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1
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DECISION AND ORDER
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COMMISSION COMPLAINT CONSERVATION THEREAFTER CONSENT AGREEMENT GUIDELINE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT PRACTICE JURISDICTION PUBLICATIONS COMMENTARIES CONSERVATION PROFESSIONALS REGULATING PARAGRAPH POLICY STATEMENT CONNECTION AIC WEBSITE AIC NEWS AMERICAN INSTITUTE VIOLATIONS JURISDICTIONAL FACTS PROVISION SUCCESSOR PURPOSES LAW MATTER REASON PROCEEDING |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
COMMISSIONERS:
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman
Sheila F. Anthony
Mozelle W. Thompson
Orson Swindle
Thomas B. Leary
____________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR ) Docket No. C-
CONSERVATION OF HISTORIC )
AND ARTISTIC WORKS, )
)
a corporation. )
____________________________________)
DECISION AND ORDER
The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") having initiated an investigation of certain
and practices of the American Institute for Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works ("AIC"),
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Respondent," and Respondent having been furnished thereafter
with a copy of the draft of Complaint that the Bureau of Competition presented to the Commission for
its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge Respondent with violations of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45; and
Respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an
Agreement Containing Consent Order ("Consent Agreement"), containing an admission by Respondent
of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of Complaint, a statement that the
the Consent Agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by
Respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such Complaint, or that the facts as
such Complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as
by the Commission's Rules; and
1
The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had
reason to believe that Respondent has violated the said Act, and that a Complaint should issue
its charges in that respect, and having accepted the executed Consent Agreement and placed such
Consent Agreement on the public record for a period of thirty (30) days for the receipt and
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2
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MOV PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
ORDINANCE FOREST PARK DEFENDANTS CITY COURT EQUAL TERMS DISTRICT SUMMARY JUDGMENT RIGHTS LAW DISCRIMINATES FACTS PROVISION RELIGIOUS ASSEMBLIES TREATMENT REFUGE TEMPLE REFUGE TEMPLE MINISTRIES PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEFENDANTS VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS FREE SPEECH UNDISPUTED FACTS EQUAL PROTECTION GOVERNMENT PRIVATE CLUBS CLASSIFICATION CONSTITUTION REASONABLE TREATMENT VIOLATING PLAINTIFFS FREE EXERCISE |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
REFUGE TEMPLE MINISTRIES OF
ATLANTA, and PASTOR HARRY SIMON,
Plaintiffs,
Civ. No. 1:01-cv-0958 (MHS)
v.
Judge Marvin H. Shoob
THE CITY OF FOREST PARK, GEORGIA,
et al., Oral Argument Requested
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
H. Eric Hilton, Esq. (GA Bar #355417)
3593 Hemphill Street
Atlanta, GA 30337
Telephone: (404) 766-0076
Facsimile: (404) 766-8823
Roman P. Storzer, Esq.
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Esq.
Derek L. Gaubatz, Esq.
THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
1350 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 605
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3
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AMENDED COMPLAINT
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
CHURCH RELIGIOU RADIO STUDIO ENFIELD GREEN MOUNTAIN EDUCATION RADIO STATION HAMPSHIRE PASTOR ZONING HURCH PLAINTIFFS TOW MURRAY VARIANCE WESCOTT ROAD MOUNTAIN EDUCATIONAL FELLOWSHIP DISTRICT PROPOSED RADIO STATION ORDINANCE ADJUSTMENT RELIGIOUS LAND DEFENDANT UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BROADCAST ACCESSORY HEREINAFTER WESTCOTT ROAD UNITED STATES |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
-----------------------------------------------------------
:
Living Wa ters Bible Church,Pa stor Elmer :
Murray , the Green Moun tain Educ ational :
Fellow ship, Inc . and Pa stor W illiam A . :
Wittick, :
:
Plaintiffs , :
v. : Case No.: 01 CV-00450-M
:
Tow n of En field, :
Defen dant. :
-----------------------------------------------------------
AMENDED COMPLAINT
NOW C OME Living Waters Bible Church of 48 Wescott Road, Enfield, New
Hampshire 03748 (hereinafter "the Church"); Pastor Elmer Murray of 48 Westcott Road,
Enfield, New Hampshire 03748; Green Mountain Educational Fellowship, Inc. of P.O.
