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1
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SUPREMECOURTDOCKET
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
MOTION AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION PARTY PETITIONERS RESPONDENTS AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH MERITS CITY CHARLESTON AMICUS CURIAE OPINION FERGUSON ORDER EXTENDING TIME EXTENDING TIME OPPOSITION NATIONAL COALITION CHILD PROTECTION REFORM NARAL FOUNDATION RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE CONFERENCE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CHICAGO SOUTH CAROLINA WRIT CERTIORARI ACLU |
No. 99-936 Status: DECIDED
Title: Crystal M. Ferguson, et al., Petitioners
v.
City of Charleston, et al.
Docketed: Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
December 2, 1999 (97-2512)
~~Date~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dec 1 1999 Petition for writ of certiorari filed. (Response due January 14, 2000)
Dec 1 1999 Appendix of petitioner filed.
Dec 14 1999 Order extending time to file brief of respondent on the merits
until January 14, 2000.
Jan 3 2000 Motion of American Public Health Association, et al. for leave to
file a brief as amici curiae filed.
Jan 11 2000 Opposition of respondents to motion of American Public Health
Association, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae
filed.
Jan 14 2000 Brief of respondents City of Charleston, South Carolina, et al. in
opposition filed.
Jan 24 2000 Reply brief of petitioners Crystal Ferguson, et al. filed.
Jan 26 2000 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 18, 2000
Feb 22 2000 REDISTRIBUTED for Conference of February 25, 2000
Feb 28 2000 The motion of American Public Health Association, et al. for leave
to file a brief as amici curiae is granted. The petition for a
writ of certiorari is granted.
SET FOR ARGUMENT October 4, 2000.
********************************************************
Mar 2 2000 Order extending time to file the joint appendix and petitioners'
brief on the merits to and including May 26, 2000.
May 22 2000 Order further extending time to file the joint appendix and
petitioners' brief on the merits to and including June 2, 2000.
Jun 1 2000 Joint appendix filed.
Jun 1 2000 Joint appendix in three volumes.
Jun 1 2000 Brief of petitioners Crystal M. Ferguson, et al. filed.
Jun 1 2000 Motion of American Civil Liberties Union, et al. for leave to file
a brief as amici curiae filed.
Jun 2 2000 Motion of American Medical Association for leave to file a brief
as amicus curiae filed.
Jun 2 2000 Motion of National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, et al.
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7
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SYLLABUS
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
TREATMENT DRUG PURPOSES COURT CONSENT LAW ENFORCEMENT MUSC POLICE EVIDENCE COCAINE POLICY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SPECIAL NEEDS OPINION STAFF MEMBERS PREGNANT PETITIONERS WARRANTLESS JUSTIFY MOTHERS OFFICIALS URINE ARRESTING PRESCRIBE JURY RESPONDENTS SUPPORT AFFIRMING REASON |
FERGUSON et al. v. CITY OF
CHARLESTON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 99-936. Argued October 4, 2000--Decided March 21, 2001
In the fall of 1988, staff members at the Charleston public hospital operated by the Medical
University of South Carolina (MUSC) became concerned about an apparent increase in the use
of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment. When the incidence of cocaine use
among maternity patients remained unchanged despite referrals for counseling and treatment of
patients who tested positive for that drug, MUSC staff offered to cooperate with the city in
prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. Accordingly, a task force
made up of MUSC representatives, police, and local officials developed a policy which set forth
procedures for identifying and testing pregnant patients suspected of drug use; required that a
chain of custody be followed when obtaining and testing patients' urine samples; provided for
education and treatment referral for patients testing positive; contained police procedures and
criteria for arresting patients who tested positive; and prescribed prosecutions for drug offenses
and/or child neglect, depending on the stage of the defendant's pregnancy. Other than the
provisions describing the substance abuse treatment to be offered women testing positive, the
policy made no mention of any change in the prenatal care of such patients, nor did it prescribe
any special treatment for the newborns. Petitioners, MUSC obstetrical patients arrested after
testing positive for cocaine, filed this suit challenging the policy's validity on, inter alia, the
theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory
purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among its actions, the District Court instructed the jury
to find for petitioners unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found for
respondents, and petitioners appealed, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
jury's consent finding. In affirming without reaching the consent question, the Fourth Circuit
held that the searches in question were reasonable as a matter of law under this Court's cases
recognizing that "special needs" may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search
policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.
