SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DUNCAN, SUPERINTENDENT, GREAT MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
v. WALKER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 00-121. Argued March 26, 2001Decided June 18, 2001
The time during which an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review" is pending tolls the limitation period for filing federal habeas petitions. §28
U.S.C. 2244 (d)(2). Before the April 24, 1996, effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), respondent's state robbery conviction
became final. He filed, inter alia, a federal habeas petition under §2254. The District
Court dismissed the petition without prejudice because it was not apparent that
respondent had exhausted available state remedies. On May 20, 1997, without having
returned to state court, respondent filed another federal habeas petition. The District
Court dismissed that petition because respondent had not filed within a reasonable time
from AEDPA's effective date. In reversing, the Second Circuit found that respondent's
first federal habeas petition was an application for "other collateral review" that tolled the
limitation period under §2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.
Held: A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review" within the meaning of §2244(d)(2). As a result, §2244(d)(2) did not
toll the limitation period during the pendency of respondent's first federal habeas
petition. The Court begins with the language of the statute. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 420, 431. Petitioner's contention that "State" applies to the entire phrase "post-
conviction or other collateral review" is correct. To begin with, Congress placed "State"
before that phrase without specifically naming any kind of "Federal" review. The fact
that other AEDPA provisions denominate expressly both "State" and "Federal"
proceedings, see, e.g., §2254(i), supplies strong evidence that Congress would have
mentioned "Federal" review expressly had Congress intended to include federal review.
See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30. Respondent's contrary construction
would render the word "State" insignificant, if not wholly superfluous. This Court's duty
to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute, United States v. Menasche, 348
U.S. 528, 538-539, makes the Court reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage. This
is especially so when the term occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme as the
word "State" in the federal habeas statute. But under respondent's rendition, "State" has
no operative effect on the scope of §2244(d)(2). The clause would have precisely the
same content were it to read "post-conviction or other collateral review." Contrary to the
Second Circuit's characterization, petitioner's interpretation does not yield the linguistic
oddity "State other collateral review," but more naturally yields the understanding "other
State collateral review." Further, that court's reasoning that the phrase "other collateral
review" would be rendered meaningless if it did not refer to federal habeas petitions
depends on the incorrect premise that the only state "collateral" review is "post-
conviction" review. "[O]ther collateral review" could include, e.g., a state court civil
commitment or civil contempt order. Congress also may have used "post-conviction or
other collateral" in recognition of the diverse terminology that different States employ to
SNIPPETS:
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DUNCAN, SUPERINTENDENT, GREAT MEADOW CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Argued March 26, 2001Decided June 18, 2001 The time during which an "application for State
Before the April 24, 1996, effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
The District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice because it was not apparent that
In reversing, the Second Circuit found that respondent's first federal habeas petition was an
A federal habeas petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other
The Court begins with the language of the statute.
Petitioner's contention that "State" applies to the entire phrase "postconviction or other
Congress placed "State" before that phrase without specifically naming any kind of "Federal"
The fact that other AEDPA provisions denominate expressly both "State" and "Federal"
Respondent's contrary construction would render the word "State" insignificant,
Contrary to the Second Circuit's characterization, petitioner's interpretation does not yield
that court's reasoning that the phrase "other collateral review" would be rendered
"ther collateral review" could include, e.g., a state court civil commitment or civil
Petitioner's construction is also far more consistent than respondent's with AEDPA's purpose
Respondent contends that petitioner's interpretation creates the potential for unfairness to
Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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