Box 126, Hartford, Vermont 05047 (hereinafter "Green Mountain") and Pastor William
A. Wittick of 7 Christia n Street, Ha rtford, Verm ont 0504 7, by and th rough co unsel,
Clauson & Atwood and The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, and for their Complaint
against the Municipality of Enfield, a municipal corporation having a principal place of
business at Whitney Hall, 24 Main Street, P.O. Box 373, in the Municipality of Enfield,
County of G rafton, State of New H ampshire (hereinafter "M unicipality" or "Tow n"),
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4
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AGREEMENT CONTAINING CONSENT
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
TRACTOR TRAILER TRAINING TRAILER TRAINING SCHOOL FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENGLAND TRACTOR TRAILER COMPLAINT REPRESENTATION CORPORATIONS PROPOSED RESPONDENTS MASSACHUSETTS MARK GREENBERG AGREEMENT CONNECTICUT DISCLOSURE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAMS PLACEMENT RATES DRAFT COMPLAINT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT TIME PERIOD UNITED STATES CONSENT ORDER GRADUATES PRACTICES DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICERS EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER ADMISSIONS PROMOTION SUCCESSORS |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
In the Matter of
NEW ENGLAND TRACTOR TRAILER TRAINING SCHOOL OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC.,
and
NEW ENGLAND TRACTOR TRAILER TRAINING SCHOOL OF CONNECTICUT, INC.,
corporations, and
MARK GREENBERG, individually and as an officer and director of the
corporations.
FILE NO. 9823040
AGREEMENT CONTAINING CONSENT ORDER
The Federal Trade Commission has conducted an investigation of certain
acts and practices of New England Tractor Trailer Training School of
Massachusetts, Inc., and New England Tractor Trailer Training School
of Connecticut, Inc., corporations, and Mark Greenberg, individually
and as an officer and director of the corporations ("proposed
respondents"). Proposed respondents, having been represented by
counsel, are willing to enter into an agreement containing a consent
order resolving the allegations contained in the attached draft
complaint. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between New England Tractor Trailer
Training School of Massachusetts, Inc., and New England Tractor
Trailer Training School of Connecticut, Inc., by their duly authorized
officers, and Mark Greenberg, individually and as an officer and
director of the corporations, and counsel for the Federal Trade
Commission that:
1.a. Proposed respondent New England Tractor Trailer Training School
of Massachusetts, Inc., is a Massachusetts corporation with its
headquarters located at 1050 Hancock Street, Quincey, Massachusetts.
1.b. Proposed respondent New England Tractor Trailer Training School
of Connecticut, Inc., is a Connecticut corporation with its
headquarters located at 32 Field Road, Somers, Connecticut 06071.
1.c. Proposed respondent Mark Greenberg is an officer and director of
the corporate respondents. Individually or in concert with others, he
formulates, directs, or controls the policies, acts, or practices of
the corporations. His principal office or place of business is the
same as that of New England Tractor Trailer Training School of
Massachusetts, Inc.
2. Proposed respondents admit all the jurisdictional facts set forth
in the draft complaint.
