SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 90-985
 JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]
Justice O'Connor , with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
The Reconstruction Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku
Klux Act (Act), 17 Stat. 13, to combat the chaos that paralyzed the post-War South.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 , 276-279 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336-
339 (1983). Section 2 of the Act extended the protection of federal courts to those who
effectively were prevented from exercising their civil rights by the threat of mob
violence. Although the immediate purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat animosity against
blacks and their supporters, Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 , 836 (1983), the language
of the Act, like that of many Recon
struction statutes, is more expansive than the historical circumstances that inspired it. The
civil remedy component of § 2, codified at §42 U.S.C.  1985 (3), speaks in general terms,
and provides a federal cause of action to any person injured or deprived of a legal right
by
"two or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, [first] for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or [second] for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . . . ."
The Court's approach to Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes has been to "accord
[them] a sweep as broad as [their] language." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801
(1966); accord, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968). Today, the Court does just the opposite, precluding
application of the statute to a situation that its language clearly covers. There is no
dispute that petitioners have "conspired" through their concerted and unlawful activities.
The record shows that petitioners' "purpose" is "directly" to "depriv[e]" women of their
ability to obtain the clinics' services, see National Organization for Women v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (ED Va. 1989), as well as "indirectly" to infringe on
their constitutional privilege to travel interstate in seeking those services. Id., at 1489.
The record also shows that petitioners accomplish their goals by purposefully "preventing
or hindering" local law enforcement authorities from maintaining open access to the
clinics. See ibid., and n. 4. In sum, petitioners' activities fit precisely within the language
of both clauses of § 1985(3).
Yet the Court holds otherwise, and it does so primarily on the basis of an "element" of the
§ 1985(3) cause of action that does not appear on the face of the statute. Adhering

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 90-985
 JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]
Justice Stevens , with whom Justice Blackmun joins, [n.1] The Ku Klux Act of 1871, 17
Stat. 13, was a response to the massive, organized lawlessness that infected our Southern
States during the post-Civil War era. When a question concerning this statute's coverage
arises, it is appropriate to consider whether the controversy has a purely local character or
the kind of federal dimension that gave rise to the legislation.
Based on detailed, undisputed findings of fact, the District Court concluded that the
portion of §2 of the Ku Klux Act now codified at §42 U.S.C.  1985 (3) provides a federal
remedy for petitioners' violent concerted activities on the public streets and private
property of law abiding citizens. National Organization for Women v. OperationRescue,
726 F. Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989). The Court of Appeals affirmed. National Organization
for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F. 2d 582 (CA4 1990). The holdings of the courts
below are supported by the text and the legislative history of the statute and are fully
consistent with this Court's precedents. Admittedly, important questions concerning the
meaning of §1985(3) have been left open in our prior cases, including whether the statute
covers gender based discrimination and whether it provides a remedy for the kind of
interference with a woman's right to travel to another State to obtain an abortion revealed
by this record. Like the overwhelming majority of federal judges who have spoken to the
issue, [n.2] I am persuaded that traditional principles of statutory construction readily
provide affirmative answers to these questions.
It is unfortunate that the Court has analyzed this case as though it presented an abstract
question of logical deduction rather than a question concerning the exercise and
allocation of power in our federal system of government. The Court ignores the obvious
(and entirely constitutional)congressional intent behind §1985(3) to protect this Nation's
citizens from what amounts to the theft of their constitutional rights by organized and
violent mobs across the country.
The importance of the issue warrants a full statement of the facts found by the District
Court before reaching the decisive questions in this case.
Petitioners are dedicated to a cause that they profoundly believe is far more important
than mere obedience to the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia or the police power of
its cities. To achieve their goals, the individual petitioners "have agreed and combined
with one another and with defendant Operation Rescue to organize, coordinate and
participate in  rescue' demonstrations at abortion clinics in various parts of the country,
including the Washington Metropolitan area. The purpose of these  rescue'
demonstrations is to disrupt operations at the target clinic and indeed ultimately to cause
the clinic to cease operations entirely." [n.3]
The scope of petitioners' conspiracy is nationwide; it far exceeds the bounds or
jurisdiction of any one State. They have blockaded clinics across the country, and their

