v. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVEHEALTH et al.
appeal from the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No.88805. Argued November 29, 1989Decided June 25, 1990 -- Decided
As enacted, Ohio's Amended Substitute House Bill 319 (H. B. 319) makes it a crime for a
physician or other person to perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated, minor
woman, unless, inter alia, the physician provides timely notice to one of the minor's
parents or a juvenile court issues an order authorizing the minor to consent. To obtain a
judicial bypass of the notice requirement, the minor must present clear and convincing
proof that she has sufficient maturity and information to make the abortion decision
herself, that one of her parents has engaged in a pattern of physical, emotional, or sexual
abuse against her, or that notice is not in her best interests. Among other things, H. B. 319
also allows the physician to give constructive notice if actual notice to the parent proves
impossible "after a reasonable effort"; requires the minor to file a bypass complaint in the
juvenile court on prescribed forms; requires that court to appoint a guardian ad litem and
an attorney for the minor if she has not retained counsel; mandates expedited bypass
hearings and decisions in that court and expedited review by a court of appeals; provides
constructive authorization for the minor to consent to the abortion if either court fails to
act in a timely fashion; and specifies that both courts must maintain the minor's
anonymity and the confidentiality of all papers. Shortly before H. B. 319's effective date,
appelleesan abortion facility, one of its doctors, and an unmarried, unemancipated, minor
woman seeking an abortion thereand others filed a facial challenge to the statute's
constitutionality in the Federal District Court, which ultimately issued an injunction
preventing H. B. 319's enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that
various of the statute's provisions were constitutionally defective.
Held:The judgment is reversed.
854 F. 2d 852, reversed.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV,
concluding that, on its face, H. B. 319 does not impose an undue, or otherwise
unconstitutional, burden on a minor seeking an abortion. Pp.414.
1.House Bill 319 accords with this Court's cases addressing the constitutionality of
parental notice or consent statutes in the abortion context. Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; H. L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398; Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416. Pp.411.
(a)Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment  requires parental notice statutes, as
opposed to parental consent statutes, to contain judicial bypass procedures, H. B. 319's
bypass procedure is sufficient because it meets the requirements identified in Danforth,
Bellotti, Ashcroft, and Akron for the more intrusive consent statutes, particularly the four
criteria set forth by the plurality in Bellotti, supra, at 643644. First, the statute satisfies
the requirement that the minor be allowed to show the maturity to make her abortion
decision without regard to her parents' wishes. Second, by requiring the juvenile court to
authorize her consent upon determining that the abortion is in her best interests and in
cases where she has shown a pattern of abuse, H. B. 319 satisfies the requirement that she
be allowed to show that, even if she cannot make the decision by herself, the abortion
would be in her best interests. Third, the requirement that a bypass procedure ensure the

 88805CONCUR v. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
No. 88805
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
As the Court emphasizes, appellees have challenged the Ohio statute only on its face. The
State may presume that, in most of its applications, the statute will reasonably further its
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its minor citizens. See H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 422423 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In some of its
applications, however, the one-parent notice requirement will not reasonably further that
interest. There will be exceptional situations in which notice will cause a realistic risk of
physical harm to the pregnant woman, will cause trauma to an ill parent, or will enable
the parent to prevent the abortion for reasons that are unrelated to the best interests of the
minor. The Ohio statute recognizes that possibility by providing a judicial bypass. The
question in this case is whether that statutory protection for the exceptional case is so
obviously inadequate that the entire statute should be invalidated. I am not willing to
reach that conclusion before the statute has been implemented and the significance of its
restrictions evaluated in the light of its administration. I therefore agree that the Court of
Appeals' judgment must be reversed and I join Parts IIV of the Court's opinion. [n.1] ests
of their child" is relevant in determining what process is due in commitment proceeding).
[n.2] I have more concern about the possible delay in the bypass procedure, but the
statute permits the Ohio courts to expedite the procedure upon a showing of good cause,
see ante, at 9 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2505.073(A) (Supp. 1988)), and sensitive
administration of the deadlines may demonstrate that my concern is unwarranted.
There is some tension between the statutory requirement that the treating physician notify
the minor's parent and our decision in Akron, 462 U.S., at 446449, that a State may not
require the attending physician to personally counsel an abortion patient. One cannot
overlook the possibility that this provision was motivated more by a legislative interest in
placing obstacles in the woman's path to an abortion, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 (1977), than by a genuine interest in fostering informed decisionmaking. I agree with
the Court, however, that the Ohio statute requires only that the physician take "reasonable
steps" to notify a minor's parent and that such notification may contribute to the de
cisionmaking process. Ante, at 1314. Accordingly, I am unable to conclude that this
provision is unconstitutional on its face.
Notes
1 It is perhaps trite for a judge to reiterate the familiar proposition that an opinion about
the facial constitutionality of a statute says nothing about the judge's views concerning
the wisdom or unwisdom of the measure. I have made this observation before, see
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 881 (1976) (dissenting opinion), and
am moved by Justice Blackmun's eloquent dissent to do so again. It would indeed be
difficult to contend that each of the challenged provisions of the Ohio statuteor the entire
mosaicrepresents wise legislation.

