Ginsburg, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 00-346
 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORA-TION, PETITIONER v.
CELESTINE GARRIS,
administratrix of the ESTATE OF
CHRISTOPHER GARRIS,
DECEASED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2001]
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part.
I join all but Part II-B-2 of the Court's opinion.
Following the reasoning in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375  (1970),
the Court today holds that the maritime cause of action Moragne established for
unseaworthiness is equally available for negligence. I agree with the Court's clear
opinion with one reservation. In Part II-B-2, the Court counsels: "Because of
Congress's extensive involvement in legislating causes of action for maritime personal
injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that assert new claims beyond what
those statutes ... allow, to leave further development to Congress." Ante, at 9. Moragne
itself, however, tugs in the opposite direction. Inspecting the relevant legislation, the
Court in Moragne found no measures counseling against the judicial elaboration of
general maritime law there advanced. See 398 U.S., at 399-402, 409; see also id., at 393
("Where death is caused by the breach of a duty imposed by federal maritime law,
Congress has established a policy favoring recovery in the absence of a legislative
direction to except a particular class of cases."). In accord with Moragne, I see
development of the law in admiralty as a shared venture in which "federal common
lawmaking" does not stand still, but "harmonize[s] with the enactments of Congress in
the field." Ante, at 9 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455
(1994)). I therefore do not join the Court's dictum.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 00-346
 NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORA-TION, PETITIONER v.
CELESTINE GARRIS,
administratrix of the ESTATE OF
CHRISTOPHER GARRIS,
DECEASED
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2001]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the negligent breach of a general maritime
duty of care is actionable when it causes death, as it is when it causes injury.
I According to the complaint that respondent filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, her son, Christopher Garris, sustained injuries on April 8,
1997, that caused his death one day later. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53. The injuries were
suffered while Garris was performing sandblasting work aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen
W. Pless in the employ of Tidewater Temps, Inc., a subcontractor for Mid-Atlantic
Coatings, Inc., which was in turn a subcontractor for petitioner Norfolk Shipbuilding &
Drydock Corporation. And the injuries were caused, the complaint continued, by the
negligence of petitioner and one of its other subcontractors, since dismissed from this
case. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States when
Garris was injured, respondent invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction, U.S. Const., Art.
III, §2, cl. 1; §28 U.S.C.  1333  and prayed for damages under general maritime law. She
also asserted claims under the Virginia wrongful death statute, Va. Code Ann. §§8.01-
50 to 8.01-56 (2000).
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim, for the
categorical reason that "no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death
of a nonseaman in state territorial waters resulting from negligence." No. Civ. A.
2:98CV382, 1998 WL 1108934, *1 (ED Va., Aug. 31, 1998) (unpublished). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, explaining that although this Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause
of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the principles contained in our
decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375  (1970), made such an
action appropriate. 210 F.3d 209, 211 (2000). Judge Hall concurred in the judgment
because, in her view, Moragne had itself recognized the action. Id., at 222-227. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's suggestion for rehearing en banc, with two judges
dissenting. 215 F.3d 420 (2000). We granted certiorari. 531 U.S. 1050 (2000).
II
Three of four issues of general maritime law are settled, and the fourth is before us. It is
settled that the general maritime law imposes duties to avoid unseaworthiness and
negligence, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-550 (1960)
(unseaworthiness); Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 630 (1882) (negligence), that

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORP. v. GARRIS, administratrix of the
ESTATE OF GARRIS, DECEASED
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
 No. 00-346. Argued April 18, 2001­Decided June 4, 2001
 In her complaint filed in the District Court, respondent alleged that her son died as a
result of injuries sustained while performing sandblasting aboard a vessel berthed in the
navigable waters of the United States. She further asserted that the injuries were caused
by the negligence of petitioner and another, and prayed for damages under general
maritime law. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal
claim, stating that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death
resulting from negligence. The Fourth Circuit reversed, explaining that although this
Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting
from negligence, the principles contained in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, made such an action appropriate.
Held: The general maritime cause of action recognized in Moragne­for death caused by
violation of maritime duties, id., at 409­is available for the negligent breach of a
maritime duty of care. Although Moragne's opinion did not limit its rule to any particular
maritime duty, Moragne's facts were limited to the duty of seaworthiness, and so the
issue of wrongful death for negligence has remained technically open. There is no
rational basis, however, for distinguishing negligence from unseaworthiness. Negligence
is no less a maritime duty than seaworthiness, and the choice-of-law and remedial
anomalies provoked by withholding a wrongful death remedy are no less severe. Nor is a
negligence action precluded by any of the three relevant federal statutes that provide
remedies for injuries and death suffered in admiralty: the Jones Act, the Death on the
High Seas Act, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Because of
Congress's extensive involvement in legislating causes of action for maritime personal
injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that assert new claims beyond what
those statutes have seen fit to allow, to leave further development to Congress. See, e.g.,
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455. The cause of action recognized
today, however, is new only in the most technical sense. The general maritime law has
recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since
Moragne that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they cause death, as when
they cause injury. Pp. 2-9.
210 F.3d 209, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I, II-A, and II-B-1 of which were
unanimous, and Part II-B-2 of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in
which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined.