Stevens, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2036
 GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., PETITIONERS v.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Milford Central School has invited the public to use its facilities for educational and
recreational purposes, but not for "religious purposes." Speech for "religious purposes"
may reasonably be understood to encompass three different categories. First, there is
religious speech that is simply speech about a particular topic from a religious point of
view. The film in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S.
384  (1993), illustrates this category. See id., at 388 (observing that the film series at
issue in that case "would discuss Dr. [James] Dobson's views on the undermining
influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional,
Christian family values instilled at an early stage"). Second, there is religious speech that
amounts to worship, or its equivalent. Our decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981), concerned such speech. See id., at 264-265 (describing the speech in question as
involving "religious worship"). Third, there is an intermediate category that is aimed
principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith.
A public entity may not generally exclude even religious worship from an open public
forum. Id., at 276. Similarly, a public entity that creates a limited public forum for the
discussion of certain specified topics may not exclude a speaker simply because she
approaches those topics from a religious point of view. Thus, in Lamb's Chapel we held
that a public school that permitted its facilities to be used for the discussion of family
issues and child rearing could not deny access to speakers presenting a religious point of
view on those issues. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S., at 393-394.
But, while a public entity may not censor speech about an authorized topic based on the
point of view expressed by the speaker, it has broad discretion to "preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 836 (1976); see also Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 275, n. 6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A school's
extracurricular activities constitute a part of the school's teaching mission, and the school
accordingly must make `decisions concerning the content of those activities' " (quoting
Widmar, 454 U.S., at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Accordingly, "control
over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so
long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The novel question that this case presents concerns the
constitutionality of a public school's attempt to limit the scope of a public forum it has
created. More specifically, the question is whether a school can, consistently with the

 Souter, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2036
 GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., PETITIONERS v.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
The majority rules on two issues. First, it decides that the Court of Appeals failed to
apply the rule in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S.
384  (1993), which held that the government may not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint in operating a limited public forum. The majority applies that rule and
concludes that Milford violated Lamb's Chapel in denying Good News the use of the
school. The majority then goes on to determine that it would not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment  for the Milford School District to allow
the Good News Club to hold its intended gatherings of public school children in
Milford's elementary school. The majority is mistaken on both points. The Court of
Appeals unmistakably distinguished this case from Lamb's Chapel, though not by name,
and accordingly affirmed the application of a policy, unchallenged in the District Court,
that Milford's public schools may not be used for religious purposes. As for the
applicability of the Establishment Clause to the Good News Club's intended use of
Milford's school, the majority commits error even in reaching the issue, which was
addressed neither by the Court of Appeals nor by the District Court. I respectfully dissent.
I Lamb's Chapel, a case that arose (as this one does) from application of N. Y. Educ. Law
§414 (McKinney 2000) and local policy implementing it, built on the accepted rule that a
government body may designate a public forum subject to a reasonable limitation on the
scope of permitted subject matter and activity, so long as the government does not use the
forum-defining restrictions to deny expression to a particular viewpoint on subjects open
to discussion. Specifically, Lamb's Chapel held that the government could not "permit
school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child
rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint." 508
U.S., at 393-394.
This case, like Lamb's Chapel, properly raises no issue about the reasonableness of
Milford's criteria for restricting the scope of its designated public forum. Milford has
opened school property for, among other things, "instruction in any branch of education,
learning or the arts" and for "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment
events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such uses
shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general public." App. to Pet. for Cert.
D1-D3. But Milford has done this subject to the restriction that "[s]chool premises shall
not be used ... for religious purposes." Id., at D2. As the District Court stated, Good

Scalia, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2036
 GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., PETITIONERS v.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Scalia, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion but write separately to explain further my views on two issues.
I First, I join Part IV of the Court's opinion, regarding the Establishment Clause issue, with
the understanding that its consideration of coercive pressure, see ante, at 14, and
perceptions of endorsement, see ante, at 14-15, 17-18, "to the extent" that the law
makes such factors relevant, is consistent with the belief (which I hold) that in this case
that extent is zero. As to coercive pressure: Physical coercion is not at issue here; and so-
called "peer pressure," if it can even been considered coercion, is, when it arises from
private activities, one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association that is
constitutionally protected, see, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958). What is at
play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas­and the private right to exert and
receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is protected by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, see, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
108-109 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-310 (1940), not banned
by the Establishment Clause. A priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot.
As to endorsement, I have previously written that "[r]eligious expression cannot violate
the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995). The same is true
of private speech that occurs in a limited public forum, publicly announced, whose
boundaries are not drawn to favor religious groups but instead permit a cross-section of
uses. In that context, which is this case, "erroneous conclusions [about endorsement] do
not count." Id., at 765. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("I would hold,
simply and clearly, that giving [a private religious group] nondiscriminatory access to
school facilities cannot violate [the Establishment Clause] because it does not signify
state or local embrace of a particular religious sect").
II
Second, since we have rejected the only reason that respondent gave for excluding the
Club's speech from a forum that clearly included it (the forum was opened to any "us[e]
pertaining to the welfare of the community," App. to Pet. for Cert. D1), I do not suppose
it matters whether the exclusion is characterized as viewpoint or subject-matter
discrimination. Lacking any legitimate reason for excluding the Club's speech from its