Held: A state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal
conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented
to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women
from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual
search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Pp. 8-18.
(a) Because MUSC is a state hospital, its staff members are government actors subject to the
Fourth Amendment's strictures. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 335-337. Moreover, the
urine tests at issue were indisputably searches within that Amendment's meaning. Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 617. Furthermore, both lower courts viewed the
case as one involving MUSC's right to conduct searches without warrants or probable cause, and
this Court must assume for purposes of decision that the tests were performed without the
patients' informed consent. Pp. 8-9.
(b) Because the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the
results over to police without the patients' knowledge or consent, this case differs from the four
SNIPPETS:
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8
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SUPREMECOURTOPINION
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT PURPOSE PATIENTS EVIDENCE COCAINE MUSC UNITED STATES OPINION STAFF POLICY SPECIAL NEEDS DRUG THREAT WARRANT POLICE CHARLESTON SUBSTANCE ABUSE SOUTH CAROLINA STAFF MEMBERS SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT RESPONDENTS PROSECUTION PRENATAL CARE CERTIORARI DIAGNOSTIC TESTS GENERAL RULE MEDICAL UNIVERSITY DRUG SCREENS SUSPICIONLESS |
CRYSTAL M. FERGUSON, et al.,
PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[March 21, 2001]
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we must decide whether a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to
obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable
search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. More narrowly, the question is whether
the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine
can justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is
unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant.
I
In the fall of 1988, staff members at the public hospital operated in the city of Charleston by
the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) became concerned about an apparent increase
in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment.1 In response to this
perceived increase, as of April 1989, MUSC began to order drug screens to be performed on
urine samples from maternity patients who were suspected of using cocaine. If a patient tested
positive, she was then referred by MUSC staff to the county substance abuse commission for
counseling and treatment. However, despite the referrals, the incidence of cocaine use among the
patients at MUSC did not appear to change.
Some four months later, Nurse Shirley Brown, the case manager for the MUSC obstetrics
department, heard a news broadcast reporting that the police in Greenville, South Carolina, were
arresting pregnant users of cocaine on the theory that such use harmed the fetus and was
therefore child abuse.2 Nurse Brown discussed the story with MUSC's general counsel, Joseph C.
Good, Jr., who then contacted Charleston Solicitor Charles Condon in order to offer MUSC's
cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth.3
After receiving Good's letter, Solicitor Condon took the first steps in developing the policy
issue in this case. He organized the initial meetings, decided who would participate, and issued
the invitations, in which he described his plan to prosecute women who tested positive for
cocaine while pregnant. The task force that Condon formed included representatives of MUSC,
the police, the County Substance Abuse Commission and the Department of Social Services.
Their deliberations led to MUSC's adoption of a 12-page document entitled "POLICY M-7,"
dealing with the subject of "Management of Drug Abuse During Pregnancy." App. to Pet. for
Cert. A-53.
SNIPPETS:
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9
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DISSENTING
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT EVIDENCE UNITED STATES MOTHERS DOCTORS URINE SAMPLE AMENDMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT NURSES ANTE SOCIAL JUDGMENT CONSTITUTION RESOLVE DRUG CONSENT INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE TREATMENT PETITIONERS JUSTICE THOMAS JOIN COOPERATION SPECIAL-NEEDS DOCTRINE CHILD ABUSE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HEALTH BENEFITS RESPONDENTS CHARLESTON DESIRABILITY INVALIDATE PROBATION OFFICER |
CRYSTAL M. FERGUSON, et al.,
PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[March 21, 2001]
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join as to Part II, dissenting.
There is always an unappealing aspect to the use of doctors and nurses, ministers of mercy, to
obtain incriminating evidence against the supposed objects of their ministration--although here, it
is correctly pointed out, the doctors and nurses were ministering not just to the mothers but also
to the children whom their cooperation with the police was meant to protect. But whatever may
be the correct social judgment concerning the desirability of what occurred here, that is not the
issue in the present case. The Constitution does not resolve all difficult social questions, but
leaves the vast majority of them to resolution by debate and the democratic process--which
would produce a decision by the citizens of Charleston, through their elected representatives, to
forbid or permit the police action at issue here. The question before us is a narrower one:
whether, whatever the desirability of this police conduct, it violates the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. In my view, it plainly does not.
