881125 & 881309OPINION v. MINNESOTA
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary
print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any
typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
Nos. 881125 and 881309
JANE HODGSON, et al, PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, an opinion with respect to Part III in which
Justice Brennan joins, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI in which Justice
O'Connor joins, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII.
A Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. 144.343(2)(7) (1988), provides, with certain exceptions,
that no abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48
hours after both of her parents have been notified. In subdivisions 24 of the statute the
notice is mandatory unless (1) the attending physician certifies that an immediate
abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to
provide the required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in writing; or (3) the
woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in which event notice of
her declaration must be given to the proper authorities. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held this pro vision
unconstitutional. In No. 881309, we granted the State's petition to review that holding.
Subdivision 6 of the same statute provides that if a court enjoins the enforcement of
subdivision 2, the same notice requirement shall be effective unless the pregnant woman
obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed. By a vote of 73, the Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of subdivision 6. In No.881125, we granted the
plaintiffs' petition to review that holding.
For reasons that follow, we now conclude that the requirement of notice to both of the
pregnant minor's parents is not reasonably related to legitimate state interests and that
subdivision 2 is unconstitutional. A different majority of the Court, for reasons stated in
separate opinions, concludes that subdivision 6 is constitutional. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety is affirmed.
I The parental notice statute was enacted in 1981 as an amendment to the Minors'
Consent to Health Services Act. The earlier statute, which remains in effect as
subdivision 1 of 144.343 and as 144.346, had modified the common law requirement of
parental consent for any medical procedure performed on minors. It authorized "any
minor" to give effective consent without any parental involvement for the treatment of
"pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other drug
abuse." [n.1] The statute, unlike others of its age, [n.2] applied to abortion services.
Subdivision 6 authorizes a judicial bypass of the two-parent notice requirement if
subdivision 2 is ever "temporarily or permanently" enjoined by judicial order. If the
pregnant minor can convince "any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction" that she is

 881125 & 881309OPINION v. MINNESOTA
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary
print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any
typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
Nos. 881125 and 881309
JANE HODGSON, et al, PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, an opinion with respect to Part III in which
Justice Brennan joins, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI in which Justice
O'Connor joins, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII.
A Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. 144.343(2)(7) (1988), provides, with certain exceptions,
that no abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48
hours after both of her parents have been notified. In subdivisions 24 of the statute the
notice is mandatory unless (1) the attending physician certifies that an immediate
abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to
provide the required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in writing; or (3) the
woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in which event notice of
her declaration must be given to the proper authorities. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held this pro vision
unconstitutional. In No. 881309, we granted the State's petition to review that holding.
Subdivision 6 of the same statute provides that if a court enjoins the enforcement of
subdivision 2, the same notice requirement shall be effective unless the pregnant woman
obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed. By a vote of 73, the Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of subdivision 6. In No.881125, we granted the
plaintiffs' petition to review that holding.
For reasons that follow, we now conclude that the requirement of notice to both of the
pregnant minor's parents is not reasonably related to legitimate state interests and that
subdivision 2 is unconstitutional. A different majority of the Court, for reasons stated in
separate opinions, concludes that subdivision 6 is constitutional. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety is affirmed.
I The parental notice statute was enacted in 1981 as an amendment to the Minors'
Consent to Health Services Act. The earlier statute, which remains in effect as
subdivision 1 of 144.343 and as 144.346, had modified the common law requirement of
parental consent for any medical procedure performed on minors. It authorized "any
minor" to give effective consent without any parental involvement for the treatment of
"pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other drug
abuse." [n.1] The statute, unlike others of its age, [n.2] applied to abortion services.
Subdivision 6 authorizes a judicial bypass of the two-parent notice requirement if
subdivision 2 is ever "temporarily or permanently" enjoined by judicial order. If the
pregnant minor can convince "any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction" that she is

881125 & 881309CONCUR/DISSENT v. MINNESOTA
Nos. 881125 and 881309
JANE HODGSON, et al, PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
As I understand the various opinions today: One Justice holds that two-parent notification
is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but
constitutional with bypass, ante, at (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is constitutional with or
without bypass, post, at (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is unconstitutional with or
without bypass, though the four apply two different standards, ante, at (opinion of
Stevens, J.), ante, at (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); six Justices
hold that one-parent notification with bypass is constitutional, though for two different
sets of reasons, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante, p.; ante, at (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment); and three Justices would hold that one-parent notification
with bypass is unconstitutional, ante, at (Blackmun, J., dissenting). One will search in
vain the document we are supposed to be construing for text that provides the basis for
the argument over these distinctions; and will find in our society's tradition regarding
abortion no hint that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant, much less any
indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to be resolved. The random
and unpredictable results of our consequently unchanneled individual views make it
increasingly evident, Term after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the
lawyer'sand hence not in the judge'sworkbox. I continue to dissent from this enterprise of
devising an Abortion Code, and from the illusion that we have authority to do so.

