Mr. Justice GOLDBERG, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BRENNAN
join, concurring. Griswald v. Connecticut I agree with the Court that Connecticut's birth-
control law unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy, and I join in its
opinion and judgment. Although I have not accepted the view that 'due process' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments (see my
concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1071, 13
L.Ed.2d 923, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117, 154, 81 S.Ct. 954, 974, 6 L.Ed.2d 156), I do agree that the concept of liberty
protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific
terms of the Bill of Rights. My conclusion that the concept of liberty is not so restricted
and that it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not mentioned
explicitly in the Constitution [Fn1] is supported both by numerous*487 decisions of this
Court, referred to in the Court's opinion, and by the language and history of the Ninth
Amendment. In reaching the conclusion that the right of marital privacy is protected, as
being within the protected penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the
Court refers to the Ninth Amendment, ante, at 1681. I add these words to emphasize the
relevance of that Amendment to the Court's holding. Fn1. My Brother STEWART
dissents on the ground that he 'can find no . . . general right of privacy in the Bill of
Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this
Court.' Post, at 1706. He would require a more explicit guarantee than the one which the
Court derives from several constitutional amendments. This Court, however, has never
held that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights that
the Constitution specifically mentions by name. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct.
1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204;
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 780, 13 L.Ed.2d 675; Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; NAACP v.
Alabama, 360 U.S. 240, 79 S.Ct. 1001, 3 L.Ed.2d 1205; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070; Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43
S.Ct. 625. To the contrary, this Court, for example, in Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, while
recognizing that the Fifth Amendment does not contain the 'explicit safeguard' of an
equal protection clause, id., 347 U.S. at 499, 74 S.Ct. at 694, nevertheless derived an
equal protection principle from that Amendment's Due Process Clause. And in Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects from arbitrary state action the right to pursue an occupation, such as the practice
of law. The Court stated many years ago that the Due Process Clause protects those
liberties that are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.' Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332,
78 L.Ed. 674. In Gitlow v. People of State of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 45 S.Ct. 625,
630, 69 L.Ed. 1138, the Court said: 'For present purposes we may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of the press--which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress--are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States.' (Emphasis added.) *488 And, in Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, the Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment,
stated: 'While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus

Mr. Justice STEWART, whom Mr. Justice BLACK joins, dissenting. Griswald v.
Connecticut Since 1879 Connecticut has had on its books a law which forbids the use of
contraceptives by anyone. I think this is an uncommonly silly law. As a practical matter,
the law is obviously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present case. As a
philosophical matter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of marriage
should be left to personal and private choice, based upon each individual's moral, ethical,
and religious beliefs. As a matter of social policy, I think professional counsel about
methods of birth control should be available to all, so that each individual's choice can be
meaningfully made. But we are not asked in this case to say whether we think this law is
unwise, or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the United States
Constitution. And that I cannot do. In the course of its opinion the Court refers to no less
than six Amendments to the Constitution: the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, the
Ninth, and the Fourteenth. *528 But the Court does not say which of these Amendments,
if any, it thinks is infringed by this Connecticut law. We are told that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not, as such, the 'guide' in this case. With that
much I agree. There is no claim that this law, duly enacted by the Connecticut
Legislature, is unconstitutionally vague. There is no claim that the appellants were denied
any of the elements of procedural due process at their trial, so as to make their
convictions constitutionally invalid. And, as the Court says, the day has long passed since
the Due Process Clause was regarded as a proper instrument for determining 'the wisdom,
need, and propriety' of state laws. Compare Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45,
25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937, with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10
L.Ed.2d 93. My Brothers HARLAN and WHITE to the contrary, '(w)e have returned to
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.'
Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra, 372 U.S. at 730, 83 S.Ct. at 1031. As to the First, Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, I can find nothing in any of them to invalidate this
Connecticut law, even assuming that all those Amendments are fully applicable against
the States. [Fn1] It has *529 not even been argued that this is a law 'respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' [Fn2] And surely,
unless the solemn process of constitutional adjudication is to descend to the level of a
play on words, there is not involved here any abridgment of 'the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.' [Fn3] No soldier has been quartered in any
house. [Fn4] There has been no search, and no seizure. [Fn5] Nobody has been
compelled to be a witness against himself. [Fn6] Fn1. The Amendments in question were,
as everyone knows, originally adopted as limitations upon the power of the newly created
Federal Government, not as limitations upon the powers of the individual States. But the
Court has held that many of the provisions of the first eight amendments are fully
embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations upon state action, and some
members of the Court have held the view that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
made every provision of the first eight amendments fully applicable against the States.
See Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 1684
(dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black). Fn2. U.S.Constitution, Amendment I. To be
sure, the injunction contained in the Connecticut statute coincides with the doctrine of
certain religious faiths. But if that were enough to invalidate a law under the provisions of