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5
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SOUTERCONCURRING
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
SMITH LAW FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE COURT GOVERNMENT PROHIBITION PRINCIPLE CONCURRING JUSTICE NEUTRALITY PRACTICE EMPLOYMENT SUPRA OPINION CONSTITUTIONALITY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTAL ACTION SOUTER EMPLOYMENT DIV APPLICABLE LAWS FORMAL NEUTRALITY STRICT SCRUTINY EXERCISE CLAUSE BARS ENFORCEMENT FIRST AMENDMENT UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS REGULATIONS LAWS VIOLATE HUMAN RESOURCES |
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. This case turns on a principle about which there is no disagreement, that the Free Exercise Clause bars government action aimed at suppressing religious belief or practice. The Court holds that Hialeah's animal sacrifice laws violate that principle, and I concur in that holding without reservation. Because prohibiting religious exercise is the object of the laws at hand, this case does not present the more difficult issue addressed in our last free exercise case, Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which announced the rule that a "neutral, generally applicable" law does not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause even when it prohibits religious exercise in effect. The Court today refers to that rule in dicta, and, despite my general agreement with the Court's opinion, I do not join Part II, where the dicta appear, for I have doubts about whether the Smith rule merits adherence. I write separately to explain why the Smith rule is not germane to this case, and to express my view that, in a case presenting the issue, the Court should reexamine the rule Smith declared. I According to Smith, if prohibiting the exercise of religion results from enforcing a "neutral, generally applicable" law, the Free Exercise Clause has not been offended. Id., at 878-880. I call this the Smith rule to distinguish it from the noncontroversial principle, also expressed in Smith, though [508 U.S. 520, 560] established long before, that the Free Exercise Clause is offended when prohibiting religious exercise results from a law that is not neutral or generally applicable. It is this noncontroversial principle, that the Free Exercise Clause requires neutrality and general applicability, that is at issue here. But before turning to the relationship of Smith to this case, it will help to get the terms in order, for the significance of the Smith rule is not only in its statement that the Free Exercise Clause requires no more than "neutrality" and "general applicability," but also in its adoption of a particular, narrow conception of free exercise neutrality. That the Free Exercise Clause contains a "requirement for governmental neutrality," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972), is hardly a novel proposition; though the term does not appear in the First Amendment, our cases have used it as shorthand to describe, at least inSNIPPETS: |
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6
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RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS-7
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
JUDGEMENT DEFENDANTS TRANSFER STATION PERMIT COMPETITION DIVEST YORK COMMERCIAL WASTE ERIE BASIN BROOKLYN YORK CITY NEKBOH FACILITY PRIVATE COMMERCIAL WASTE UNITED STATES MCGETTRICK RED HOOK OHIO WASTE MANAGEMENT ENTRY COMPLAINT TRANSACTION BRONX ERIE BASIN MARINE RETENTION NULLIFY ORDERED DIVESTITURES DEFENDANTS OUGHT WITHDRAW |
City Center Building
1401 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
September 13, 1999
Mr. John McGettrick
Co-Chairman
The Red Hook Civic Association
178 Coffey Street
Brooklyn, New York 11231
Re: Comment on Proposed Final Judgment in United States, State of Ohio, et al. v. USA
Waste Services, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., et al., Civil No. 98-1616 (N.D. Ohio,
filed July 16, 1998)
Dear Mr. McGettrick:
Thank you for your letter commenting on the Final Judgment submitted for entry in the above
case. The Complaint in this case charged, among other things, that USA Waste's acquisition of
Waste Management would substantially lessen competition in the disposal of New York City's
commercial waste. The proposed Judgment would settle the competitive concerns with respect to
the New York City market by, inter alia, requiring the defendants to divest: (a) the USA Waste's
SPM Transfer Station; (b) USA Waste's All City Transfer Station; and (c) the pending application by
USA Waste for a permit to construct and operate the Nekboh Transfer Station, also in Brooklyn, NY.
See Judgment, §§ II (C)(2) (i)(1)-(3) and IV(A). To ensure the defendants' continued cooperation
with the purchaser in its efforts to get the Nekboh site permitted, the proposed Judgment further
provides that if the Nekboh Transfer Station does not receive an operating permit within one year
after entry of the Judgment, the defendants must divest the Scott Avenue Transfer Station, also in
Brooklyn, NY. See Judgment, §§ II (C)(2)(i)(4) and IV(B).
In a transaction approved by the United States in August 1998, under the terms of the
proposed Judgment, the defendants divested All City Waste Transfer Station and their application for
a permit for the proposed Nekboh site to Republic Services, Inc., which previously did not operate
any waste disposal sites in the New York City area.
