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1
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SYLLABUS
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
NBSP BRANDENBURG OHIO STATUTE CRIME ASSEMBLAGE MERE ADVOCACY INCITEMENT IMMINENT LAWLESS ACTION PUNISH FORBID VIOLENCE UNLAWFUL METHODS TERRORISM SOCIETY DOCTRINES INDICTMENT PURPORTS PAIN CONDEMNATION AMENDMENTS FREEDOMS SPEECH PERMIT LAW VIOLATION INCITING PRODUCING IMMINENT LAWLESS WHITNEY CALIFORNIA |
Brandenburg v Brandenburg v. Ohio No. 492 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 395 U.S. 444 Argued February 27, 1969 Decided June 9, 1969 Syllabus Appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Neither the indictment nor the trial judge's instructions refined the statute's definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action. Held: Since the statute, by its words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action, it falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, overruled. Reversed.SNIPPETS: |
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2
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OPINION
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
OHIO CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM ADVOCACY COURT UNITED STATES APPELLANT STATUTE VIOLENCE CONSTITUTIONALITY KLAN ORGANIZERS SPEECH ACT MEMBERS LAWS WHITNEY CALIFORNIA MERE ADVOCACY PUNISHES SUPREME COURT NECESSITY PROPRIETY DOCTRINES AMENDMENTS HOODED FIGURES STATION REPORTER MEETING SCENE |
Brandenburg v Brandenburg v. Ohio No. 492 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 395 U.S. 444 Argued February 27, 1969 Decided June 9, 1969 PER CURIAM. The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety [445] of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 2923.13. He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to 10 years' imprisonment. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction without opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal sua sponte "for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein." It did not file an opinion or explain its conclusions. Appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 393 U.S. 94 (196). We reverse. The record shows that a man, identified at trial as the appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan "rally" to be held at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events. Portions of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a national network. The prosecution's case rested on the films and on testimony identifying the appellant as the person who communicated with the reporter and who spoke at the rally. The State also introduced into evidence several articles appearing in the film, including a pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, ammunition, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the speaker in the films.SNIPPETS: |
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3
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CONCURRING
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
COURT JUSTICE FIRST AMENDMENT WAR CONVICTION ADVOCACY OPINION DENNIS CONCURRING JUSTICE HOLMES PROSECUTION DISSENT SPEECH BRANDEIS CHARGE ACT DOUGLAS DOCTRINE SUSTAIN GOVERNMENT CONSTITUTIONALITY OHIO CONGRESS SCHENCK DRAFT CARD INCITEMENT COMMUNITY INDICTMENT PROTEST |
Brandenburg v Brandenburg v. Ohio No. 492 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 395 U.S. 444 Argued February 27, 1969 Decided June 9, 1969 MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring. I agree with the views expressed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in his concurring opinion in this case that the "clear and present danger" doctrine should have no place [450] in the interpretation of the First Amendment. I join the Court's opinion, which, as I understand it, simply cites Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), but does not indicate any agreement on the Court's part with the "clear and present danger" doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. While I join the opinion of the Court, I desire to enter a caveat. The "clear and present danger" test was adumbrated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a case arising during World War I--a war "declared" by the Congress, not by the Chief Executive. The case was Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, where the defendant was charged with attempts to cause insubordination in the military and obstruction of enlistment. The pamphlets that were distributed urged resistance to the draft, denounced conscription, and impugned the motives of those backing the war effort. The First Amendment was tendered as a defense. Mr. Justice Holmes, in rejecting that defense, said: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, also authored by Mr. Justice Holmes, involved prosecution and punishment for publication of articles very critical of the war effort in World War I. Schenck was referred to as aSNIPPETS: |
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