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 90-985
 JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]
Justice Souter , concurring in the judgment in part and
This case turns on the meaning of two clauses of §42 U.S.C.  1985 (3) which render
certain conspiracies civilly actionable. The first clause (the deprivation clause) covers
conspiracies
"for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws";
the second (the prevention clause), conspiracies
"for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws . . . ."
For liability in either instance the statute requires an "act in furtherance of the . . .
conspiracy, whereby [a person] is injured in his person or property, or deprived of . . . any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States . . . ."
Prior cases giving the words "equal protection of the laws" in the deprivation clause an
authoritative construction have limited liability under that clause by imposing two
conditions not found in the terms of the text. An actionable conspiracy must have some
racial or perhaps other class based motivation, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88  102
(1971), and, if it is %aimed at" the deprivation of a constitutional right, the right must be
one secured not only against official infringement, but against private action as well.
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). The Court follows these cases in applying
the deprivation clause today, and to this extent I take no exception to its conclusion. I
know of no reason that would exempt us from the counsel of stare decisis in adhering to
this settled statutory construction, see Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n,
502 U. S. ---- (1991), which Congress is free to change if it should think our prior reading
unsound.
The meaning of the prevention clause is not thus settled, however, and starting in Part IV
I will give my reasons for reading it without any importation of these extratextual
conditions from the deprivation clause. First, however, a word is in order to show that the
prevention clause's construction is properly before us, and to explain why the Court is not
in a position to cast doubt on that clause's arguable applicability to the facts indicated by
the record, in light of the Court's refusal to allow respondents to address this very issue in
the supplemental briefing that was otherwise permitted prior to the reargument of this
case.
Respondents' complaint does not limit their theory of liability to the deprivation clause
alone, for it alleges simply that petitioners "have conspired with each other and other
parties presently unknown for the purpose of denying women seeking abortions at
targeted facilities their right to privacy, in violation of §42 U.S.C.  1985 (3)." App. 16.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 90-985
 JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]
Justice Kennedy , concurring.
The three separate dissenting opinions in this case offer differing interpretations of the
statute in question, §42 U.S.C.  1985
(3). Given the difficulty of the
question, this is understandable, but the dissenters' inability to agree on a single rationale
confirms, in my view, the correctness of the Court's opinion. As all recognize, essential
considerations of federalism are at stake here. The federal balance is a fragile one, and a
false step in interpreting § 1985(3) risks making a whole catalog of ordinary state crimes
a concurrent violation of a single congressional statute passed more than a century ago.
Of course, the wholesale commission of common state law crimes creates dangers that
are far from ordinary. Even in the context of political protest, persistent, organized,
premeditated lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State to maintain
order and preserve the rights of its citizens. Such actions are designed to inflame, not
inform. They subvert the civility and mutual respect that are the essential preconditions
for the orderly resolution of social conflict in a free society. For this reason, it is
important to note that another federal statute offers the possibility of powerful federal
assistance forpersons who are injured or threatened by organized lawless conduct that
falls within the primary jurisdiction of the States and their local governments.
Should state officials deem it necessary, law enforcement assistance is authorized upon
request by the State to the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to §42 U.S.C.
10501 . In the event of a law
enforcement emergency as to which "State and local resources are inadequate to protect
the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law," § 10502(3), the
Attorney General is empowered to put the full range of federal law enforcement
resources at the disposal of the State, including the resources of the United States
Marshals Service, which was presumably the principal practical advantage to respondents
of seeking a federal injunction under § 1985(3). See § 10502(2).
If this scheme were to be invoked, the nature and extent of a federal response would be a
determination for the Executive. Its authority to act is less circumscribed than our own,
but I have little doubt that such extraordinary intervention into local controversies would
be ordered only after a careful assessment of the circumstances, including the need to
preserve our essential liberties and traditions. Indeed, the statute itself explicitly directs
the Attorney General to consider "the need to avoid unnecessary Federal involvement and
intervention in matters primarily of State and local concern." § 10501(c)(5).
I do not suggest that this statute is the only remedy available. It does illustrate, however,
that Congress has provided a federal mechanism for ensuring that adequate law
enforcement resources are available to protect federally guaranteed rights and that

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 No. 90-985
 JAYNE BRAY, et al., PETITIONERS v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 13, 1993]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents sued to enjoin petitioners from conducting demonstrations at abortion
clinics in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area. Following an expedited trial, the
District Court ruled that petitioners had violated § 1985(3) by conspiring to deprive
women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The court also ruled for
respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass and public nuisance. As relief
on these three claims, the court enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing
access to, abortion clinics in specifiedVirginia counties and cities in the Washington, D.
C., metropolitan area. National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
Supp. 1483 (ED Va. 1989). Based on its § 1985(3) ruling and pursuant to §42 U.S.C.
1988  the court also ordered petitioners to pay respondents $27,687.55 in attorney's fees
and costs.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, National Organization for Women
v. Operation Rescue, 914 F. 2d 582 (CA4 1990), and we granted certiorari, 498 U. S. ___
(1991). The case was argued in the October 1991 Term, and pursuant to our direction, see
504 U. S. ___ (1992), was reargued in the current Term.
Our precedents establish that in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of the
first clause of § 1985(3), [n.1] a plaintiff must show, inter alia, (1) that-some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the
conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and (2) that the
conspiracy "aimed at interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as
official, encroachment," Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). We think neither
showing has been made in the present case.
In Griffin this Court held, reversing a 20 year old precedent, see Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U.S. 651  (1951), that § 1985(3) reaches not only conspiracies under color of state
law, but also purely private conspiracies. In finding that the text required that expanded
scope, however, we recognized the "constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of
interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law." Griffin, 403 U. S., at 102. That was
to be avoided, we said, "by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of
invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting
amendment," ibid.--citing specifically Representative Shellabarger's statement that the
law was restricted "  to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of
rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which
is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies . . .
.' " Id., at 100 (emphasis in original), quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App.
478 (1871). We said that "[t]he language [of § 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of

