Scalia, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 00-767
 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. ENRICO ST. CYR
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2001]
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join, and with whom
Justice O'Connor joins as to Parts I and III, dissenting.
The Court today finds ambiguity in the utterly clear language of a statute that forbids the
district court (and all other courts) to entertain the claims of aliens such as respondent St.
Cyr, who have been found deportable by reason of their criminal acts. It fabricates a
superclear statement, "magic words" requirement for the congressional expression of
such an intent, unjustified in law and unparalleled in any other area of our jurisprudence.
And as the fruit of its labors, it brings forth a version of the statute that affords criminal
aliens more opportunities for delay-inducing judicial review than are afforded to non-
criminal aliens, or even than were afforded to criminal aliens prior to this legislation
concededly designed to expedite their removal. Because it is clear that the law deprives
us of jurisdiction to entertain this suit, I respectfully dissent.
I In categorical terms that admit of no exception, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, unambiguously
repeals the application of §28 U.S.C.  2241 (the general habeas corpus provision), and of
all other provisions for judicial review, to deportation challenges brought by certain kinds
of criminal aliens. This would have been readily apparent to the reader, had the Court at
the outset of its opinion set forth the relevant provisions of IIRIRA and of its statutory
predecessor, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110
Stat. 1214. I will begin by supplying that deficiency, and explaining IIRIRA's
jurisdictional scheme. It begins with what we have called a channeling or " `zipper'
clause," Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)
namely, §8 U.S.C.  1252 (b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V). This provision, entitled
"Consolidation of questions for judicial review," provides as follows:
"Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section." (Emphases added.)
In other words, if any review is available of any "questio[n] of law ... arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter," it is available "only in judicial review of a final order under this section
[§1252]." What kind of review does that section provide? That is set forth in §1252(a)(1),
which states:
"Judicial review of a final order of removal (other than an order of removal without a
hearing pursuant to [the expedited-removal provisions for undocumented aliens arriving

O'Connor, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 00-767
 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. ENRICO ST. CYR
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2001]
Justice O'Connor, dissenting.
I join Parts I and III of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in this case. I do not join Part II
because I believe that, assuming, arguendo, that the Suspension Clause guarantees some
minimum extent of habeas review, the right asserted by the alien in this case falls outside
the scope of that review for the reasons explained by Justice Scalia in Part II-B of his
dissenting opinion. The question whether the Suspension Clause assures habeas
jurisdiction in this particular case properly is resolved on this ground alone, and there is
no need to say more.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 00-767
 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
PETITIONER v. ENRICO ST. CYR
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2001]
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), enacted on
April 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), enacted on September 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-
546, contain comprehensive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
66 Stat. 163, as amended, §8 U.S.C.  1101 et seq. This case raises two important
questions about the impact of those amendments. The first question is a procedural one,
concerning the effect of those amendments on the availability of habeas corpus
jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. §2241. The second question is a substantive one, concerning
the impact of the amendments on conduct that occurred before their enactment and on the
availability of discretionary relief from deportation.
Respondent, Enrico St. Cyr, is a citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States as
a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Ten years later, on March 8, 1996, he pled guilty in
a state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut law.
That conviction made him deportable. Under pre-AEDPA law applicable at the time of
his conviction, St. Cyr would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation at the
discretion of the Attorney General. However, removal proceedings against him were not
commenced until April 10, 1997, after both AEDPA and IIRIRA became effective, and,
as the Attorney General interprets those statutes, he no longer has discretion to grant such
a waiver.
In his habeas corpus petition, respondent has alleged that the restrictions on discretionary
relief from deportation contained in the 1996 statutes do not apply to removal
proceedings brought against an alien who pled guilty to a deportable crime before their
enactment. The District Court accepted jurisdiction of his application and agreed with his
submission. In accord with the decisions of four other Circuits, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed.1 229 F.3d 406 (2000). The importance of both questions
warranted our grant of certiorari. 531 U.S. 1107  (2001).
I The character of the pre&nbhyph;AEDPA and pre-IIRIRA law that gave the Attorney
General discretion to waive deportation in certain cases is relevant to our appraisal of
both the substantive and the procedural questions raised by the petition of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We shall therefore preface our discussion
of those questions with an overview of the sources, history, and scope of that law.
Subject to certain exceptions, §3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 excluded from
admission to the United States several classes of aliens, including, for example, those
who had committed crimes "involving moral turpitude." 39 Stat. 875. The seventh
exception provided "[t]hat aliens returning after a temporary absence to an

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ST. CYR
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
 No. 00-767. Argued April 24, 2001­Decided June 25, 2001
 Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), §212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give
the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. As relevant
here, the large class of aliens depending on §212(c) relief was reduced in 1996 by §401
of AEDPA, which identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would
preclude such relief; and by IIRIRA, which repealed §212(c) and replaced it with a new
section excluding from the class anyone "convicted of an aggravated felony," §8 U.S.C.
1229b (a)(3). Respondent St. Cyr, a lawful permanent United States resident, pleaded
guilty to a criminal charge that made him deportable. He would have been eligible for a
waiver of deportation under the immigration law in effect when he was convicted, but his
removal proceedings were commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. The
Attorney General claims that those Acts withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver.
The Federal District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that
the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who
pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Held:
1. Courts have jurisdiction under §28 U.S.C.  2241  to decide the legal issue raised by St.
Cyr's habeas petition. Pp. 7-24.
(a) To prevail on its claim that AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction
to decide a pure question of law, as in this case, petitioner Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear and
unambiguous statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. Here, that
plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory
construction: First, when a statutory interpretation invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, there must be a clear indication that Congress intended that result; and second, if
an otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious constitutional problems and an
alternative interpretation is fairly possible, the statute must be construed to avoid such
problems. Pp. 7-9.
(b) Construing the amendments at issue to preclude court review of a pure question of
law would give rise to substantial constitutional questions. The Constitution's Suspension
Clause, which protects the privilege of the habeas corpus writ, unquestionably requires
some judicial intervention in deportation cases. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235.
Even assuming that the Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, substantial
evidence supports St. Cyr's claim that pure questions of law could have been answered in
1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ. Thus, a serious Suspension
Clause issue would arise if the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal
judges and provided no adequate substitute. The need to resolve such a serious and