I
The first step in Fourth Amendment analysis is to identify the search or seizure at issue. What
petitioners, the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence really object to is not the urine
testing, but the hospital's reporting of positive drug-test results to police. But the latter is
obviously not a search. At most it may be a "derivative use of the product of a past unlawful
search," which, of course, "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong" and "presents a question,
not of rights, but of remedies." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). There is
only one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search of petitioners in the present case: the
taking of the urine sample. I suppose the testing of that urine for traces of unlawful drugs could
be considered a search of sorts, but the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches of
citizens' "persons, houses, papers, and effects"; and it is entirely unrealistic to regard urine as
of the "effects" (i.e., part of the property) of the person who has passed and abandoned it. Cf.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35 (1988) (garbage left at curb is not property protected by
the Fourth Amendment). Some would argue, I suppose, that testing of the urine is prohibited by
some generalized privacy right "emanating" from the "penumbras" of the Constitution (a
question that is not before us); but it is not even arguable that the testing of urine that has been
lawfully obtained is a Fourth Amendment search. (I may add that, even if it were, the factors
legitimizing the taking of the sample, which I discuss below, would likewise legitimize the
testing of it.)
SNIPPETS:
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10
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ORAL ARGUMENTS
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
DOCTORS COURT POLICE CARE DRUG CRITERIA UNITED STATES CONSENT LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES CHILD POLICY EVIDENCE SPECIAL NEEDS CHARLESTON PROTOCOL ESQ SOUTH CAROLINA DISCRETION AMENDMENT CHILD ABUSE INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION PRENATAL CARE URINE SAMPLE PRISCILLA SMITH PHYSICIANS LEVERAGE HOOD |
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 3 CRYSTAL M. FERGUSON, ET AL., : 4 Petitioners : 5 v. : No. 99-936 6 CITY OF CHARLESTON, ET AL. : 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 8 Washington, D.C. 9 Wednesday, October 4, 2000 10 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 11 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 12 10:03 a.m. 13 APPEARANCES: 14 PRISCILLA J. SMITH, ESQ., Baltimore, Maryland; on behalf 15 of the Petitioners. 16 ROBERT H. HOOD, ESQ., Charleston, South Carolina; on 17 behalf of the Respondents. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25SNIPPETS: |
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11
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Government Exhibit # 4THCIRCUITREMANDED
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
UNITED STATES PLAINTIFFS COCAINE POLICY MUSC APPELLANTS SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DRUG DISTRICT COURT SUPREME COURT CIRCUIT CONDON SHIRLEY BROWN URINE DRUG SCREENS LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIAL NEEDS CONSTITUTION DISCRIMINATION SUBSTANCE ABUSE GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS PRENATAL CARE INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION AFRICAN-AMERICAN DISPARATE IMPACT PROSECUTION REASONABLENESS DAVID SCHWACKE |
U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
FERGUSON v CITY OF CHARLESTON
Case reversed and remanded by Supreme Court opinion filed 3/21/01
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CRYSTAL M. FERGUSON; PAULA S. HALE; ELLEN L. KNIGHT; PATRICIA R.
WILLIAMS; LORI GRIFFIN; PAMELA PEAR; SANDRA POWELL; LAVERNE
SINGLETON; THERESA JOSEPH; DARLENE M. NICHOLSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
STATE-RECORD COMPANY, INCORPORATED; THE EVENING POST PUBLISHING
COMPANY, Intervenors-Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON, South Carolina; HARRISON L. PEOPLES, Dr.; No. 97-2512
THOMAS C. ROWLAND, JR., Dr.; STANLEY C. BAKER, JR., Dr.; CHARLES B. HANNA,
Dr.; COTESWORTH P. FISHBURNE, Dr.; E. CONYERS O'BRYAN, Dr.; MELVYN
BERLINSKY; PATRICIA T. SMITH; M. J. COOPER; HERBERT C. GRANGER; ROBERT C.
