasure bent, and Westerly had superior attractions
to offer, surf bathing on ocean beaches, quieter bathing in salt and fresh water
ponds, fishing, annual sail and later motor boat races. The broad beaches of
clean white sand dip gently toward the sea; there are no odorous marshes at low
tide, no railroad belches smoke, and the climate is unrivalled on the coast,
that of Newport only excepted. In the phenomenal heat wave of 1881 ocean resorts
from northern New England to southern New Jersey sweltered as the thermometer
climbed to 95 and 104 degrees, while Watch Hill enjoyed a comfortable 80. When
Providence to the north runs a temperature of 90, the mercury in this favored

Breyer, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2047
 ANTHONY PALAZZOLO, PETITIONER v.
RHODE ISLAND et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[June 28, 2001]
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Ginsburg that Palazzolo's takings claim is not ripe for adjudication,
and I join her opinion in full. Ordinarily I would go no further. But because the Court
holds the takings claim to be ripe and goes on to address some important issues of
substantive takings law, I add that, given this Court's precedents, I would agree with
Justice O'Connor that the simple fact that a piece of property has changed hands (for
example, by inheritance) does not always and automatically bar a takings claim. Here, for
example, without in any way suggesting that Palazzolo has any valid takings claim, I
believe his postregulatory acquisition of the property (through automatic operation of
law) by itself should not prove dispositive.
As Justice O'Connor explains, under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104  (1978), much depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a
change of ownership affect whatever reasonable investment-backed expectations might
otherwise exist. Ordinarily, such expectations will diminish in force and significance
rapidly and dramatically­as property continues to change hands over time. I believe that
such factors can adequately be taken into account within the Penn Central framework.
Several amici have warned that to allow complete regulatory takings claims, see Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003  (1992), to survive changes in land
ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such claims by strategically
transferring property until only a nonusable portion remains. See, e.g., Brief for Daniel
W. Bromley et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. But I do not see how a constitutional provision
concerned with " `fairness and justice,' " Penn Central, supra, at 123-124 (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)), could reward any such strategic
behavior.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

No. 99-2047. Argued February 26, 2001-Decided June 28, 2001

In order to acquire the waterfront parcel of Rhode Island land that is here at
issue, petitioner and associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI), in 1959.
After SGI purchased the property petitioner bought out his associates and became
the sole shareholder. Most of the property was then, and is now, salt marsh
subject to tidal flooding. The wet ground and permeable soil would require
considerable fill before significant structures could be built. Over the years,
SGI's intermittent applications to develop the property were rejected by various
government agencies. After 1966, no further applications were made for over a
decade. Two intervening events, however, become important to the issues
presented. First, in 1971, the State created respondent Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council (Council) and charged it with protecting the
State's coastal properties. The Council's regulations, known as the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP), designated salt marshes like those
on SGI's property as protected "coastal wetlands" on which development is
greatly limited. Second, in 1978 SGI's corporate charter was revoked, and title
to the property passed to petitioner as the corporation's sole shareholder. In
1983 petitioner applied to the Council for permission to construct a wooden
bulkhead and fill his entire marsh land area. The Council rejected the
application, concluding, inter alia, that it would conflict with the CRMP. In
1985 petitioner filed a new application with the Council, seeking permission to
fill 11 of the property's 18 wetland acres in order to build a private beach
club. The Council rejected this application as well, ruling that the proposal
did not satisfy the standards for obtaining a "special exception" to fill salt
marsh, whereby the proposed activity must serve a compelling public purpose.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island
Superior Court, asserting that the State's wetlands regulations, as applied by
the Council to his parcel, had taken the property without compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The suit alleged the Council's
action deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property,
resulting in a total taking requiring compensation under Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, and sought $3,150,000 in damages, a figure
derived from an appraiser's estimate as to the value of a 74-lot residential
subdivision on the property. The court ruled against petitioner, and the State
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) petitioner's takings claim was not
ripe; (2) he had no right to challenge regulations predating 1978, when he
succeeded to legal ownership of the property; (3) he could not assert a takings
claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of
undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an
upland parcel of the property; and (4) because the regulation at issue predated
his acquisition of title, he could have had no reasonable investment-backed
expectation that he could develop his property, and, therefore, he could not