 Mr. Justice WHITE, concurring in the judgment. Griswald v. Connecticut In my view this
Connecticut law as applied to married couples deprives them of 'liberty' without due process of
law, as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore concur in the judgment of
the Court reversing these convictions under Connecticut's aiding and abetting statute. It would be
unduly repetitious, and belaboring the obvious, to expound on the impact of this statute on the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against arbitrary or capricious denials or on the
nature of this liberty. Suffice it to say that this is not the first time this Court has had
articulate that the liberty entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right
'to marry, establish a home and bring up children,' Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399,
43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed.2d 1042 and 'the liberty . . . to direct the upbringing and education of
children,' Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534- 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070,
and that these are among 'the basic civil rights of man.' Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655. These decisions affirm that there is a 'realm of
family life which the state cannot enter' without substantial justification. Prince v. Com. of
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645. Surely the right invoked in
this case, to be free of regulation of the intimacies of *503 the marriage relationship, 'come(s) to
this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.' Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95, 69 S.Ct. 448,
458, 93 L.Ed. 513 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute deals
rather substantially with this relationship. For it forbids all married persons the right to use
control devices, regardless of whether their use is dictated by considerations of family planning,
Trubek v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 633, 165 A.2d 158, health, or indeed even of life itself. Buxton v.
Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508. The anti-use statute, together with the general aiding and
abetting statute, prohibits doctors from affording advice to married persons on proper and
effective methods of birth control. Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d 582. And the clear
effect of these statutes, as enforced, is to deny disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those
without either adequate knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical
assistance and up-to-date information in respect to proper methods of birth control. State v.
Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856; State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479. In my view,
a statute with these effects bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220; Skinner
v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288. An
examination of the justification offered, however, cannot be avoided by saying that the
Connecticut anti-use statute invades a protected area of privacy and association or that it
demands the marriage relationship. The nature of the right invaded is pertinent, to be sure, for
statutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under *504 the cases of this Court, require
scrutiny,' Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, and 'must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.' Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231. 'Where there is a significant encroachment upon
personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling.' Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 417. See also
McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283. But such statutes, if reasonably
necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or
capricious in application, are not invalid under the Due Process Clause. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 85 S.Ct. 1271.* * Dissenting opinions assert that the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process

Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring in the judgment. Griswald v. Connecticut I fully agree
with the judgment of reversal, but find myself unable to join the Court's opinion. The
reason is that it seems to me to evince an approach to this case very much like that taken
by my Brothers BLACK and STEWART in dissent, namely: the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment
is found to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
*500 In other words, what I find implicit in the Court's opinion is that the 'incorporation'
doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me
this is just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the 'incorporation'
approach to impose upon the States all the requirements of the Bill of Rights as found in
the provisions of the first eight amendments and in the decisions of this Court interpreting
them. See, e.g., my concurring opinions in Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408,
85 S.Ct. 1065, 1070, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85
S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, and my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 522, at pp. 539-545, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1774, 1778. In my view, the proper
constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288. For reasons stated at length in my dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, supra, I believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be
aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent
on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom. A further observation seems in order respecting
the justification of my Brothers BLACK and STEWART for their 'incorporation'
approach to this case. Their approach does not rest on historical reasons, which are of
course wholly lacking (see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan.L.Rev. 5 (1949)), but on the thesis
that by limiting the content of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the protection of rights which can be found elsewhere in the Constitution, in this instance
in the Bill of Rights, judges will thus be confined to 'interpretation' of specific
constitutional *501 provisions, and will thereby be restrained from introducing their own
notions of constitutional right and wrong into the 'vague contours of the Due Process
Clause.' Rochin v. People of State of California, 342 U.S. 165, 170, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208, 96
L.Ed. 183. While I could not more heartily agree that judicial 'self restraint' is an
indispensable ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the
formula suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real. 'Specific' provisions of the
Constitution, no less than 'due process,' lend themselves as readily to 'personal'
interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution
in supposed 'tune with the times' (post, p. 1702). Need one go further than to recall last
Term's reapportionment cases, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11
L.Ed.2d 481, and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, where
a majority of the Court 'interpreted' 'by the People' (Art. I, s 2) and 'equal protection'
(Amdt. 14) to command 'one person, one vote,' an interpretation that was made in the
face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the contrary? See my dissenting
opinions in those cases, 376 U.S., at 20, 84 S.Ct. at 536; 377 U.S., at 589, 84 S.Ct. at
1395. Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the 'due process' area

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). * * *
GRISWOLD et al. v. CONNECTICUT * * * APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF CRIMINAL ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT No. 496 Supreme Court of the United
States Argued March 29, 1965. Decided June 7, 1965. Griswald v. Connecticut Court
Cases Index <../court_cases.asp> Court's Opinion, Justice Douglas
 Justice White's concurring opinion  Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion  Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion
 Justice Black's dissenting opinion  Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion  Joseph B. Clark, New Haven, Conn., for appellee. *480
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant Griswold is
Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Appellant Buxton
is a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who served as Medical
Director for the League at its Center in New Haven--a center open and operating from
November 1 to November 10, 1961, when appellants were arrested. They gave
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of
preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive
device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were
serviced free. The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this appeal are ss 53-32
and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides: 'Any
person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.' Section 54-196 provides: 'Any
person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any
offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.' The
appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each, against the claim that
the accessory statute as so applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate
Division of the Circuit Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Errors affirmed that
judgment. 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479. We noted probable jurisdiction. 379 U.S. 926,
85 S.Ct. 328, 13 L.Ed.2d 339. *481 We think that appellants have standing to raise the
constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional
relationship. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 63 S.Ct. 493, 87 L.Ed. 603, is different, for
there the plaintiff seeking to represent others asked for a declaratory judgment. In that
situation we thought that the requirements of standing should be strict, lest the standards
of 'case or controversy' in Article III of the Constitution become blurred. Here those
doubts are removed by reason of a criminal conviction for serving married couples in
violation of an aiding-and-abetting statute. Certainly the accessory should have standing
to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot
constitutionally be a crime. This case is more akin to Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36
S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, where an employee was permitted to assert the rights of his
employer; to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070,
where the owners of private schools were entitled to assert the rights of potential pupils
and their parents; and to Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586,
where a white defendant, party to a racially restrictive covenant, who was being sued for
damages by the covenantors because she had conveyed her property to Negroes, was
allowed to raise the issue that enforcement of the covenant violated the rights of
prospective Negro purchasers to equal protection, although no Negro was a party to the

ESTELLE T

ESTELLE T. GRISWOLD and

C. LEE BUXTON, Appellant

-v.-

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Appellee.

No. 496

Washington, D.C.

Monday, March 29, 1965

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument

 

BEFORE:

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice of the United States

HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice

TOM C. CLARK, Associate Justice

JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice

POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice

BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

THOMAS I. EMERSON, ESQ., 127 Wail Street, New Haven, Connecticut, on behalf
of Appellants.