881125 & 881309CONCUR v. MINNESOTA
Nos. 881125 and 881309
HODGSON, et al., PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part.
 I I join all but Parts III and VIII of Justice Stevens' opini on. While I agree with some of
the central points made in Part III, I cannot join the broader discussion. I agree that the
Court has characterized "[a] woman's decision to beget or to bear a child [as] a
component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Ante, at 12. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 687 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502503 (1965) (White, J., concurring in judgment). This Court extended that liberty
interest to minors in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti II), and Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), albeit with some
important limitations: "[P]arental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may
be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important decisions. As immature
minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both
immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental
consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor." Bellotti II, supra, at
640641; see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 423 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment); cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences
of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated
by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. ,
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13) ("[M]inors are treated differently from
adults in our laws, which reflects the simple truth derived from communal experience,
that juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibility that we
presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in the rights and duties of
modern life").
It has been my understanding in this area that "[i]f the particular regulation does not
 unduly burde[n]' the fundamental right, ... then our evaluation of that regulation is
limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. , (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at
9). It is with that understanding that I agree with Justice Stevens' statement that the
"statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not reasonably related to
legitimate state interests. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 97; Carey v. Population
Services International 431 U.S., at 704 (opinion of Powell, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 194195, 199 (1973)." Ante, at 15.
I agree with Justice Stevens that Minnesota has offered no sufficient justification for its
interference with the family's decisionmaking processes created by subdivision 2two-
parent notification. Subdivision 2 is the most stringent notification statute in the country.
See ante, at 3, n.5. The only other state that defines the generic term "parents," see, e.g.,

 881125 & 881309CONCUR/DISSENT v. MINNESOTA
Nos. 881125 and 881309
JANE HODGSON, et al., PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join, concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur in Parts I, II, IV, and VII of Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in No.881309.
[n.1] Although I do not believe that the Constitution permits a State to require a minor to
notify or consult with a parent before obtaining an abortion, compare ante, at 24, with
infra, at 312, I am in substantial agreement with the remainder of the reasoning in Part V
of the Court's opinion. For the reasons stated by Justice Stevens, ante, at 2834,
Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement is not even reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest. Therefore, that requirement surely would not pass the strict
scrutiny applicable to restrictions on a woman's fundamental right to have an abortion.
I dissent from the judgment of the Court in No.891125, however, that the judicial bypass
option renders the parental notification and 48-hour delay requirements constitutional.
See post, at 34 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); post, at 1721 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The
bypass procedure cannot save those requirements because the bypass itself is
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied. At the very least, this scheme
substantially burdens a woman's right to privacy without advancing a compelling state
interest. More significantly, in some instances it usurps a young woman's control over her
own body by giving either a parent or a court the power effectively to veto her decision to
have an abortion.
I This Court has consistently held since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
 (1973), that the
constitutional right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id., at 153. We have also repeatedly stated
that "[a] woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental." Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
, 772 (1986). Accord
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
, 420, n.1 (1983); Roe,
supra, at 155. As we reiterated in American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
supra, "Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decisionwith the guidance of
her physician and within the limits specified in Roewhether to end her pregnancy." Id., at
772. Accordingly, we have subjected state laws limiting that right to the most exacting
scrutiny, requiring a State to show that such a law is narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling interest. Roe, supra, at 155; Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at
427. Only such strict judicial scrutiny is sufficiently protective of a woman's right to
make the intensely personal decision whether to terminate her pregnancy.
Roe remains the law of the land. See Webster v. Repro ductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
, (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in

 881125 & 881309CONCUR/DISSENT v. MINNESOTA
Nos. 881125 and 881309
JANE HODGSON, et al., PETITIONERSv.881125
MINNESOTA, et al., PETITIONERSv.881309
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
[June 25, 1990]
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia join,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
" There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by
encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in
making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave
decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make
it without mature advice and emotional support.'" Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S.
622 , 640641 (1979)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 , 91 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring)); see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
, 409411 (1981); id., at
422423 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Danforth, supra, at 9495 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 102103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Today, the Court holds that a statute requiring a minor to notify
both parents that she plans to have an abortion is not a permissible means of furthering
the interest described with such specificity in Bellotti II. This conclusion, which no doubt
will come as a surprise to most parents, is incompatible with our constitutional tradition
and any acceptable notion of judicial review of legislative enactments. I dissent from the
portion of the Court's judgment affirming the Court of Appeal's conclusion that
Minnesota two-parent notice statute is unconstitutional.
The Minnesota statute also provides, however, that if the two-parent notice requirement is
invalidated, the same notice requirement is effective unless the pregnant minor obtains a
court order permitting the abortion to proceed. Minn. Stat. 144.343(6) (1988). The Court
of Appeals sustained this portion of the statute, in effect a two-parent notice requirement
with a judicial bypass. Five Members of the Court, the four who join this opinion and
Justice O'Connor, agree with the Court of Appeals' decision on this aspect of the statute.
As announced by Justice Stevens, who dissents from this part of the Court's decision, the
Court of Appeals' judgment on this portion of the statute is therefore affirmed.
I The provisions of the statute before us are straightforward. In essence, the statute
provides that before a physician in Minnesota may perform an abortion on an
unemancipated minor, the physician or the physician's agent must notify both of the
minor's parents, if each one can be located through reasonable effort, either personally or
by certified mail at least 48 hours before the abortion is performed. Minn. Stat.
144.343(2)(3) (1988). Notification is not required if the abortion is necessary to prevent
the minor's death; or if both parents have consented to the abortion; or if the minor
declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse. 144.343(4).
Failure to comply with these requirements is a misdemeanor, and the statute authorizes a
civil action against the noncomplying physician by the minor's parents. 144.343(5).