Official Transcript
United States Supreme Court

Case No. 90-985

Jayne BRAY, et al., Petitioners,
v.
ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC, et al, Respondents


Tuesday, October 6, 1992.



APPEARANCES:
JAY ALAN SEKULOW, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Petitioners.
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners.
DEBORAH A. ELLIS, ESQ., New York, New York; on behalf of the Respondents.


CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument first this morning in number 90- 985,
Jayne Bray versus Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. Mr. Sekulow.


        ORAL REARGUMENT OF JAY ALAN SEKULOW ON BEHALF OF THE
                                          PETITIONERS

MR. SEKULOW: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Through the misapplication of
section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia now monitors State trespass action. It has been our position from the outset of this
litigation that this case should not be in Federal court. The Fourth Circuit holding rests on two
faulty legal premises. First, an opposition to abortion constitutes invidious discrimination against
women, and secondly, the district court further compounded its error by misapplying this Court's
jurisprudence with regard to the constitutional right to interstate travel by finding that
conduct would have an effect on interstate travel and thereby purposely violating the right to
interstate travel. The Fourth Circuit's position goes a long way in making the general Federal tort
law that this Court has long counseled against. There is redress available, and that is in the
Virginia Commonwealth courts. In fact, the circuit court in Norfolk, Virginia has issued
injunctions which prohibits blockades and prohibit trespass activity. The law does offer redress.
This is not a case where redress is unavailable. It is. State court injunctions whose provisions
mirror those of the Federal court here in significant areas have been upheld in numerous State
courts on appeal. This is a case of statutory construction and statutory interpretation. The
question presented is, does section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 cover the petitioners'
activities? Our position is that it does not, and the Fourth Circuit is wrong and should be
reversed. In order for there to be a violation of section 2 of the act, there must be established,

 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BRAY et al. v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 90-985. Argued October 15, 1991 -- Decided Reargued October 6, 1992
Decided January 13, 1993
Respondents, abortion clinics and supporting organizations, sued to enjoin petitioners, an
association and individuals who organize and coordinate antiabortion demonstrations,
from conducting demonstrations at clinics in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area.
The District Court held that, by conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions of their
right to interstate travel, petitioners had violated the first clause of §42 U.S.C.  1985 (3),
which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; ruled for
respondents on their pendent state law claims of trespass and public nuisance; as relief on
these three claims, enjoined petitioners from trespassing on, or obstructing access to,
specified clinics; and, pursuant to §42 U.S.C.  1988  ordered petitioners to pay
respondents attorney's fees and costs on the § 1985(3) claim. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1.The first clause of § 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics. Pp. 2-14.
(a) Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion qualifies alongside race
discrimination as an "otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus
[underlying] the conspirators' action," as is required under Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102, in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of § 1985(3)'s first
clause. Respondents' claim that petitioners' opposition to abortion reflects an animus
against women in general must berejected. The "animus" requirement demands at least a
purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex, whereas the record indicates
that petitioners' demonstrations are not directed specifically at women, but are intended to
protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition
to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex based intent; there are
common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of
women as a class. This Court's prior decisions indicate that the disfavoring of abortion,
although only women engage in the activity, is not ipso facto invidious discrimination
against women as a class. Pp. 3-9.
(b) Respondents have also not shown that petitioners "aimed at interfering with rights"
that are "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment," a second
prerequisite to proving a private conspiracy in violation of § 1985(3)'s first clause.
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833. Although the right to interstate travel is
constitutionally protected against private interference in at least some contexts,
Carpenters makes clear that a § 1985(3) private conspiracy must be "aimed at" that right.
Ibid. That was not established here. Although respondents showed that substantial
numbers of women travel interstate to reach the clinics in question, it was irrelevant to
petitioners' opposition whether or not such travel preceded the intended abortions.