The Court correctly states that we have not decided the specific question whether a
judicial bypass procedure is necessary in order to save the constitutionality of a single
parent notice statute. See ante, at 5. We have, however, squarely held that a requirement

 88805CONCUR v. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
No. 88805
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, because I agree that the Ohio statute neither deprives
minors of procedural due process nor contradicts our holdings regarding the
constitutional right to abortion. I continue to believe, however, as I said in my separate
concurrence last Term in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. (1989), that
the Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be found in the longstanding
traditions of our society, nor can it be logically deduced from the text of the
Constitutionnot, that is, without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable
question of when human life begins. Leaving this matter to the political process is not
only legally correct, it is pragmatically so. That aloneand not lawyerly dissection of
federal judicial precedentscan produce compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the
electorate that this deeply felt issue will cease distorting the remainder of our democratic
process. The Court should end its disruptive intrusion into this field as soon as possible.

 No. 88805
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in
which The Chief Justice, and Justice White, and Justice Scalia join.
The Court of Appeals held invalid an Ohio statute that, with certain exceptions, prohibits
any person from performing an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated, minor woman
absent notice to one of the woman's parents or a court order of approval. We reverse, for
we determine that the statute accords with our precedents on parental notice and consent
in the abortion context and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
 I
A The Ohio Legislature, in November 1985, enacted Amended Substitute House Bill 319
(H.B. 319), which amended Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2919.12 (1987), and created 2151.85
and 2505.073 (Supp. 1988). Section 2919.12(B), the cornerstone of this legislation,
makes it a criminal offense, except in four specified circumstances, for a physician or
other person to perform an abortion on an unmarried and unemancipated woman under
eighteen years of age. See 2919.12(D) (making the first offense a misdemeanor and
subsequent offenses felonies); 2919.12(E) (imposing civil liability).
The first and second circumstances in which a physician may perform an abortion relate
to parental notice and consent. First, a physician may perform an abortion if he provides
"at least twenty-four hours actual notice, in person or by telephone," to one of the
women's parents (or her guardian or custodian) of his intention to perform the abortion.
2919.12(B)(1)(a)(i). The physician, as an alternative, may notify a minor's adult brother,
sister, stepparent, or grandparent, if the minor and the other relative each file an affidavit
in the juvenile court stating that the minor fears physical, sexual, or severe emotional
abuse from one of her parents. See 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(i), 2919.12(B)(1)(b),
2919.12(B)(1)(c). If the physician cannot give the notice "after a reasonable effort," he
may perform the abortion after "at least forty-eight hours constructive notice" by both
ordinary and certified mail. 2919.12(B)(2). Second, a physician may perform an abortion
on the minor if one of her parents (or her guardian or custodian) has consented to the
abortion in writing. See 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(ii).
The third and fourth circumstances depend on a judicial procedure that allows a minor to
bypass the notice and consent provisions just described. The statute allows a phy sician to
perform an abortion without notifying one of the minor's parents or receiving the parent's
consent if a juve- nile court issues an order authorizing the minor to consent,
2919.12(B)(1)(a)(iii), or if a juvenile court or court of appeals, by its inaction, provides
constructive authorization for the minor to consent, 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(iv).
The bypass procedure requires the minor to file a complaint in the juvenile court, stating
(1) that she is pregnant; (2) that she is unmarried, under 18 years of age, and
unemancipated; (3) that she desires to have an abortion without notifying one of her
parents; (4) that she has sufficient maturity and information to make an intelligent
decision whether to have an abortion without such notice, or that one of her parents has
engaged in a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that notice is
not in her best interests; and (5) that she has or has not retained an attorney.

88805DISSENT v. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
No. 88805
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
I The constitutional right to "control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-
directing decision whether to carry a fetus to term," Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, U.S. , (1989) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), does "not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976); Hodgson v. Minnesota, ante, at (slip op. 1314) ("[T]he constitutional protection
against unjustified state intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a
child extends to pregnant minors as well as adult women"). Although the Court "has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults," in doing so, the State nevertheless must demonstrate that there is
a "significant state interest in conditioning an abortion ... that is not present in the case of
an adult." Danforth, 428 U.S., at 7475 (emphasis added). "Any independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become
pregnant." Id., at 75.
"The abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made
during minority. The need to protect the constitutional right and the unique nature of the
abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular
sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter." Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (Bellotti II).
"Particular sensitivity" is mandated because "there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and
indelible." Ibid. It should be obvious that "considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood
may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor." Ibid.
The State of Ohio has acted with particular insensitivity in enacting the statute the Court
today upholds. Rather than create a judicial-bypass system that reflects the sensitivity
necessary when dealing with a minor making this deeply intimate decision, Ohio has
created a tortuous maze. Moreover, the State has failed utterly to show that it has any
significant state interest in deliberately placing its pattern of obstacles in the path of the
pregnant minor seeking to exercise her constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. The
challenged provisions of the Ohio statute are merely "poorly disguised elements of
discouragement for the abortion decision." Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986).
II The majority does not decide whether the Ohio parental- notice statute must contain a
judicial-bypass procedure because the majority concludes that the bypass procedure in
the statute "meets the requirements identified for parental- consent statutes in Danforth,
Bellotti, Ashcroft, and Akron." Ante, at 5. I conclude, however, that, because of the
minor's emotional vulnerability and financial dependency on her parents, and because of
the "unique nature of the abortion decision," Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 642, and its