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1
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SYLLABUS
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
PRIVILEGE DEFENDANT CUSTODY COURT ATTORNEY SELF-INCRIMINATION SILENT LAWYER POLICE INTERROGATION PROCESS SAFEGUARDS PROTECTION CEASE NBSP MIRANDA SUPREME COURT ARIZONA OFFICERS PROSECUTING WARNING RIGHTS ADMISSIONS CONVICTIONS EXCULPATORY INCULPATORY LAW ENFORCEMENT INHERENT ABSENCE PRIOR |
MIRANDA v IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MIRANDA v. ARIZONA No. 759 Argued February 28-March 1, 1966 Decided June 13, 1966 * 384 U.S. 436 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA Syllabus In each of these cases, the defendant, while in police custody, was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and, in three of them, signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted, and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal. Held: 1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491. (a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating, and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp. 445-458. (b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansiveSNIPPETS: |
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2
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
POLICE PRIVILEGE COURT UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ESCOBEDO CRIME RIGHTS JUSTICE COUNSEL WARNING CONFESSION DEFENDANT LAW ENFORCEMENT INCRIMINATE SUPREME COURT PROSECUTION CONSISTENT ADMISSIBILITY FBI SELF-INCRIMINATION AUTHORITIES GOVERNMENT SAFEGUARDS IN-CUSTODY INTERROGATION ATMOSPHERE INTERROGATION PROCESS CALIFORNIA |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MIRANDA v. ARIZONA No. 759 Argued February 28-March 1, 1966 Decided June 13, 1966 * 384 U.S. 436 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. [384 U.S. 440] We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible. This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessingSNIPPETS: |
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3
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DISSENTING
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
UNITED STATES CONFESSION INTERROGATION PRIVILEGE AMENDMENT LAW COUNSEL OPINION COERCED CONFESSIONS WARNINGS SELF-INCRIMINATION POLICE AUTHORITIES DISSENTING COMMON LAW HISTORY REPORTS COMMON LAW FEDERAL OFFENDERS DEFENDANT SUPREME COURT IN-CUSTODY INTERROGATION CONSTITUTION DISTRICT COURT SELF-INCRIMINATION FORBIDS IN-CUSTODY INVOLUNTARINESS CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION JUSTICE STEWART JOIN PROSECUTION POLICE OFFICER |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MIRANDA v. ARIZONA No. 759 Argued February 28-March 1, 1966 Decided June 13, 1966 * 384 U.S. 436 WHITE, J., dissenting MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting. I The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment. As for the English authorities and the common law history, the privilege, firmly established in the second half of the seventeenth century, was never applied except to prohibit compelled judicial interrogations. The rule excluding coerced confessions matured about 100 years later, "[b]ut there is nothing in the reports to suggest that the theory has its roots in the privilege against self-incrimination. And, so far as the cases reveal, the privilege, as such, seems to have been given effect only in judicial proceedings, including the preliminary examinations by authorized magistrates." Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 18 (1949). Our own constitutional provision provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." These words, when "[c]onsidered in the light to be shed by grammar and the dictionary . .. , appear to signifySNIPPETS: |
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4
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CONCURANDDISSENT
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COUNSEL COURT POLICE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION UNITED STATES WARNING DISSENTING LAW ENFORCEMENT OPINION PRACTICE CRIME AMENDMENT AFFIRM HAYNES WAIVER SUSPECT BROTHER HOLDING TOTALITY SOLICITOR FBI CLARK CONCURRING MAJORITY POLICE OFFICERS CRIME DETECTION ESCOBEDO CONSTITUTION RIGHTS |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
No. 759
Argued February 28-March 1, 1966
Decided June 13, 1966 *
384 U.S. 436
CLARK,
J., concurring and dissenting
MR.
JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting in Nos. 759, 760, and 761, and concurring in the
result in No. 584.
It is
with regret that I find it necessary to write in these cases. However, I am
unable to join the majority because its opinion goes too far on too little,
while my dissenting brethren do not go quite far enough. Nor can I join in the
Court's criticism of the present practices of police and investigatory agencies
as to custodial interrogation. The materials it refers to as "police
manuals"{1} are, as I read them, merely writings in this field by
professors and some police officers. Not one is shown by the record here to be
the official manual of any police department, much less in universal use in
crime detection. Moreover, the examples of police brutality mentioned by the
Court{2} are rare exceptions to the thousands of cases [384 U.S. 500] that
appear every year in the law reports. The police agencies -- all the way from
municipal and state forces to the federal bureaus -- are responsible for law
enforcement and public safety in this country. I am proud of their efforts,
which, in my view, are not fairly characterized by the Court's opinion.
I
The
ipse dixit of the majority has no support in our cases. Indeed, the Court
admits that "we might not find the defendants' statements [here] to have
been involuntary in traditional terms." Ante, p. 457. In short, the Court
has added more to the requirements that the accused is entitled to consult with
his lawyer and that he must be given the traditional warning that he may remain
silent and that anything that he says may be used against him. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491 (1964). Now the Court fashions a constitutional
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