You have pointed out that although the proposed Final Judgment orders the defendants to
divest a number of waste transfer stations in Brooklyn and in the Bronx, the Judgment does not order
them to divest their interest in the proposed Erie Basin Marine Transfer Terminal, a large waste
disposal facility that USA Waste had proposed permitting and constructing in the Red Hook section
of Brooklyn, NY. You asked whether the defendants' retention of this disposal facility might
the effects of the ordered divestitures, and whether the defendants ought to be forced to withdraw
their proposal to permit and construct the Erie Basin facility.
As noted above, the Complaint alleged that defendants' transaction would substantially
reduce competition in the disposal of the city's commercial waste. The proposed Erie Basin site,
however, was designed primarily for handling the city's residential waste, not its private
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7
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RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS-10
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
WASTE DIVESTITURE NEKBOH YORK DEFENDANTS PERMIT JUDGEMENT SCOTT AVENUE UNITED STATES NEKBOH SITE DECREE BROOKLYN WASTE MANAGEMENT CONTINGENT DIVESTITURE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ACQUISITION COMPETITION FACILITY OHIO EASTERN ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES WASTE/EASTERN MODIFY ASSEMBLYMAN COMMERCIAL WASTE SETTLE CITY CONSTRUCTION CONSENT DECREE IMMEDIATE DIVESTITURE |
City Center Building
1401 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530
September 13, 1999
The Honorable Joseph R. Lenthol
Assemblyman 50 District
th
Kings County, New York
State of New York Assembly
619 Lorimer Street
Brooklyn, NY 11211
Re: Comment on Proposed Final Judgment in United States, State of Ohio et al. v. USA
Waste Services, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., et al., Civil No. 98-1616 (N.D. Ohio,
filed July 16, 1998)
Dear Assemblyman Lenthol:
This letter responds to your written comment on the proposed Final Judgment in United
States v. USA Waste Services, Inc., now pending in federal district court in Cleveland, Ohio. The
Complaint in that case charged, among other things, that USA Waste's acquisition of Waste
Management would substantially lessen competition in the disposal of New York City's commercial
waste. The proposed Final Judgment would settle the case by, inter alia, requiring the defendants
divest (a) the Waste Management's SPM Transfer Station in the Bronx, NY; (b) USA Waste's All
City Waste Transfer Station in Brooklyn, NY; and (c) USA Waste's proposed Nekboh transfer
Station in Brooklyn, NY. See Judgment, §§ II (C)(2) (i)(1)-(3), IV(A). To ensure USA Waste's
continued cooperation with the purchaser in its efforts to permit and construct a transfer station
the Nekboh site, the proposed Judgment further provides that, if the Nekboh Transfer Station is not
permitted within one year after entry of the decree, USA Waste must, in addition, divest Waste
Management's Scott Avenue Transfer Station, also in Brooklyn, NY. Judgment, §§ II (C)(2)(i)(4)
and IV(B).
Your letter raises two issues related to the divestiture of the Nekboh and Scott Avenue
transfer stations. First, you point out that the proposed Nekboh facility, though much larger than
Scott Avenue station, is still in the permitting stage and may never obtain a permit to open and
operate. For that reason, you urged that we amend the consent decree to require an immediate
divestiture of the already-permitted Scott Avenue transfer station. Second, you note that in any
event, the proposed Nekboh facility would be adjacent to the Eastern District Terminal, "a beautiful
20 acre parcel of waterfront property" recently placed on an open-spaces list. You suggested that
public interest would be better served if the decree contained a prohibition on the use of the
site as a waste transfer station.
