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SEC LITIGATION RELEASE
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EXTRACTED KEY WORDS
SHULL STOCK LEONARD FIESSEL ROBERT SHULL SECURITIES FRAUD COLLINS COMMISSION PATRICK INDICTMENT UNITED STATES TERRY SHULL CANADIAN DEFENDANTS STOCKBROKERS BOSTON CONSPIRACY COMMIT SECURITIES FRAUD PARTICIPATING SCHEME MANIPULATE MARKET PAY DISGORGEMENT PURCHASE CONTROLLING PRICE SHARES SELLING SALES |
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 15770 / June 5, 1998
UNITED STATES of AMERICA v. LEONARD E. FIESSEL, ROBERT L. SHULL, TERRY
L.
SHULL and PATRICK A. COLLINS, Cr. No. 98-10112-MLW (D. MA)
The Commission and the United States Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts announced that on June 3, 1998, Patrick A. Collins, a
Boston
area stock promoter, pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud
and
one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud for participating in
a
scheme to manipulate the market for Fairmont Resources, Inc. ( Fairmont
),
a Canadian oil and gas company. Collins, together with the majority
shareholders of Fairmont, Robert Shull, Terry Shull and Leonard
Fiessel,
all of British Columbia, Canada, was indicted on April 8, 1998 in a 45
count indictment which charged the defendants with securities fraud,
conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud. Previously, the
Commission had obtained permanent injunctions and orders to pay
disgorgement against Patrick Collins, Leonard Fiessel, Robert Shull,
and
five others for their participation in the scheme.
The indictment alleged that after Leonard Fiessel and Robert Shull
purchased a controlling interest in Fairmont, the defendants caused
the
price of the stock to increase from $.30 (Canadian) to $3.10 (Canadian)
per
share between January and June 1993 by (1) paying kickbacks totaling
$540,000 to stockbrokers in the U.S. for inducing their customers to
purchase more than one million shares of Fairmont stock, (2) creating
the
false appearance of an active market in Fairmont stock by buying and
selling large quantities of the stock, including wash sales and
cross
trades, and (3) controlling the timing and pricing of certain
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