SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 00-549
CEDRIC KUSHNER PROMOTIONS, LTD.,
PETITIONER v. DON KING et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2001]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, §18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.,
makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to
conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs" through the
commission of two or more statutorily defined crimeswhich RICO calls "a pattern of
racketeering activity." §1962(c). The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that
this provision fore-
sees two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct
"enterprise."
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely
held corporation. The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporation's
affairs through the forbidden "pattern," though for present purposes it is conceded that, in
doing so, he acted within the scope of his authority as the corporation's employee. In
these circumstances, are there two entities, a "person" and a separate "enterprise"?
Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint
are true, we conclude that the "person" and "enterprise" here are distinct and that the
RICO provision applies.
Petitioner, Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., is a corporation that promotes boxing
matches. Petitioner sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of Don King
Productions, a corporation, claiming that King had conducted the boxing-related affairs
of Don King Productions in part through a RICO "pattern," i.e., through the alleged
commission of at least two instances of fraud and other RICO predicate crimes. The
District Court, citing Court of Appeals precedent, dismissed the complaint. Civ. No. 98-
6859, 1999 WL 771366, *3-4 (SDNY, Sept. 28, 1999). And the Court of Appeals
affirmed that dismissal. 219 F.3d 115 (CA2 2000) (per curiam). In the appellate court's
view, §1962(c) applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities,
a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly
conducts. Id., at 116. In this instance, "it is undisputed that King was an employee" of the
corporation Don King Productions and also "acting within the scope of his authority." Id.,
at 117. Under the Court of Appeals' analysis, King, in a legal sense, was part of, not
separate from, the corporation. There was no "person," distinct from the "enterprise,"
who improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs." And thus §1962(c) did not apply.
Ibid.
Other Circuits, applying §1962(c) in roughly similar circumstances, have reached a
contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Brannon v. Boatmen's First Nat. Bank of Okla., 153 F.3d
1144, 1148, n. 4 (CA10 1998); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L. P., 52 F.3d 640, 647
(CA7 1995); Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258, 265, 269 (CA3
SNIPPETS:
DON KING et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, §18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., makes it
The language suggests, and lower courts have held, that this provision foresees two separate
This case focuses upon a person who is the president and sole shareholder of a closely held
The plaintiff claims that the president has conducted the corporation's affairs through the
Assuming, as we must given the posture of this case, that the allegations in the complaint
"it is undisputed that King was an employee" of the corporation Don King Productions and also
Bank of Okla., 153 F.3d 1144, 1148, n.
We do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under §1962one must
particularly in light of the fact that 12 Courts of Appeals have interpreted the statute as
Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 445; United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc., 219 F.3d
denied, 531 U.S. __; Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190; Richmond, supra, at 646-647;
Linguistically speaking, an employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through
We note that the Second Circuit relied on earlier Circuit precedent for its decision.
to apply the RICO statute in present circumstances is consistent with the statute's basic
|