A. The Contingent Divestiture of the Scott Avenue Transfer Station
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8
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TRIAL VOL4
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
BURNETT COURT DEPOSITION SIR LONDON OBJECTIONS LIFE RULING ADVOCATES PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT COALITION OKAY ANDREW BURNETT MAGAZINE ABORTION JUDGEMENT FERRARA PHOTOGRAPH MEMBERS LAWSUIT CLINICS ACLA OPINION SHELLEY SHANNON PRETRIAL RULINGS TESTIMONY WITNESS FORMATION |
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
3 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE )
COLUMBIA/WILLAMETTE, INC., et al. )
4 )
Plaintiffs, ) CV 95-1671 JO
5 )
vs. ) January 12, 1999
6 )
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ) Portland, Oregon
7 ACTIVISTS, et al. ))
8 Defendants. ) Volume IV
9
10 TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. JONES
12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, AND A JURY
13 APPEARANCES
14
15
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: CAROL BERNICK
16 Davis Wright Tremaine
1300 S.W. Fifth Ave., Suite 2300
17 Portland, Or 97201
503 778-5233
18
MARIA T. VULLO
19 MARTIN LONDON
ELIZABETH MARINGER
20 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, etc.
1285 Avenue of the Americas
21 New York, NY 10019-6064
212 373-3346
22
ROGER K. EVANS
23 Planned Parenthood Federation of America
810 7th Ave.
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9
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MEMO IN OPPOSITION OF US TO MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
BCBSO MFN CLAUSES APPEALS HARM UNITED STATES CIR MOTION CID VIOLATE SHERMAN ACT IRREPARABLE HARM ANTITRUST BLUE CROSS LIKELIHOOD GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST LAWS REASON PETITION BLUE SHIELD ENFORCEMENT OHIO LEGITIMATE ANTITRUST DIVISION MEMORANDUM MERITS SUBSTANTIALITY CONSUMER PRICES INJURY |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD )
OF
OHIO,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v. )
) Civil Action No. 1:94 CV 2297
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and )
ANNE K. BINGAMAN, Assistant ) Hon. Ann Aldrich
Attorney General, U.S. Department )
of Justice, Antitrust Division, )
)
Respondents
and
)
Cross
Petitioners.
)
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF OHIO'S MOTION
FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
The United States opposes Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio's ("BCBSO") motion for a
stay pending appeal of this Court's June 24, 1996, Order directing BCBSO to comply with Civil
Investigative Demand ("CID") No. 11466. It does so on the grounds that: (1) there is no
likelihood that the Court of Appeals will reverse the finding of the District Court that CID No.
11466 is "reasonably related to a legitimate government investigation"; (2) BCBSO will not be
irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay pending appeal; and (3) the public interest in free and
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10
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INDICTMENT
|
EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
LUBBOCK BUSINESS INDICTMENT WHOLESALE PLUMBING SUPPLIES PLUMBING SUPPLIES DEFENDANTS CHARGES CO-CONSPIRATORS PRICES SALE ACT DISTRIBUTION CONSPIRACY PLUMBING SUPPLIES SOLD MEETINGS TRANSACTION MINIMUM PRICES NORTHERN DISTRICT GRAND JURY OFFENSE RESTRAIN INTERSTATE TRADE COMMERCE VIOLATION LAWS CLOWE COWAN DIRECTORS CARRYING |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK
DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Criminal No.: 5-95-CR-74-C
)
v )
) Filed: [9/28/95]
OBERKAMPF SUPPLY OF LUBBOCK, INC.; )
CYRIL REASONER; and )
CLOWE & COWAN, INC., ) Violation:
) 15 U.S.C. § 1
Defendants. )
INDICTMENT
The Grand Jury Charges:
I.
OFFENSE
CHARGED
1. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc., Cyril Reasoner, and Clowe & Cowan, Inc., are
hereby indicted and made defendants on the charge stated below.
2. Beginning at least as early as July 1990 and continuing thereafter until at least
October 1990, the exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury, the above-named defendants and
others entered into and engaged in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and restrain
competition by fixing prices for the sale of certain wholesale plumbing supplies in unreasonable
restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. § 1).
II.
DEFENDANTS AND CO-CONSPIRATORS
3. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc., is incorporated and exists under the laws of the
State of Texas and has its principal place of business in Lubbock, Texas. During the period
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