LAKE, JR.; PHILLIP D. SASSER; CLAUDIA W. PEOPLES; CARROLL V. BING, JR., Dr., as
Trustees of the Medical University of South Carolina in their official capacities; REUBEN
GREENBERG; CHARLES MOLONY CONDON; DAVID SCHWACKE; SHIRLEY BROWN,
R.N.; EDGAR O. HORGER, III, M.D.;
VICTOR DEL BENE; JOHN SANDERS; WILLIAM B. PITTARD, M.D.; ROGER NEWMAN,
M.D.; HAROLD BIVENS, M.D.; MELESIA HENRY, R.N., personally and in their official
capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. C.
Weston Houck, Chief District Judge. (CA-93-2624-2-12)
Argued: October 26, 1998
Decided: July 13, 1999
Before WILKINS and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BLAKE, United States District Judge
for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkins wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer joined. Judge Blake wrote an opinion dissenting in part.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Priscilla Joyce Smith, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW & POLICY, New
York, New York, for Appellants. Barbara Wynne Showers, Joseph Camden Wilson, IV, HOOD
LAW FIRM, L.L.C., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Susan K. Dunn,
SNIPPETS:
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12
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Government Exhibit # 4THCIRCUITOPINION
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
UNITED STATES PLAINTIFFS COCAINE MUSC POLICY APPELLANTS SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DRUG DISTRICT COURT CIRCUIT CONDON SHIRLEY BROWN URINE DRUG SCREENS LAW ENFORCEMENT PATIENTS SPECIAL NEEDS DISCRIMINATION CONSTITUTION SUBSTANCE ABUSE GOVERNMENT DISPARATE IMPACT EFFECTIVENESS AFRICAN-AMERICAN PRENATAL CARE DRUG TREATMENT PROSECUTION CAPACITIES DAVID SCHWACKE |
U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
FERGUSON v CITY OF CHARLESTON
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
CRYSTAL M. FERGUSON; PAULA S. HALE; ELLEN L. KNIGHT; PATRICIA R.
WILLIAMS; LORI GRIFFIN; PAMELA PEAR; SANDRA POWELL; LAVERNE
SINGLETON; THERESA JOSEPH; DARLENE M. NICHOLSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
STATE-RECORD COMPANY, INCORPORATED; THE EVENING POST PUBLISHING
COMPANY, Intervenors-Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON, South Carolina; HARRISON L. PEOPLES, Dr.; No. 97-2512
THOMAS C. ROWLAND, JR., Dr.; STANLEY C. BAKER, JR., Dr.; CHARLES B. HANNA,
Dr.; COTESWORTH P. FISHBURNE, Dr.; E. CONYERS O'BRYAN, Dr.; MELVYN
BERLINSKY; PATRICIA T. SMITH; M. J. COOPER; HERBERT C. GRANGER; ROBERT C.
LAKE, JR.; PHILLIP D. SASSER; CLAUDIA W. PEOPLES; CARROLL V. BING, JR., Dr., as
Trustees of the Medical University of South Carolina in their official capacities; REUBEN
GREENBERG; CHARLES MOLONY CONDON; DAVID SCHWACKE; SHIRLEY BROWN,
R.N.; EDGAR O. HORGER, III, M.D.;
VICTOR DEL BENE; JOHN SANDERS; WILLIAM B. PITTARD, M.D.; ROGER NEWMAN,
M.D.; HAROLD BIVENS, M.D.; MELESIA HENRY, R.N., personally and in their official
capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. C.
Weston Houck, Chief District Judge. (CA-93-2624-2-12)
Argued: October 26, 1998
Decided: July 13, 1999
Before WILKINS and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BLAKE, United States District Judge
for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkins wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer joined. Judge Blake wrote an opin- ion dissenting in part.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Priscilla Joyce Smith, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW & POLICY, New
York, New York, for Appellants. Barbara Wynne Showers, Joseph Camden Wilson, IV, HOOD
LAW FIRM, L.L.C., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Susan K. Dunn,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellants. Robert H. Hood, HOOD LAW FIRM, L.L.C.,
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