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2036
 GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., PETITIONERS v.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions. The first question is whether Milford Central School
violated the free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from
meeting after hours at the school. The second question is whether any such violation is
justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the
Establishment Clause. We conclude that Milford's restriction violates the Club's free
speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation.
I The State of New York authorizes local school boards to adopt regulations governing the
use of their school facilities. In particular, N. Y. Educ. Law §414 (McKinney 2000)
enumerates several purposes for which local boards may open their schools to public use.
In 1992, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) enacted a community use policy
adopting seven of §414's purposes for which its building could be used after school. App.
to Pet. for Cert. D1-D3. Two of the stated purposes are relevant here. First, district
residents may use the school for "instruction in any branch of education, learning or the
arts." Id., at D1. Second, the school is available for "social, civic and recreational
meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the
community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the
general public." Ibid.
Stephen and Darleen Fournier reside within Milford's district and therefore are eligible to
use the school's facilities as long as their proposed use is approved by the school.
Together they are sponsors of the local Good News Club, a private Christian organization
for children ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford's policy, in September 1996 the Fourniers
submitted a request to Dr. Robert McGruder, interim superintendent of the district, in
which they sought permission to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings in the
school cafeteria. App. in No. 98-9494 (CA2), p. A-81. The next month, McGruder
formally denied the Fourniers' request on the ground that the proposed use­to have "a
fun time of singing songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing scripture," ibid.­was
"the equivalent of religious worship." App. H1-H2. According to McGruder, the
community use policy, which prohibits use "by any individual or organization for
religious purposes," foreclosed the Club's activities. App. to Pet. for Cert. D2.
In response to a letter submitted by the Club's counsel, Milford's attorney requested
information to clarify the nature of the Club's activities. The Club sent a set of materials
used or distributed at the meetings and the following description of its meeting:
"The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking attendance. As she calls a child's
name, if the child recites a Bible verse the child receives a treat. After attendance, the
Club sings songs. Next Club members engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning

Breyer, J., concurring in part
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 99-2036
 GOOD NEWS CLUB, et al., PETITIONERS v.
MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Breyer, concurring in part.
I agree with the Court's conclusion and join its opinion to the extent that
they are consistent with the following three observations. First, the government's
"neutrality" in respect to religion is one, but only one, of the considerations relevant to
deciding whether a public school's policy violates the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 839 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment);
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 774, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). As this Court previously has indicated, a child's perception that the school has
endorsed a particular religion or religion in general may also prove critically important.
See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-390 (1985); see also
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993);
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 592-594 (1989). Today's opinion does not purport to change that legal
principle.
Second, the critical Establishment Clause question here may well prove to be whether a
child, participating in the Good News Club's activities, could reasonably perceive the
school's permission for the club to use its facilities as an endorsement of religion. See
Ball, supra, at 390 ("[A]n important concern of the effects test is whether ... the
challenged government action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
of their individual religious choices"). The time of day, the age of the children, the nature
of the meetings, and other specific circumstances are relevant in helping to determine
whether, in fact, the Club "so dominate[s]" the "forum" that, in the children's minds, "a
formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval." Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Bd., supra, at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in
judgment).
Third, the Court
cannot fully answer the Establishment Clause question this case raises, given its
procedural posture. The specific legal action that brought this case to the Court of
Appeals was the District Court's decision to grant
Milford Central School's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the grant of summary judgment. We now hold that the school was not entitled to
summary judgment, either in respect to the Free Speech or the Establishment Clause

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOOD NEWS CLUB et al. v. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
 No. 99-2036. Argued February 28, 2001­Decided June 11, 2001
 Under New York law, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) enacted a policy
authorizing district residents to use its building after school for, among other things, (1)
instruction in education, learning, or the arts and (2) social, civic, recreational, and
entertainment uses pertaining to the community welfare. Stephen and Darleen Fournier,
district residents eligible to use the school's facilities upon approval of their proposed
use, are sponsors of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children
ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford's policy, they submitted a request to hold the Club's
weekly afterschool meetings in the school. Milford denied the request on the ground that
the proposed use­to sing songs, hear Bible lessons, memorize scripture, and pray­was the
equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. Petitioners
(collectively, the Club), filed suit under §42 U.S.C.  1983 alleging, inter alia, that the
denial of the Club's application violated its free speech rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court ultimately granted Milford summary
judgment, finding the Club's subject matter to be religious in nature, not merely a
discussion of secular matters from a religious perspective that Milford otherwise permits.
Because the school had not allowed other groups providing religious instruction to use its
limited public forum, the court held that it could deny the Club access without engaging
in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. In affirming, the Second Circuit rejected the
Club's contention that Milford's restriction was unreasonable, and held that, because the
Club's subject matter was quintessentially religious and its activities fell outside the
bounds of pure moral and character development, Milford's policy was constitutional
subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
Held:
1. Milford violated the Club's free speech rights when it excluded the Club from meeting
after hours at the school. Pp. 5-11.
(a) Because the parties so agree, this Court assumes that Milford operates a limited public
forum. A State establishing such a forum is not required to and does not allow persons to
engage in every type of speech. It may be justified in reserving its forum for certain
groups or the discussion of certain topics. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829. The power to so restrict speech, however, is not without
limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech based on viewpoint, ibid., and
must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806. Pp. 5-6.
(b) By denying the Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that
the Club was religious in nature, Milford discriminated against the Club because of its
religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause. That exclusion is
indistinguishable from the exclusions held violative of the Clause in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, where a school district
precluded a private group from presenting films at the school based solely on the